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ABSTRACT
In this study, I look at the mutually reflective changes in society and 
autobiography in works definitive for their various periods: Augustine's The 
Confessions from antiquity; Rousseau's The Confessions from the eighteenth century; 
the autobiographical writings o f Gertrude Stein, from the modernist period; and, most 
importantly here, the focus on the development o f  David Antin's work as representative 
o f both postmodernism and current culture. Specifically, I consider the construction o f  
the self in respect to art, literary theory, memory research, and science and technology.
During the second half o f the twentieth century, computers have permeated 
almost every facet o f society. Transmission o f information in a high-speed, electronic 
society is represented as fragments and collage, and Antin's early disjointed 
autobiographies reflect this. His work, however, does not merely extend or expand 
upon traditional autobiographical methods; it turns sharply and breaks from long-held 
cultural notions o f how nature and the self function as illustrated in autobiography, 
rejecting all previous beliefs o f order and where the se lf may be located. As he ages, his 
work moves toward a radical type o f order or unity, reflecting the current technology 
and the ongoing cultural desire for order. This desire is reinforced by the growing 
interest in neural networks, quantum physics, and chaos theory, all o f which promote 
the premise that underlying patterns or recursions exist throughout various levels o f a 
highly interconnected system. By finding the recursion, we allow the order o f  the 
system to emerge. However, because patterns may not be immediately observable when 
a system is in a particular stage o f change or scale o f measurement, a system often is
viii
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mistakenly considered random or without order. Essential to finding the pattern or 
order o f the system is increasing the scale used to measure the system until period 
doubling, repetition, or a strange attractor is established. Similarly, Antin believes that 
no definitive view o f the self can be constructed in a limited, single text called an 
autobiography. Instead, numerous works spanning a vast time period are necessary to 
allow patterns that create sense and coherency to emerge, thus defining the self.
IX
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
"i like the fringe...it seemed to be the place where everything meaningful happened" 
(David Antin 1993, 6)
The classic autobiographies o f  any given age reveal much to us about the culture 
in which they are written. In particular, they reflect the definitive theories o f recalling 
and practices o f presenting memory for a specific age. In revealing the cultures from 
which they come, these autobiographies can be examined to determine how literary 
theory, memory research, and science and technology simultaneously affect one another 
and are mutually reflective o f the construction o f  the self in that society. Although this 
interaction is most immediately prominent in postmodern works, it is not unique to 
current culture but, rather, is part o f a continuing pattern that is observable in the 
autobiographical texts o f  writers who define their periods. Additionally, as 
autobiography has developed from historical to contemporary times, the representation 
o f the self has shifted, in response to culture, from a cohesive being, as in St.
Augustine's work, to a random assortment o f fragments in postmodern autobiographies, 
to a nebulous externally constructed web in current texts.
Autobiography has been well discussed in terms o f both memory and the self 
and occasionally in terms o f the interaction o f literary theory, memory research, and 
culture (some notable scholars o f  this area include Eakin 1985, 1992; G usdorf 1956; 
Spengemann and Lundquist 1965; and Weintraub 1975, 1978). In addition to 
discussing how these various disciplines interact, scholars for the most part address how 
culture forges the individual. However, they barely, if  at all, touch upon the way
1
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autobiography may be used to examine a culture—its theories o f literature and memory 
as well as scientific technologies that in part define that culture. As autobiography has 
evolved since the first major work, St. Augustine's The Confessions, culture, o f course, 
has also changed. Society has become markedly diversified, fast paced, and disjointed. 
The institution o f the Church, which was the dominant force in Augustine's time, has— 
like other social institutions-been splintered, increasing the challenge for 
autobiographers searching for a way by which to show the subject in relation to 
numerous institutions-or none. As writers have striven to define the self as it is 
affected by society, the study o f  autobiography has provided a way for scholars to study 
past cultures in contrast to current society.
In this study, 1 look at the mutually reflective changes in society and 
autobiography in works definitive for their various periods: Augustine's The 
Confessions from antiquity; Rousseau's The Confessions from the eighteenth century; 
the autobiographical writings o f  Gertrude Stein from the modernist period; and, most 
importantly here, the focus on the development o f David Antin's work as representative 
o f both postmodernism and current culture. By looking at Augustine's autobiography, 
we see how his culture defined itself completely in relation to religion. In Rousseau's 
time, religion still occupied a role in society; however, culture was becoming more 
secular. As a result, Rousseau and those in his culture considered how their actions 
affected both their relationship with other members o f  society and their relationship 
with God. In the modernist period, the number o f sources to which people were 
accountable continued to increase as society became more diversified and complex due
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to global changes ranging from the Industrial Revolution to World War I. By 
examining the autobiographical writings o f Stein, we can see how changes in society 
affected the individual, who, like society, was perceived as more diversified and 
complex. In contrast to preceding periods, David Antin's autobiographical work shows 
sharp turns and abrupt breaks in long-held cultural notions o f how nature and the self 
function. His work begins as representative o f  postmodern thought but develops to 
represent contemporary ideas that break and question all previous beliefs o f order and 
where the self may be located. When looking at his early work, readers see a collage o f 
unrelated fragments presented in various unidentified voices. Antin's work indicates 
that the num ber and identity o f elements to which individuals bear a relationship during 
the postmodern period are multiple and undefined—a significant change from the single, 
well-established concept o f  the individual in relation to God during Augustine's time. 
However, Antin's work evolves to emphasize the relation between interconnected 
elements that affect and compose the self, which he sees as a retrospective construction 
that exists outside o f the human body.
In looking at the various phases o f Antin's writing, we can see his work as part 
o f a pattern in autobiography which began with Augustine, in which the culture o f a 
writer is manifest in the work. The scientific thought and accompanying technology 
prevalent in a given period affects how everything in society functions at that time, and 
in turn the technology shapes what and how people in that society remember. In 
Augustine's day, science and philosophy were synonymous; theories concerning the 
brain and memory were not the result o f  the invasive experimentation that defines
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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science today. In The Confessions, while Augustine recounts his life story, he also 
explores his thoughts on how he believes his mind is able to remember his past. During 
antiquity, an individual's life was considered to be a reflection o f  the larger providential 
story and was viewed linearly, having a start (birth) and finish (death). The ultimate 
goal for Augustine and those who share his culture was to be with God. Likewise, 
Augustine believes that his memory unfolds linearly, and he writes his text using the 
same linear, chronological structure to reflect both his memory and the assumptions o f 
his society.
Rousseau's autobiography, like Augustine's, unfolds in a linear, chronological 
style, reflecting the belief that linear progression is the correct order. In contrast to 
Augustine, though, this desire for linear order is not due to a belief in providence but to 
an understanding that because humans develop in time, so, too, should their life stories. 
Rousseau's text also differs from Augustine's in that it reads more like what is now 
considered to be a traditional novel. That his text resembles a novel is no accident; the 
novel was becoming a major literary form during the period in which he was writing 
The Confessions. His writing, like other ground breaking writers whose work 
characterizes their historical period, takes a shape (in this case, a new genre) that 
eventually became the popular form associated with his era. At this time, the invention 
o f the printing press made the production o f texts easier, allowing for new and longer 
forms o f writing to emerge, and allowed for greater distribution o f these texts to a more 
widespread readership.
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With more copies o f  his book available to more readers, Rousseau found himself 
compelled by the idea o f being understood by all o f  his possible readers—people that he 
considered to be as much his judges as God. In telling his life story, he shows that he, 
like Augustine, is accountable to God, but, more importantly for Rousseau, he is 
accountable to his community. Whereas Augustine's culture was largely a religious one, 
and so responsibility to God and community was the same, Rousseau's largely secular 
community splits the individual's responsibility between God and society. When 
Augustine's and Rousseau's texts are examined as reflective o f their culture, the shift 
from a largely religious to a largely secular society can be traced. In showing that he is 
accountable to more than God alone, Rousseau begins to develop an idea that 
subsequent writers also address—that the individual is shaped in part by an increasing 
number and variety o f  influences.
In the modernist period, Gertrude Stein continued in the vein o f  previous 
autobiographers by presenting the self as it is shaped by current culture. She, however, 
takes autobiography further as she delves into how the self is constructed through 
memory, not just how one remembers while writing an autobiography. Because the 
modernist period is characterized by, among many things, technology that made distant 
areas o f  the world more easily accessible, people at this time were influenced by a 
variety o f cultures and events. Technological advances also increased the speed at 
which information to and from these areas was communicated, which, in turn, affected 
the way in which people remembered that information. As technology advanced, the 
introduction o f automobiles and airplanes into society allowed people who were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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previously separated geographically to interact with one another more easily. World 
War I also brought together people from a variety o f  cultures. As diversity increased 
within geographic regions, a sense o f distinct community and personal history began to 
fade; people were now challenged to maintain some sense o f individuality as they 
assimilated into a global community.
As the individual became more multifaceted in response to the increasing 
number and variety o f influences, the self became more difficult than ever to represent 
as a complete, definitive being. Writers continued to address the limitations o f language 
as representative o f thought, but conceded that words were still the best mode o f 
communication available. Conventional writing styles could not adequately reflect the 
changing society or ways that thinking occurred, so writers again searched for styles 
that would better complement the representation o f a multifaceted individual in a 
society that was more globally united by technology. During the modernist period, 
avant-garde writers experimented with styles that mirrored thinking processes as 
understood by advances in science and technology and that took into account the 
multiple perspectives that comprise individuals.
One o f the most influential and experimental modernist writers concerned with 
language both as an end in itself and as an accurate representation o f  thought was 
Gertrude Stein. Her writing style, which is fluid and circular, reflects her thinking 
process and creates a sense o f  motion and immediacy, as i f  her ideas are unfolding for 
the first time on the paper before her. This style mimics the way both Stein's mind and 
the culture o f her time work. With World War I and the advent o f technologies leading
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to the automobile and airplane, the speed at which society functioned increased 
significantly, which is represented by the intricate time- and motion-conscious texts of 
avant-garde writers o f the period.
The days in which science and philosophy were synonymous had given way to 
two distinct fields, where science was now considered a discipline based on physical 
experimentation to support intellectual theories. Stein, who studied to be a doctor, 
writes in a circular style that parallels the scientific brain and memory theories o f her 
period. In the 1920s, scientists who were interested in learning about the brain placed 
electrodes on human scalps in an attempt to measure brain activity (Rose 1993). From 
these experiments, they concluded that the brain regularly underwent "rhythmic waves 
o f electrical activity" (Rose 1993, 78). The resulting metaphor o f the brain sending 
messages and searching for memories in waves, although still basically a linear model, 
complemented the stream-of-consciousness writing styles that were also gaining 
popularity in literature o f the period. Although the developments in these fields were 
similar, their relationship was not necessarily causal, but, probably, more a result o f 
general cultural undercurrents o f the time. As N. Katherine Hayles points out,
"Different disciplines are drawn to similar problems because the concerns underlying 
them are highly charged within a prevailing cultural context" (1990, xi). She describes 
the simultaneous influence o f  different fields, including literature, as a feedback loop 
that "connect[s] theory with culture and culture with theory through the medium o f 
technology. Literary texts and theories [are] also involved in this cycle, for they too 
[are] affected by technology at the same time that they [are] affecting it" (xiv). So
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while brain research and literature may not directly influence one another, the ideas 
arising in each do reflect and permeate the current society. Thus, disciplines eventually 
affect one another, even if  they do so unintentionally or unknowingly, making the study 
o f  one discipline helpful in revealing developments in the other.
What Augustine, Rousseau, and Stein show—how difficult it is to represent the 
se lf through language and how as the world becomes perceived as more complex, so 
does any attempt to present the self as a whole—David Antin continues in his 
postmodern autobiographies. Simply titled Autobiography and "Autobiography 2," 
Antin's texts provide a window through which to view how changes in society affect the 
self and how it is presented in autobiography. His work, however, is not merely an 
extension or expansion o f  traditional autobiography; it is a break from conventional 
ideas o f  what constitutes autobiography in reaction to what he saw as a totally new 
culture after modernism.
Reflecting the increasing complexity and interconnectedness o f society, Antin's 
work brings together numerous aspects—such as unidentified voices, clips from 
advertisements, and news items—that had never before been considered appropriate for 
an autobiography. His break from convention, paradoxically, continues in the 
traditional vein o f autobiography to a degree; like previous autobiographers who 
incorporated the various influences o f their cultures in their writing, Antin incorporates 
the major influences o f the time—in his case, rapid developments in science and 
technology and their effect on other fields o f study. It is just that these influences are 
the very causes for the break in how the self is viewed and, therefore, constructed in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
autobiography. For example, during Antin's period, scientific research on the brain 
affected developments in numerous other fields such as computer technology, and 
Antin's work comments upon the significance o f technology in his period, while his 
writing style reflects that technology.
During the second half o f the twentieth century, computers have impacted 
almost every facet o f  society, including brain research and writing. Advances in 
computers have led to the testing o f similar theories in brain research and have changed 
the way we receive and send information and, therefore, the way we write. Since 
computers were first introduced in the 1940s, they have increasingly been compared to 
the brain. From that time until the 1980s, computers transmitted information in a linear, 
sequential manner. Although this method was fast, backups in processing occurred 
because o f  fixed speed limits built into linear transmission (Rose, 1993). Information 
processing in computers needed to be improved, and communication between brain 
scientists, computer experts, and Artificial Intelligence researchers in the 1980s led to 
this improvement. Through interdisciplinary communication, researchers inspired by 
biological models determined that if  computers could be designed to process 
information in parallel, then the speed limitation associated with the available linear 
processing models could be eliminated. The scientific community's acceptance that 
nonlinearity is representative rather than exceptional (Hayles 1990), coupled with 
growing technology, coincides with a society in which methods o f transportation and 
communication have gained tremendous speed. To meet the needs of a faster-moving 
society, information must also be transmitted faster, producing a barrage o f stimuli that
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is represented in art as fragmentation and collage. The multiple perspectives and 
influences that have emerged have made common, or defining, social institutions 
practically extinct, leaving individuals on their own to search for some way to define 
themselves. Because there are now so many combinations o f  influences possible with 
which to identify, it has, in turn, become increasingly difficult for individuals to identify 
and communicate similar experiences with each other.
A contradiction seems to arise, however, when a greater focus on the self 
appears in postmodern thought alongside a theory that emphasizes a break from 
tradition, a calling into question o f human relations, especially the notion o f a cohesive, 
continuous self or o f  a subject as the central orchestrator o f  an artwork. This 
contradiction is even more significant in terms o f autobiography. Antin responds to the 
paradox o f postmodern autobiography by creating a text in which the self is hinted at in 
terms o f how it is defined by surrounding objects, a view similar to Michel Foucault's in 
which individuals do not compose culture; rather culture composes individuals 
(Foucault, 1970). In Antin's autobiography, the "I," "he," and "you" are unidentifiable 
and constantly changing; they are often clearly not Antin and are never absolutely 
Antin. This shifting o f  person and voice mirrors current culture, which is marked by an 
increase in speed and volume o f  information. Antin's voices reveal shards o f other 
people's stories, sometimes sensical and sometimes not, and force the reader to 
determine how these shards o f stories may have bearing on the autobiographer who is 
not clearly present in the text. His emphasis on fragmentation and his lack o f an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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obvious subject or center to his text reflect his belief that conventional writing styles do 
not accurately represent postmodern culture.
Furthermore, Antin's fragmented writing style, like fast video cuts, directly 
results from and reinforces the frenetic culture that acts on the brain, thus influencing 
how the brain adjusts to assimilate, remember, and present experiences. By eliminating 
a defined subject, Antin comments both on the perceived view o f  individuals in present 
society and on the inadequacy o f  traditional autobiography techniques in a postmodern 
world. The autobiographers who precede Antin acknowledge that, although traditional 
writing styles are inadequate, language remains our most prominent method o f 
communication. These predecessors, therefore, continually attempted to show who the 
self was by writing descriptions o f their own lives as seen from the outside, as well as 
by trying to articulate the internal experience. In contrast, Antin sees the attempt to 
present a self tlirough narrative descriptions and personal anecdotes as futile, so he 
breaks from all conventional autobiographical writing and abandons these methods 
altogether. Instead, he presents various quotes, phrases, and stories from many sources 
that are important in shaping his life.
Antin's early disjointed autobiographies that lack conventional textual transitions 
correlate with trends popular in the science and art o f  postmodern thought. Current 
work in brain and memory theory indicates that when particular neurons usually used in 
transmitting information are damaged, the brain will find other paths o f neurons to 
follow. Therefore, the need for particular neurons to make specific connections is in 
dispute; the brain can actually function without all o f  its connecting fibers and neurons.
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or can substitute neurons, altering the final output or message. Likewise, current video, 
photography, music, and performance art present images that seemingly are unrelated 
and that lack the unifying elements present in traditional narrative. Because the images 
are unrelated, any images can be substituted, and numerous interpretations are possible 
that the viewer must instantly decipher and assimilate for herself. In all o f these 
instances, the transitions that show the relationship between images or ideas either are 
missing or are interchangeable, creating the possibility for countless meanings and 
interpretations. Because everyone's schema is unique and constantly changing, the 
attempt to present one authorial meaning is not a realistic goal for the postmodern 
writer.
As Antin develops, his texts continue to address the issues o f his society, and in 
doing so, his writing style changes significantly. By the end o f what it means to be 
avant-garde (1993), Antin has gone from presenting fragments without any 
cohesiveness for the reader to showing how we ultimately can and must make some 
sense of the disjointedness in society. He takes seemingly unrelated fragments and 
finds a way to make some type o f sense or coherency out o f them. Ultimately, he 
moves toward a form of unity. Just as the modernist writers, Rousseau, and Augustine 
do.
Antin's move toward unity reflects the current technology and the ongoing 
cultural desire for unity, which is reinforced by the growing interest in neural networks, 
quantum physics, and chaos theory. Neural networks in computers, which were initially 
based on biological models, search for patterns within an existing system so that new
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information introduced into the system can be assimilated through identification with 
those patterns. Similarly, a major premise o f both contemporary chaos and quantum 
theory is that underlying patterns exist throughout various levels o f a highly 
interconnected system; the system changes shape as information within it shifts 
continually, allowing new forms o f order to emerge before collapsing back into the 
system. We see order in recursion, but this recursion often is not apparent when 
systems are in particular stages o f  change or at a scale where patterns are not 
immediately observable. For new forms o f  order or patterns to emerge, the scale used to 
measure or view the system often has to be increased. To visualize this, imagine 
looking at an object tlu-ough a zoom lens camera and then lengthening the lens so that 
the object is seen in context with its surroundings. Suddenly the object is defined by 
and seen in relation to everything around it. Antin's work follows this shift to a larger 
scale. In a break from the notion that the self can be constructed and presented 
definitively in a single text called an autobiography, he argues that showing the patterns, 
sense, and coherency that define the self reach well beyond the boundaries o f  a single 
text or genre to something broader and all encompassing, which is nothing short o f a 
life's worth o f work. Yet again on the fringe, tangled in paradox, Antin's ideas o f  what 
is necessary for the most comprehensive view o f  the self—a complete body o f  work— 
preclude the writing o f  one's own autobiography, calling into question a genre already 
surrounded by blurred boundaries at best.
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CHAPTER 2. THE FOUNDATION OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY WRITING: 
THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
Any meaningful study o f autobiography must consider the works o f St. 
Augustine and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These writers established the foundation upon 
which autobiographers continue to build and that critics continue to reference. Their 
texts, considered ground breaking in their time, introduce ideas about memory and 
representation o f the self in society and, in doing so, reveal the culture in which they 
were written. Their works serve as reference points when exploring autobiography in 
any period and allow us to see the changes through which the genre and culture have 
evolved to arrive at where we are in contemporary society.
Although separated by almost 1300 years, Augustine and Rousseau consider 
similar issues in their texts, issues that remain to be addressed by autobiographers who 
succeed them. Both o f these writers are interested in memory and its role in defining 
who they are, and both are concerned with their ability to communicate experience and 
meaning to others. Augustine and Rousseau detail these introspections in ways that can 
be seen to reflect the ideas, ways o f thinking and communicating, and the concept o f  the 
individual in their respective societies.
Representation of culture in St. Augustine's The Confessions 
St. Augustine's The Confessions, generally recognized as the first major 
autobiographical work, can be examined for many purposes. One such purpose may be 
to determine the role o f the self and the theories o f memory commonly accepted in 
Augustine's culture. Both the book's content and structure are representative o f his
14
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period; and through examining both, we can see the conceptions that defined life at that 
time. During latter antiquity, Christians had become the majority o f the population in 
Europe (Weintraub 1978, 20). Christianity dominated to the degree that, for the 
majority o f  the people, and especially for Augustine, the purpose o f life was viewed 
completely in relation to one social institution—the Church. An individual's life was 
considered to be a reflection or microcosm o f the larger providential story, and it 
progressed linearly, having a start (birth) and a finish (death). Karl Weintraub describes 
autobiography as late as 1681 as still being closely tied to religion and asserts that 
events in people's lives acquired meaning from their relation to eternal truths (1975,
844). People had to stay on the straight path to God or else be considered lost, as is 
made clear by Augustine's regard for anyone who deviated from Christianity. In The 
Confessions, the goal o f life is to reach God, and, according to Augustine, a way to 
reach God is through memory: "One may attain joy in one way, another in another way, 
but the end at which they are all aiming is one and the same, namely, a state of joy.
And joy  is something which no one can say he has no experience of; therefore, he finds 
it in his memory" (232). For Augustine, God and joy  are one and the same, and they are 
only recognizable, hence attainable, because o f  memory. Therefore, memory is integral 
to achieving the single, well-defined purpose o f life in his culture.
The Confessions reflects its creator and his society; and in doing so, it reflects 
the prominent role o f  the Church at that time. The title alone brings us into the church 
where we, the readers, are eavesdroppers listening to Augustine speak to God. Every 
page provides testimony o f the error o f Augustine's ways—whether it is stealing pears.
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being unchaste, or following the Manichees—until his conversion to Catholicism and a 
life with God. That God and the Church permeate every page o f  his book reinforces the 
role o f the Church in Augustine's period; the Church was the institution by which 
society defined itself and individuals gauged their worth. Correspondingly, the 
Christian subject matter o f  art and literature o f the period illustrates the strong influence 
that the Church maintained in society at the time.
Narrative structure of Augustine's The Confessions: rhetoric and chronology as 
supports of Christianity during antiquity
Both the extension o f the confession box metaphor and the denunciation o f the 
Manichaean religion in favor o f Catholicism demonstrate Augustine's awareness o f  his 
audience. He writes as if  his words are intended only for God's ears, but he, o f course, 
is writing for mortals. To appeal to his readers, he uses rhetoric, which he taught for a 
living (70). Following the guidelines o f  rhetoric, he calls upon a higher authority, in the 
case o f this book the highest authority, i.e., the word o f  God, to enhance his arguments, 
and, hence, he cannot be contradicted. When Augustine criticizes the Manichees for 
using rhetoric to gain control over people, he uses rhetoric at the same time to persuade 
readers that Catholicism is preferred by God and to debunk the Manichaean religion 
whose "arguments are checked, overthrown, and put out o f court by you, God o f  truth"
(178). He condemns the Manichaean religion, saying it is plagued with fallacies (108) 
and lacks proof (117). His condemnation is based on the inability o f  the Manichees to 
produce a flawless argument. Augustine supports his argument against the Manichees 
by providing a detailed example o f a choice between two evils, one which takes a
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person to the theater and the other which takes a person to the Manichees. The passage 
continues to unfold like a model argument, deferring to a higher authority and following 
up with more support, such as that which compares a person's decision to jo in  the 
Manichaean religion to other bad choices—specifically murder, theft, and adultery. 
Finally, the section ends by reaffirming his thesis that the Manichaean religion cannot 
stand up before God.
In addition to using his mastery o f rhetoric to present his story, Augustine 
structures his book to reflect the cultural desire for order, which, in his case, leads 
directly and purposefully to God. His book unfolds chronologically and in a series of 
numbered sections, each o f which tells of an event leading up to his eventual 
conversion. He organizes his story into what he considers to be the required "perfect 
order," which for him is chronological (217). Current society, as in Augustine's period, 
desires order, specifically chronological order in autobiography. Because we live in 
time, it is convenient and sensible for us to organize events in the order in which they 
occur in relation to the passage o f  time. However, this linear organization tends to 
imply that events in time possess a cause/effect relationship that may not necessarily be 
true. It often leads autobiographers to ignore events that may not directly contribute to 
the cause/effect development o f a specific story.
Despite the problems associated with chronological presentation o f  events in 
autobiography, it remains the most commonly used organizational pattern. P. J. Bakin, 
in Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography (\992), most satisfactorily 
addresses the continued use o f  linear narrative in autobiography and sees it as more than
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only a convenient form already in place; he sees it as a "response to the fundamental
temporality o f  human experiences" (86). Because the self develops in time, presenting
its story following that time line seems sensible. However, this presentation o f the life
story m ust not be viewed as interchangeable with the representation o f  how one
naturally remembers the selfs story unfolding. M emory is actually very non-
chronological (191).
To believe that we naturally remember our lives chronologically, or to insist, as
Augustine does, that this is the correct or perfect order because it resembles the order of
God is no longer reasonable. James Olney in Metaphors o f  S e lf  (1972) discusses the
relationship between the natural sciences and faith. He writes that as late as the
beginning o f this century, the sciences were based on the following assumptions:
first, that there is a causal order in nature and the universe...second that there is 
some unfailing relation between the formal organization o f the human mind and 
the formal organization o f  nature; and a faith, therefore, that the human m ind is 
capable o f discerning and describing the ordered processes that rule the natural 
universe. (11-12)
Possessing such faith can only come from having absolute trust in God, as Augustine 
does, and believing blindly that "the universe is an orderly place because I know it is" 
(Olney 1972, 12). Scientists now accept that chronology or linearity is not the natural 
order (Foucault 1970, 82; Hayles 1990, 143) but is, instead, one way for us to make 
sense o f our lives and to impose meaning on either a part or all o f  it more easily.
Olney, in Metaphors o f  S e lf  supports this need to order when he comments, "the 
vital impulse to order that has always caused man to create and that, in the end, 
determines both the nature and the form o f what he creates" (1972, 3) is the purpose
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behind autobiography writing. The impulse to order, to get one's story to make sense 
regardless o f  what events are included or excluded from a particular perspective, I 
believe, is constant in human nature; however, the actual or resulting order, i.e. 
narrative structure, and approach to the creation o f the narrative changes with culture.
Lawrence Byrne (1989) reiterates what is commonly accepted by scholars o f 
autobiography and memory (for example, G usdorf 1956 and Olney 1972 and 1993), 
which is that autobiographers unconsciously impose a narrative coherence on events 
that may not have been coherent at the time that they actually occurred. This has always 
been the point o f  constructing a narrative; anyone concerned with the writing o f 
autobiography is aware that events are random and do not obtain meaning until they are 
put into some context or perspective. Byrne does not, however, distinguish between 
creating a narrative that makes a well-written story and creating a narrative that 
resembles the actual development o f  the self through time. Augustine addresses this 
issue in his discussion o f memory and its relation to the self.
R ecalling and  p resenting  inform ation: A ugustine 's models of m em ory 
Writers since Augustine have organized their autobiographies in many different ways in 
the attempt to reflect more the process o f remembering. This attempt to illustrate how 
the mind operates or orders has, as Olney (1972) points out, allowed for the creation o f 
autobiographical texts o f varying forms. Augustine's text provides a starting point from 
which we can track, chronologically for the purposes o f this study, the evolution o f 
narrative structures and popular theories regarding how the mind searches for and 
categorizes information in autobiography. Because Augustine was in the habit o f using
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one format repeatedly when presenting his arguments, it is likely that how he thought 
about his life when he was constructing his arguments was either consciously or 
subconsciously influenced by this style. Bearing this in mind, we can see how the 
communication tools available affect the way in which writers are able to remember as 
well as the way in which they choose to write. Like the actual tools available, 
information and how it is communicated also affect how writers receive and process 
material in their minds. During antiquity, the concepts o f  science and technology as we 
know them were unheard of, and theories regarding how memory and the brain work 
were not based on the experimentation associated with science since the late 1800s.
In The Confessions, Augustine presents his views o f the role o f memory in one's 
life and how memory actually Works, which are also the accepted cultural beliefs 
regarding memory at the time. By looking at Augustine's treatment o f memory, we can 
gain insight into what his society believed and valued. W hile several scholars (Eakin 
1992; Gusdorf 1956; Spengemarm and Lundquist 1965; and Weintraub 1975) assert that 
a writer's culture and personal environment shape the writer and her or his 
autobiographical work, they do not address how examining autobiography may answer 
questions regarding the nature o f a particular culture itself. In Augustine's case, he and 
his community saw memory as the pathway to God, reaching whom was the sole 
purpose o f their existence. Because reaching God was the ultimate purpose o f and 
reason behind every decision in life, memory became significant to living correctly 
according to the beliefs o f the time. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly for this 
dissertation, Augustine's ideas reflect the scientific theories o f  memory accepted by his
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community, and by examining his text, we can determine the level and perspective o f 
science regarding memory during antiquity.
In Book X o f The Confessions, Augustine contemplates the power o f memory. 
For him memory is neither easily definable, nor is it fully comprehensible. He does, 
however, in this book, arrive at two types or models o f  memory: one which views 
memory as a receptacle or physical location in the mind and one which considers 
memory to be a force or active agent. Olney has named these models archaeological 
and processual, respectively (1993, 872). In the archaeological model, Olney describes 
memory as a noun that Augustine refers to in terms such as "harbor" and "stomach." 
According to Augustine, experiences enter through the senses and are sorted and stored 
in various compartments where they become memories. It is in these compartments, 
Olney says, that memories reside until they are needed and, hence, are then retrieved or 
dug up by the autobiographer. In the processual model, Olney describes memory as a 
verb, possessing the ability to weave together memories and patterns.
Augustine expounds on the versatility and power o f memory when he writes, 
"From the same store too I can take out pictures o f things which have either happened to 
me or are believed on the basis o f  experience; I can m yself weave them into the context 
o f the past, and from them I can infer future actions" (219). This description o f memory 
as having the capacity both to hold information and to assimilate new experiences onto 
our existing mental schema serves as a transition into Augustine's description o f 
memory as a powerful force that may be used to reach God. He compares his search for 
God to that o f animals returning to their homes. Memory is so vital to life and to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
forging the self that he believes all creatures, "even beasts and birds have memory; 
otherwise they would not be able to find their ways back to their dens" (227). Just as 
memory is necessary for beasts and birds to find their way home, memory is also 
necessary for humans to find their way home, and, for Augustine and his fellow 
Christians, home is God.
Augustine's ideas about memory are highly sophisticated and interestingly 
similar to the theories currently popular in the scientific community. Throughout time, 
there have been numerous theories in the sciences and humanities regarding memory; 
however, concrete evidence has yet to be produced to confirm the plausibility o f any 
particular theory. Augustine's philosophically oriented view o f  memory remains 
equally possible o f becoming the definitive theory o f memory as current views that are 
based on extensive invasive experimentation on the brain. Specifically in this regard, 
consider Augustine's perspective on how the brain distinguishes complete from partial 
memories:
The whole thing had not slipped from our memory; part o f it was retained and 
by means o f this part the other part was sought for, because the memory realized 
that it was not carrying along with it the totality which it was used to and, going 
unevenly, as it were, through the loss o f something to which it was accustomed, 
eagerly demanded the restoration o f what was lacking. (229)
The proposed ability o f the brain to recognize when a memory is incomplete and to
work with available information to retrain itself in order to recreate the initial
experience is a theory currently being investigated by numerous scientists and various
disciplines (for example, John Briggs and F. David Peat in chaos theory 1990; Daniel
Dennett in psychology 1991; Bart Kosko in fuzzy logic 1993; Karl Pribham in
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neurophysiology, discussed in Briggs and Peat 1990; and Steven Rose in biochemistry 
1993).
The individual and the self in Augustine's culture
While hypotheses and theories regarding how memory functions have not advanced 
significantly in terms o f producing conclusive evidence to support any o f these theories, 
this limited understanding has not diminished the role o f  memory in defining the self. 
Wlien Augustine writes, "Yet this force o f  my memory is incomprehensible to me, even 
though, without it, I should not be able to call m yself myself," (226) he acknowledges 
his limited understanding as a human while yet again forwarding the purpose o f his 
book. Just as the force o f  God is mysterious yet necessary to directing his life and 
shaping who he is, memory, which for Augustine is directly linked to God, is 
incomprehensible yet necessary to defining the self. The complexity o f memory is at 
the same time an inexplicable curiosity and a necessity, for, although Augustine and 
other writers throughout history have tried to define memory because o f its integral role 
in determining who we are, it has escaped full comprehension. The inability o f humans 
to comprehend memory supports Augustine's description o f its vast boundlessness, 
because without boundaries, like the universe, something cannot be contained, hence it 
always retains a sense o f mystery and curiosity because o f  the unknown that exists 
beyond our range o f comprehension.
Despite the human inability to grasp a complete understanding o f memory, 
memory remains vital to creating and identifying the self. This acknowledgment o f the 
role o f  memory in understanding the self, as well as the concern with the self at all, was
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scarcely considered prior to Augustine (Freeman 1993; Gusdorf 1956; and Weintraub 
1975). There was autobiography, for example Emperor Augustus' Res Gestae, but this 
only recounted historical feats and did not address any type o f  self-examination 
(Weintraub 1975). Outside o f Heraclitus, who as Olney points out was the first "to 
declare that every cosmology begins in self-knowledge," (1972,4) Augustine was the 
first formal writer to concern him self with questions o f  selfhood and individuality.
Using memory, Augustine is able to recall his past experiences and to show how these 
experiences, guided by the hand o f God, have formed the person he has become.
In The Confessions, Augustine obviously is represented prominently. However, 
during antiquity, people saw themselves in community with others and not as 
individuals (Eakin 1985 and Gusdorf 1956). In a culture where the self as an individual 
does not exist, autobiography, as we have come to consider it, cannot be possible 
(Gusdorf, 1956). Therefore, it seems both bizarre for Augustine to search for a self 
through memory and contradictory, almost hypocritical, for him to write an 
autobiography when his society, as he would have us believe, was so closely identified 
with the Church, which stressed unity with God and not individuality. In writing about 
African cultures, Olney points out about that individual and group identities merge so 
that the part represents the whole and the whole is embodied and personified in the part 
(1973). If this rationale is applied to Augustine, who believed he was a typical 
representation of his Christian culture, his decision to write about himself is no longer 
problematic because in speaking about him self he is speaking about his community.
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Karl W eintraub's statement that during antiquity, people believed wise men
should only talk about themselves for didactic purposes (1978, 12) certainly applies to
the intentions o f Augustine, who told his story to show him self as an example by which
others could hopefully learn and convert just as he had. Weintraub writes:
The text in no way suggests that Augustine self-consciously thought o f him self 
as a unique individual with the life task o f translating his uniqueness from mere 
potentiality into actuality...Quite to the contrary, the indications are that he saw 
the story o f  one Christian soul, the one he could know best, the typical story o f 
all Christians. (1978, 45)
Augustine never sees his life as special in relation to the lives o f his fellow Christians.
He, like they, had unique experiences that eventually lead to the same place—God.
Weintraub writes that The Confessions have one center—the relationship o f Augustine's
soul and God—and that everything else, even Monica, is only peripheral (1978, 44).
While this may be true, it is not because Augustine is egocentric but because he believes
his story is also the story o f his Christian community, and so there is no need to pause
long on their stories, which would only be modified versions o f  his own. Augustine
excludes from his book influences outside o f the Christian community, such as the
Manichees, except for how they played a role in his eventual conversion. Is it remiss to
disregard any person or group that is outside o f his Christian community and to give the
impression that it had no power or presence within the culture? Perhaps, if  we judged
Augustine's intentions using contemporary criteria. However, Augustine's dismissal o f
elements outside o f  the Christian community again reflects his culture's linear view o f
life and refusal to recognize any deviation from the accepted "correct path" o f living.
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The idea o f  one correct path, one Christian soul, one self and community representing 
and embodying each other, permeates Augustine's culture and text.
The limitations of language
In describing the unique experiences o f his typically Christian life, Augustine struggles
with the notion that he cannot adequately convey the meaning o f his experiences and his
conversion. He recognizes the limits o f language in representing internal experiences.
His description o f  his attempt to communicate as an infant parallels a writer's attempt to
communicate at any age:
I wanted to express my desires to those who could satisfy them; but this was 
impossible, since my desires were inside me and those to whom I wished to 
express them were outside and could not by any sense perception o f their own 
enter into my spirit. And so I used to jerk  my limbs about and make various 
noises by way o f  indicating what I wanted, using the limited forms o f 
communication which were within my capacity and which, indeed, were not 
very like the real thing. (21)
His desire to be understood and frustration with the inadequacy o f the communication
tools available to him are common issues that writers continue to address and which
inspire experimentation with language, structure, and style in the attempt to match the
internal experience with the external interpretation. Augustine recognizes that in trying
to express the inner self, meaning is lost in the translation. Although he understands
this limitation, he continues the attempt using language and a writing style that mirrors
what he believes to be the natural or proper thinking order, i.e., linear structure. He can
write his story countless ways, trying to somehow represent the self fully and correctly,
but the meaning will never be complete. Michel Foucault seems to articulate this
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deficiency most accurately when he writes o f the differences between visual and oral 
communication:
It is not that words are imperfect, or that, when confronted by the visible, they 
prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the other's terms: it is 
in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say.
And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use o f images, metaphors, or 
similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not 
that deployed by our eyes but that defined by the sequential elements o f syntax. 
(1970, 9)
Although Foucault is writing about the discrepancy in viewing and in talking about 
Dutch painting, his argument applies well to the problem that arises when any medium 
is used to represent another: one cannot be reduced to the other's terms.
Augustine recognizes the possibilities and the limits o f language. Language, in 
general, allows us to communicate our thoughts effectively with one another. However, 
in making our emotions or internal experiences understood to someone outside o f us, we 
find language falls short. Despite this limitation, language remains our most prominent 
method o f communication. Regarding this issue in terms o f autobiography,
Spengemann and Lundquist write, "Autobiography does not communicate raw 
experience, for that is uncommunicable. It presents, rather, a metaphor for the raw 
experience" (1965, 502). Autobiographers, including Augustine realize that no matter 
how vivid the metaphor is, it remains a layer between the raw experience and the 
external receiver. By no means should this layer be viewed strictly as a hindrance 
because, although it separates, it also joins the raw experience and the external receiver. 
M etaphor makes meaning possible. With this in mind, writers create metaphors that 
represent their experiences more exactly, and, to have meaning, these metaphors usually
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correspond to the technology and conditions o f  their particular culture. However, 
merely updating the metaphor does not significantly improve the communication o f  the 
internal experience. To do this, most experimentation occurs with the structure o f  the 
language, where the writer attempts to m irror the working o f  the mind while it is 
recalling the experience. The hope here is that, in taking the mental journey with the 
writer as she or he recalls an experience, the reader will understand how the writer 
arrived at the metaphor, and its meaning will be enhanced.
Forging the self through memory and writing style to reflect cultural constructs
Memory and language (writing style) can only partially reconstruct an actual
experience. The challenge o f  any autobiographical text is to overcome the combined
effect o f this inadequacy. Augustine's effort to meet this challenge is immersed in
cultural expectations, which are reflected, perhaps even magnified, in text. As the
organization and narrative structure o f  his book reflects the culturally accepted notions
o f order, Augustine's stylistic approach to language also mirrors the literary techniques
popular in his day. His sentence structure often relies on repetition and meter to create a
rhythm that further builds and reinforces his argument. Augustine uses these techniques
throughout his text and most effectively to conclude his book when he writes:
How can one man teach another man to understand this? What angel will teach 
an angel? What angel will teach a man? This must be asked  o f you, sought in 
you, knocked  for at you. So, so shall it be received, so shall it be found , so shall 
it be opened. Amen. (350)
By closing his book this way, he leaves the reader with an impression that is strong
because o f both its message and its delivery'. He intellectually affects the reader through
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Biblical echoes and words and basally affects the reader through rhythm. His 
knowledge o f form and ability to use it skillfully impresses the reader who may be 
unaware as to why she or he is affected and perhaps even convinced by Augustine's 
words.
W hile his writing style is representative o f the literary techniques popular in his 
day, its reliance on providence for direction and structural order is indicative o f the 
belief that remained unchallenged until the end o f the 18th century, which was that 
nature possessed an inherent, usually linear, order (Foucault 1970; Hayles 1990). 
Wliereas humans were thought to be messy and disorganized, nature, in contrast, 
possessed a pattern, a sense o f  order to which humans aspired. According to Karl 
Weintraub, the Christian doctrine indicates, "In his Fall man had lost control o f him self 
as a unified being and become prey to the multitude o f  perverted forces within which 
pulled him in so many conflicting directions that he lost him self and his way" (1978,
38). To unify the self again, to be whole by being with God, one had to devote all of 
life to this effort. This desire for unity was a distinguishing philosophy between the 
Manichaean and Christian religions. As Weintraub points out, "while the one saw the 
life task in learning to separate what had unjustly been condemned to coexist, the soul 
with the body, the other saw the salvation in reuniting in one healthy whole what man 
by his own fault had permitted to be torn asunder" (1978, 45). So, in rejecting the 
Manichaean religion for Christianity, Augustine reinforces his desire for unity, 
coherence, sense, and wholeness.
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Augustine's goals for the self parallel and represent the goals o f his culture, and 
his choice o f Christianity indicates the cultural acceptance o f  unity with God. After his 
conversion, Augustine was awed by the inherent, God-created order in nature and 
believed that his life's work was to find a way and place to fit into that order and to be 
complete with God again (Weintraub 1975, 830). Augustine writes that he is in 
shattered pieces and so writing The Confessions, tracking how his life relates to God's 
purpose, creates an order and reconstructs him as a whole person (Jay 1984, 176). In 
attempting to achieve the divine order o f  nature and God, Augustine structures his 
communication to mirror what he believes to be the perfection that exists only in nature. 
When he writes, "Let your works praise you that we may love you, and let us love you 
that your works may praise you. For they have a beginning and an end in time a rising 
and setting, growth and decay, form and privation. So they have their succession of 
morning and evening" (347), he is using rhetoric and style to mimic and approach as 
closely as possible the linear order in nature believed to be created by God. Hence, he is 
praising God both directly by what he says and indirectly by how he says it.
Although Augustine proposes several models o f  memory, as discussed earlier, 
all o f  the models ultimately reinforce the linear order that is prescribed by his culture.
The practices or codes o f a culture shape everything in that culture, including language, 
values, and empirical orders (Foucault 1970, xx). During latter antiquity, linear, 
chronological order dictated society to the degree that anything or anyone that deviated 
was considered ju st that—a deviate. The emphasis on linearity affected even the 
subconscious, as we see in one o f Augustine's descriptions o f memory; "some things are
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produced easily and in perfect order, just as they are required; what comes first gives 
place to what comes next" (2 17). The need for order is so imperative that even the 
subconscious is not allowed the freedom to act as it might naturally, associating 
memories because o f their relationship to one another rather than as occurrences in a 
sequential order.
Elizabeth de Mijolla writes that Augustine tries unsuccessfully to find God's 
place in memory (1994, 24). Augustine, however, does not actually look for God's 
place in memory but looks for the way in which memory may help him to reach and 
recognize God wherever He dwells. Memory as a force has the ability to guide an 
individual up toward God. However, it is limited at the same time because God is 
found beyond or above memory. As Augustine describes, "I mount up through my 
mind toward you who dwell above me, and now 1 shall go beyond this force o f mine 
called memory, for I desire to reach you at the point from which you may be reached" 
(227). Memory is the catapult by which one can reach God, but it does not bring an 
individual completely to God. It is necessary for living correctly because with it 
individuals define who they are according to the rules o f the Church. It is only capable 
o f helping individuals to know who they are and to stay on the right path.
Although the force o f memory does not deliver individuals completely to God, 
memory as a receptacle is absolutely necessary for recognizing God after death. 
Augustine questions both how people will know God if  they have never before seen him 
and "whether the happy life is in our memory. For we could not love it, if  we did not 
know it" (230). In addressing this concern, he writes extensively about the power o f
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memory to help us recall the sight, smell, or taste o f something when it is not in front o f
us. Just as memory allows us to recall that which we have previously experienced, it
will allow us to recognize God when we reach Him again, although we are unable to
reconstruct as mortals what His image is. The implication is that we once were with
God and will return or ascend to Him at the end o f  this life, since "from the time I
learned you [God], I have not forgotten you"(234). Because we can only recognize that
which we have previously experienced, we must have known God before we began life
on earth. Therefore, building on Plato's proposal o f memory, Augustine argues that we
must have entered the world with the beginnings o f a mental schema or memory already
in place from God and onto which we assimilate new experiences so that they follow
the order that focuses life on, and toward, God. I f  this is the case, then memory
becomes the single most significant property o f our being (234).
1300 years of slow progress: cultural developments from antiquity to the 
Eighteenth century
As may be expected, in the 1300 years that separate St. Augustine and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, scientific and technological developments occurred and cultural beliefs 
shifted, impacting the view and role o f the self in society. Science went from being a 
purely philosophical discipline to one which required, in addition to theoretical 
assumptions, physical experimentation. In the late 1400s and early 1500s, Leonardo da 
Vinci, an artist, architect, and engineer, produced intricate drawings o f the brain and its 
ventricles (Rose, 1993, 76). Correspondingly, memory models reflected the changing 
views o f the scientific community as more was learned about the structure o f  the brain
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and as technology, such as electricity, developed. M emory models evolved from 
Augustine's theory o f memory as both a place and force to René Descartes' hydraulic 
model o f  memory in the 1600s to the electrical maze or "telegraphic" model o f  memory 
in the late 1700s and early 1800s, reflecting the permeation o f electricity in society.
Also during this 1300 year span, European culture shifted from being wholly 
situated in religion to being predominantly secular. As Michel Montaigne's Essays from 
the late 1500s reveal, secularization allowed individuals to see themselves as ju st that— 
separate, unique entities, and not microrepresentations o f  a larger society. The growth 
o f  secularization coupled with advances in science and technology shook the long-held 
belief that the self is a cohesive, single-purpose entity that reflects the providential view 
o f  life that leads straight to God and self-completion.
Representation of culture in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Confessions 
Whereas Augustine's The Confessions is generally recognized as the first major 
autobiographical work, hence making him the first major autobiographer, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau is often considered to be the father o f m odem  autobiography (Eakin 1985, 4). 
His work introduces ideas concerning the se lf within society and the representation o f 
that self in such a way that subsequent autobiographers could no longer validly regard 
the self as the single, cohesive being o f Augustine's text. Like Augustine's text, 
Rousseau's autobiography reveals the culture in which the self is situated. Both The 
Confessions' coxi\.e.ni and organizational structure reflect the ideas prevalent in 
Rousseau's eighteenth-century society.
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In Augustine's autobiography, culture is defined completely within the larger 
construct o f religion, as Christians believed that they were on earth only in passage to 
God. However, as secularization grew, especially by the end o f the M iddle Ages, the 
providential view  o f life began to lose ground (W eintraub 1975, 844). By the 
eighteenth century, religion occupied a significantly less powerful position in society. 
God was no longer the absolute authority as judicial systems were put into place; 
instead, society became the judge o f  people (Elbaz 1988, 42). As society became more 
secular, individuals became just that—individuals concerned more with their own 
diversified existences than with the thoughts o f  a united Christian pilgrimage to the 
afterlife (W eintraub 1975, 844). Karl Weintraub points out the shift in focus o f 
audience address in Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies; "while Augustine, 
befitting a God-centered view, confesses his soul to God and only incidentally to his 
fellow men, Rousseau, as a measure o f the degree to which the world had become 
secularized, has nothing to confess to God, but everything to his fellow men" (1978, 
299-300). This shift in audience address correlates with a shift in authority from 
Augustine's singular identity o f the Church with community to Rousseau's identity with 
various institutions in his secular society. As a result, Rousseau must consider how his 
actions affect both his relationship with God and, more importantly, his relationship 
with the members o f his society.
With an increased concern for how society judges one's actions and ideas, along 
with a diminished view that we are in this world only on pilgrimage to the afterlife with 
God, the here and now gains a tremendous sense o f  urgency, importance, and finality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
As Michel Montaigne wrote nearly two hundred years before Rousseau: "But it seems
to me that death is indeed the end, but not therefore the goal o f life; it is its finish, its
extremity, but not therefore its object. Life should aim unto itself, a purpose unto itse lf
(1963, 405). This view contrasts starkly with Augustine's belief that the goal o f life is
to reach God: one way or another, "the end at which they are all aiming is one and the
same, namely, a state o f  joy" (1963, 232). Montaigne's introspection detailing the
development o f the self and its responsibility to and interaction with society serves as a
transition, in this case, to track the development o f secular philosophy regarding the
purpose o f life from the time o f Augustine to Rousseau. Montaigne's Essays, unlike
Augustine's The Confessions, is neither a confession to God nor a model or
representation o f a Christian on the road to God. Montaigne presents his philosophy to
his readers and writes:
For likewise these are my humors and opinions; I offer them as what I believe, 
not what is to be believed. I aim here only at revealing myself, who will perhaps 
be different tomorrow, if  I learn something new which changes me. I have no 
authority to be believed, nor do 1 want it, feeling m yself too ill-instructed to 
instruct others. (1963, 25-27)
Montaigne writes about the need for one to look inside o f oneself and take stock, to
come to terms with the philosophy that shapes who one is.
The effect o f  secularization, the celebration o f living for the present moment,
expressed so eloquently by Montaigne, underscores every story in Rousseau's The
Confessions. In one sentence which reads, "I have not been able to cut this tale short,
for it has been important to trace it in exact detail, this period o f my life having had an
influence upon the future which will extend to my dying day," (453) Rousseau
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encapsulates the many purposes o f writing his autobiography. Rousseau's 
autobiography is a tale—i.e., a story containing an uncertain amount of embellishment— 
and he repeatedly reminds us, the readers, that he has had to use his imagination to fill 
in the gaps o f his failed memory when constructing this narrative. As proof o f  his 
story's veracity, he says to us that he has had to trace every detail or else chance either 
that his words be disputed or that he be accused o f  intentionally hiding some truth. So 
Rousseau fills hundreds upon hundreds o f pages, undoubtedly grateful for the 
introduction o f the printing press into Europe during the Renaissance. He traces, like a 
pen on his memory, the events of his past, with the pen moving steadily forward on a 
firm (so Rousseau believes) time line. He recognizes that every incident or personal 
encounter has its place in the continuum o f our lives and influence on our character. In 
these last two aspects, Rousseau's ideas closely resemble Augustine's, although these 
writers are separated by some 1300 years.
Obviously, more than time divides Augustine and Rousseau. Rousseau's 
statement, "this period o f  my life having had an influence upon the future which will 
extend to my dying day," (453) punctuates the view o f life in a secular culture, which is 
far removed from Augustine's Christian community. Rousseau understands that every 
action that he or someone else makes causes a ripple, sometimes a wave, in society and 
on the lives o f everyone in that society. Furthermore, this change alters in some way the 
development o f his person and life until death. This view is also shared by Augustine, 
but the two writers' philosophies diverge beyond this point. Where Augustine sees our 
actions in this world as affecting our lives in the next, Rousseau sees our actions as
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affecting us in this world only. Rousseau, reflecting his culture, is not concerned with
the notion o f an afterlife. His and his culture's goal was to live this life fully for itself.
With a shift in the defining goal o f life from that o f reaching God in the hereafter
to that o f living fully in this world came a shift in the emphasis on the se lf and the
reason for telling one's story. The disintegration o f  community with the emergence of
individuality allowed, perhaps required, individuals to tell their personal achievements
in order to carve out their position in society. At last it was acceptable to write about
oneself for the sole purpose o f  distinguishing oneself among others and not, as
Augustine, to teach or to show oneself as an example. In the introduction o f  his 1953
translation o f Rousseau's The Confessions, J. M. Cohen writes:
Before his day there were perhaps two great autobiographies, St. Augustine's 
Confessions and Santa Teresa's Life o f  Herself, and both these works were 
written not for personal display or justification but to tell o f  a vital experience 
which might serve as an example to others. By Rousseau's age, however, men 
had begun to see themselves not as atoms in a society that stretched down from 
God to the world o f nature but as unique individuals, important in their own 
right. It was possible for the first time, therefore, for a man to write his life in 
terms o f his worldly experience, and to advance views on his place in the 
Universe that bore only a distant relationship to the truths o f revealed religion.
(7)
The purpose o f autobiography had shifted in response to a culture that had moved from 
being almost exclusively religious to being primarily secular. No longer was the 
purpose o f  writing solely to provide an example o f how to follow the correct path 
leading to the ultimate joy o f once again being united with God. Instead, writing was a 
means to attest to one's personal triumphs and accolades in this world in relation to 
other individuals. To meet the standards and expectations o f his secular culture.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
Rousseau goes to great lengths in his autobiography to tell as many stories as he 
possibly can with the hope that "whoever you may be that wish to know a man, have the 
courage to read the next two or three pages and you will have complete knowledge o f 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau" (300). He is the writer to whom we look to find the inception 
o f  the personal memoirs genre, which remains popular even if  it is not challenging or 
interesting as literature two hundred years after its introduction.
W hether his stories reveal his failed attempts to steal apples (amazingly similar 
to Augustine's childhood incident o f  stealing pears) or his blundered sexual exploits or 
his abandonment o f  his five children, Rousseau always aims to show that he is "like no 
one in the whole world" (17). While asserting his uniqueness he, at the same time, 
believes that his readers will eventually see in his faults their own shortcomings and, 
thus, not judge him too harshly or think, "I was a better man than he" (17). With 
Rousseau, we begin to see more complexity in how we evaluate ourselves and each 
other because the make-up o f society is itself more diversified, rendering it impossible 
to weigh various people's lives with the same scale. Rousseau's stories illustrate the 
complex nature o f the individual and are full o f  human efforts and errors in the attempt 
to capture the compassion o f  his readers. Every detail is crucial for Rousseau because it 
both reveals one's nature and records, as completely as possible, a moment in one's life; 
and in a secular culture, every moment is crucial because life is finite.
Just as the content o f  The Confessions represents the concerns o f  Rousseau's 
culture, the organizational structure o f  the text follows the popular literary form o f the 
day and reflects ideas regarding life and order at the time. Rousseau's book opens with
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a brief description o f his purpose addressed to his audience. He then immediately 
moves into what has since become the conventional life-story opener: "I was bom  at 
Geneva in 1712, the son o f Isaac Rousseau, a citizen o f  that town, and Suzanne Bernard, 
his wife" (17). From the outset, Rousseau lets us know that he intends to describe the 
events o f his life, his position in society, and who he is in exact succession, with nothing 
intentionally omitted or rearranged in the always straight ahead time line. Each o f his 
books contains sections dated to cover specific years. Rousseau's text actually adheres 
more stringently to a blatant chronological time line than Augustine's; but, as discussed 
previously, Augustine's text follows what he considers to be the natural linear 
progression o f  a Christian soul. At the end o f The Confessions, Rousseau again 
addresses his audience to end simultaneously his book and the reading o f  his story to 
Mme d'Egmont and her companions.
The blurring o f the listening audience and the reading audience addressed in The 
Confessions increases the complexity o f the book's structure but by no means is 
original. This practice o f  framing a narrative can be found in works that precede 
Rousseau's, such as Sir Philip Sidney's Old Arcadia and St. Thomas More's Utopia. 
Rousseau, like Augustine, masterfully employs the literary techniques popular in his 
day. Using rhetorical tropes, he reiterates often his argument's thesis of, "you [the 
reader] will watch the march o f events and judge whether I could have stayed it" (391). 
Following his thesis he describes an account o f terrible circumstance in which no one, 
according to Rousseau, could have escaped unscathed, and then punctuates his argument 
with a final plea for understanding and empathy from his audience.
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As previously noted, Rousseau's book, like Augustine's, unfolds in chronological 
order. Like Augustine, Rousseau and his culture still view linearity and chronology as 
the "proper order" (561). Unlike Augustine, however, this is not because the order 
parallels the path through life to God but because the order tracks the development and 
progression o f one's life through time in this world. Elizabeth de Mijolla points out, 
"Rousseau's continual concern for the 'order' and 'sequence' o f The Confessions reveals, 
in part, his respect for the norm o f chronological narrative, a norm that works both for 
and against his self-knowledge. Carefully ordering his life for presentation in The 
Confessions, Rousseau sacrifices, to a degree, introspection for exposition" (1994, 80).
In this observation, de Mijolla accurately points out that, while Rousseau's chosen 
structure does show how he became the man he is, it also prevents him from performing 
the meditative self-analysis that Augustine and Montaigne view as critical to 
understanding who that man is.
The use o f classical rhetoric, chronological order, and the narrative frame all 
contribute to making The Confessions read more like a novel than nonfiction. This was 
obviously intentional, as the novel was becoming a m ajor literary genre during the 
eighteenth century, with the purpose o f entertaining taking precedence over that o f  
teaching or setting example. Rousseau aims to construct a fluid, engaging narrative, 
even if that means delaying the mention o f  certain experiences "for fear o f  interrupting 
the thread o f  [his] story" (587). Particularly, he creates a work that mirrors the very 
popular picaresque novel. The adolescent protagonist bumbles through life, and, by 
sharing his mishaps and developments with an audience, hopes to gain the audience's
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empathy and understanding. As Weintraub describes The Confessions, "It is the story o f 
a youth, rarely settled for long, wandering about in search o f life and h im se lf (1978, 
311).
As part o f creating the appearance o f a picaresque novel and o f validating his 
argument, Rousseau includes correspondence between him self and others, among them 
Diderot, Mme de Luxembourg, the Abbé, and Mme d'Epinay. The letters not only 
contribute to the appearance o f  the book as a novel or support the arguments presented, 
they also reinforce the prevailing cultural desire for linear order. Often Rousseau refers 
to chronological order as "proper order," and he supports this belief with the 
chronological dating and progression o f his book. When he must arrange some undated 
letters so that he may place them in the book, he fills with anxiety, "as it were groping 
in the dark, in order to arrange them in their proper order" (561). The arrangement o f  
most o f these letters bears no significance one way or another on Rousseau's story, yet 
he becomes rather disturbed by his inability to remember which was written first. The 
desire for order, to see exactly how every event or word exchanged occurred in 
sequence, is so critical to his culture in which life is brief and composed o f  moment 
upon moment, that he feels compelled to order even unrelated letters.
Narrative structure in Rousseau's The Confessions
The organizational structure o f  Rousseau's The Confessions mirrors the trends o f his 
culture and is closely tied to the actual narrative structure. Like Augustine, who uses 
elements o f  the rhetorical argument, the popular literary form o f  his day, Rousseau also 
chooses from the tools available in his culture and composes a very readable narrative
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that resembles any fictional novel o f  his period. In telling, or rather in creating, his 
autobiography, he admits quite freely, "Here is what I have done, and i f  by chance I 
have used some immaterial embellishment it has been only to fill a void due to a defect 
in memory" (17). From the beginning o f  his story, he lets the reader know that he is 
attuned to what the public enjoys reading—even if  he does proclaim at one point that he 
does not intend for his book to be published while he or anyone in the book is alive 
(373)—and that he will do all he can "to provide enough interest to hold the reader to the 
end" (506).
In addition to presenting a detailed, seamless, and entertaining story, Rousseau 
hopes his narrative depicts the development o f a complete, whole being in such a 
manner that readers may come to know who Jean-Jacques is. Using a chronological 
narrative in autobiography is common and logical because, as John Eakin points out,
"the self is a developmental, time-embedded construct" (1992, 198). Charting "the 
trajectory o f how one's self came to be" (Freeman 1993, 33), Rousseau follows the 
linear time frame because that mirrors the occurrence o f the actual events. By insisting 
upon a linear time line, however, Rousseau refuses to acknowledge that meaning 
acquired from experience does not necessarily occur in the same order in which events 
may have taken place. Meaning is acquired and appropriated to events only in 
retrospect (Gusdorf 1956); therefore, selecting memories for presentation creates (more 
than Rousseau is aware or admits) rather than represents a self (Lloyd 1986, 180).
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Eakin puts forth the question, "What kind o f sense does it make that
autobiographers should resort to narrative, especially chronological narrative, when they
come to represent their lives?" (1992, 191). Resort, indeed, for as Eakin further asserts:
structure represents an important opportunity for self-expression in 
autobiographical narrative, although most autobiographers neglect it, assuming 
that content and style will serve to communicate their sense o f individual 
uniqueness...any appeal to the order o f memory will discredit the notion that 
chronological order is somehow an intrinsically 'natural' representation o f  human 
experience. (1992, 191)
Experimenting with various narrative structures in the attempt to mirror what the writer
believes to be the way one actually develops and remembers is what ground-breaking
autobiographers do. While the chronological narrative may be an outdated, ineffective
form for contemporary autobiographers, it was the innovative form for an examination
o f the self in the eighteenth century because the practice o f  self-examination itself was
still relatively new (Weintraub 1978, 325). In this sense, when Rousseau convinces
himself that he remembers properly only when he does so in chronological order, he
believes this is because that order mirrors the order in which his life unfolded. He does
not acknowledge that various events occurring at different times work together to create
a meaning, usually at a time far removed from when any one particular event took place.
That meaning and selfhood do not follow a strictly linear progression is a concept
beyond the understanding o f Rousseau and his eighteenth-century society.
A problem with Rousseau's belief that selfliood and meaning unfold
chronologically is that as he approaches the time o f his writing he is unable to
understand how his present fits with his past. As his ability to sequence or order events
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dissipates, he writes, "All the rest o f my life has been nothing but afflictions and 
heartaches, which I find it so sad to recall, and which come to me in so confused a form 
that 1 can no longer reduce my story to any sort o f  order. Henceforth 1 shall be obliged 
to arrange my facts haphazard, as they come to my mind" (553). He does not appear to 
recognize that he has all along selected specific events that contribute to the narrative 
and the Jean-Jacques he wishes to portray, or that the selection o f these events requires 
time and distance in order to determine how they fit in with the image he tries to 
convey. As Montaigne wrote centuries earlier, "A man who does not have a picture of 
the whole in his head cannot possibly arrange the pieces" (1963, 159). As Rousseau 
nears the present in his story, he cannot possibly have the retrospect necessary to 
assimilate that part o f his life with all that has come before. This case reinforces the 
notion that, while autobiography attempts to mirror a life, the narrative cannot merely 
be a tracking o f  events in time—it must be a selection and ordering o f those events that 
have meaning from a given perspective (Gusdorf 1953).
The limitations o f chronological narrative in representing the self, touched upon 
by Rousseau, remain topical to writers even now. Paul Jay credits Henry Adams' 
autobiography. The Education o f  Henry Adams, with being about "the end o f history, 
the end o f historiography, the end o f the 'whole' and 'coherent' ego, and the end o f 
'Adams'—it is also about the ends to which autobiography, as a narrative practice, has 
come" (1984, 159). Furthermore, Jay writes that Adams' "observations about the real 
limitations o f narrative as a form for the twentieth-century self-reflexive writer are tied 
to the expanding limits o f humankind's conception o f  the s e l f  (1984, 159). While
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Adams certainly drives home the notion that there can be no one coherent se lf and that 
the narrative in autobiography is insufficient, Rousseau deserves credit for introducing 
these very ideas in the eighteenth century. Although he may not completely grasp why 
his narrative form is inadequate for his purpose, he is able to recognize and articulate his 
observation:
The further I go in my story, the less order and sequence I can put into it. The 
disturbances of my later life have not left events time to fall into shape in my 
head. They have been too numerous, too confused, too unpleasant to be capable 
o f straightforwai'd narration...Now my story can only proceed at haphazard, 
according as the ideas come back into my mind. (574)
Rousseau may not fully appreciate the natural relation or "haphazard" connection o f
different stimuli or memories in his head, but he does begin to see that time and
retrospect are necessary for determining or appropriating meaning on past events that
define the self. Also, he calls to attention, even though he does not explore, the issue
that chronological order or narrative obviously falters when one is trying to delve into a
meaning o f the self. He views the non-chronological relation o f memories as
problematic, but writers who follow him will argue that these "haphazard" connections
are, in fact, what make us unique individuals.
Eighteenth-century technology and theories of memory as reflected in Rousseau's 
text
In the time between Augustine and Rousseau, communication technology and theories 
o f memory naturally changed with society. The invention o f the printing press led to 
the privileging of writing during the Renaissance (Foucault 1970, 38) and made text 
easier to reproduce and more accessible to readers. It would certainly be more feasible
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now to produce numerous copies o f  lengthy texts relatively quickly that otherwise
would have been copied significantly slower, if  at all, by a secretary.
While the printing press changed communication in the sixteenth century,
science was influencing how society viewed life. New scientific theories and findings
called into question society's foundation o f  absolute truth regarding nature as previously
explicated by religion. Robert Elbaz writes:
With the scientific revolution, Descartes and Newton brought the modem world 
into a new phase which accelerated the displacement o f  religion by science. 
Common-sense knowledge based on the senses was replaced by mathematical 
reasoning; new experiments were carried out using quantitative methods o f 
measurement...Religion was taken out o f nature and confined to the expression 
o f beliefs and morals, while science took over in the natural world. (1988, 41)
The scientific revolution ushered in not only advances in technology and machines but
also new metaphors that described the brain and memory in contemporary terms.
Leonardo da Vinci, in the sixteenth century, was drawing intricate representations o f  the
brain and its ventricles (Rose 1993, 76). By the seventeenth century, the scientific
community had agreed that memories resided in these ventricles and flowed throughout
the brain after passing through a control valve that separated the front and back areas o f
the brain (Rose 1993, 76). Descartes' amended version o f this early hydraulic model o f
memory to a free-flowing spirit, that moved from side to side o f  the brain until it
touched upon the desired memory, is actually quite similar to Augustine's model in
which he searched his mind only to have memories flow forth. The major difference
between these two theories is that the methodology o f science had changed from one
that was philosophieally oriented to one that was more experimentally oriented. This
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difference continued to grow as science separated from religion to explain the natural 
world.
The split o f  science from religion corresponded with the changes in society's 
view o f life; for example, Rousseau's predominantly secular culture believed that living 
well, not preparing for an afterlife with God, was the goal o f life. In turn, the role of 
memory as the path to reaching God faded, becoming, instead, a way to construct the 
self into a coherent, whole being in this life. Memory models continued to reflect the 
communication technology in society, such as with the shift in view o f the nervous 
system from a hydraulic model to an electrical maze following Galvani's electrical 
experiments on frogs in the 1700s (Rose 1994, 77). Around the time o f Rousseau's 
death, the telegraph was formally introduced into society and the brain and memory 
was, for the day, described as a telegraphic signaling system. This telegraph metaphor 
complements Rousseau's own earlier claim that he could call up on demand particular 
memories. The developments in and borrowing among these various fields reaffirms a 
premise o f this study that in any given culture similar developments arise 
simultaneously in different fields.
Although Rousseau's elaim about memory can be seen to foreshadow the arrival 
o f the telegraph, he does not, as Augustine does, elaborate on his ideas regarding 
models o f memory. He does, however, provide readers with a few brief insights into 
how he believes his memory works. Most strikingly, Rousseau claims his "memory 
calls up only pleasant objects" (261) and dismisses painful events so well that he 
"cannot recapture them when [he] need[s] them" (261). The mechanical nature o f  his
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memory, similar to the telegraph which sends and receives linear codes, reflects the 
communication technology o f his day and reinforces the belief in linear progression 
prevalent in his culture. However, unlike Augustine's ideas about memory that hold up 
consistently throughout his book, Rousseau's ideas often contradict what actually occurs 
in his work, eventually disintegrating by the end o f the text. This inability to "call up" 
in order to reproduce a linearly developed, whole, coherent self marks the beginning o f 
the "end" that Jay notes takes place in Henry Adams' autobiography, but which actually 
began to manifest prior to Adams' work.
Rousseau says that he remembers only pleasant events and forgets the painful, 
for which he is grateful "for never having known that vindictive feeling which is kept 
boiling in a resentful heart by the continual memory o f  insults received, and which 
inflicts upon itself all the textures that it longs to inflict on its enemy" (540). This 
proclamation, however, seems ridiculous when it is placed almost at the end o f a work 
which inundates the reader with stories that expose the flaws and evils o f everyone who 
Rousseau believes has worked to destroy him but against whom he harbors no 
resentment. Surely Rousseau does not expect us to believe this, but his content directly 
contradicts his claims o f  memory control. So, while he aims to present memory as 
possessing some type o f mechanical quality, which does reflect the developments in 
culture, ultimately the mechanical metaphor is inadequate.
By the end o f The Confessions, Rousseau is dejected by his inability to represent 
the movement of his recent memory: "I have so confused a memory o f  this whole affair 
that it is impossible for me to impose any order or connexion on the ideas which come
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back to me. I can do no more than record them in the scattered and isolated form in 
which they come to my mind" (579). Rousseau does not recognize the coherency in 
free-associated images, although he does mention earlier in the text without significance 
that his memory o f dinner at Château de Toune, "which was the sweeter for the 
innocence associated with it, recalled others o f the same kind" (397). He passes on the 
opportunity to leave the linear narrative and to explore, as Montaigne does in his 
Essays, the natural associations o f memory and how they may be mirrored in a 
nonlinear structure. Although Rousseau may not be as willing as Montaigne is to let his 
style and mind "alike go roaming" (1963, 375), he does, by ultimately calling attention 
to the failure o f  linear narrative and memory, provide the avenue which subsequent 
modernist period autobiographers will explore in depth, always in search o f  the best 
way to represent textually the working mind.
The individual and the self in Rousseau's culture
Georges G usdorf writes that Rembrandt painted sixty-two self portraits throughout his 
career because he was aware that no single image could be the definitive se lf and that 
only in viewing many perspectives over time could a "common denominator" o f the self 
be determined (1980, 35). Likewise, Rousseau provides numerous insights into his life 
so that we may come away from the text with a sense o f  his basic nature, despite the 
various ways in which he was forced to behave when dealing with different situations 
and people. In recognizing the fragmented nature o f  the self, Rousseau touches upon 
the problem o f trying to represent the self in text or even o f  creating an autobiography
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that is not a fiction from the moment the writer decides to impose a coherent narrative 
on it.
Rousseau remains adamant in his belief that memory and life and, therefore, any 
narrative describing them must follow a linear, chronological order. When his memory 
and narrative diverge from this strict order, he grows frustrated and confused. His goal 
throughout his text is to show who he is, and he fears that without the order expected by 
his culture, he cannot possibly represent him self adequately or comprehensibly. In 
attempting to represent him self comprehensibly, however, Rousseau continues to be full 
o f contradictions; first his plea that no one should read his book when he is alive, while 
at the same time he addresses his intertextual story and reading audiences; then his self 
praise for not being vindictive, while his entire book exposes what he sees as other 
people's wrongdoings toward him; now his claim o f uniqueness, while hoping that 
others who read his story will identify with him.
The Confessions opens with Rousseau's almost adolescent proclamation of 
individuality:
1712-1719 I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent, and which, 
once complete, will have no imitator. My purpose is to display to my kind a 
portrait in every way true to nature, and the man I shall portray will be myself.
Simply myself. I know my own heart and understand my fellow man.
But I am unlike any one I have ever met; I will even venture to say that I am 
like no one in the whole world. I may be no better, but at least I am different.
(17)
His belief that he is so different from everyone else in the world that no one will ever be 
able to understand him resembles the egocentric tantrum o f  a teenager. His immaturity 
aside, however, both Rousseau's assertion o f uniqueness and promise to reveal his true
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self are relatively unexplored concepts in the eighteenth century. With the exception o f 
Montaigne, whose Essays showed the change in Western European culture from 
Augustine's Christian community to an increasingly secular society where the 
autobiographer now had the responsibility o f  illuminating the private facets o f  the 
individual (Gusdorf 1980, 34), Rousseau is the first major autobiographer to present 
him self to an audience for its examination, recognition o f uniqueness, and approval.
By first asserting his uniqueness, then hoping that others will come to see 
similarities between themselves and him based on his behavior in certain situations, 
Rousseau is basically reiterating Augustine's belief regarding human nature. Augustine 
thought that all Christians had the same nature, although individual experiences along 
the Christian path to God may have been different. Rousseau's similar belief that his 
community will see themselves in his actions not only contradicts his statement that no 
one is like him but also condemns the nature o f  his society to one that is mean-spirited, 
irresponsible, and unconscionable.
Rousseau's delusional vision o f him self as a unique but ordinary man noted, he 
does point toward the changing idea o f the individual. The shift away from Christian- 
centered culture, the split in science and religion, and technological advances, such as 
that o f  the improved mirror at the end o f  the Middle Ages, all contributed to a new 
conception o f the individual by the eighteenth century (Eakin 1992, 84; Elbaz 1988, 41; 
Gusdorf 1980, 32). The individual was now seen as distinct from others rather than as a 
typical representation o f the community. As Guillemette Jolinston notes, "the collective 
self exists only through its prim itive foundations and cannot survive when confronted
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by a social world whose foundations rely not on primitive similarities between 
individuals, but on differences between them" (1990, 277). With this dissipation o f  the 
collective self comes not only the need to show how one stands out in a community but 
also how one may still be accepted into that community. Rousseau's comment, "You 
cannot judge...till you have read me to the end," (261) is a plea for acceptance by the 
community he believes cannot understand him but which, alongside and with greater 
consequence than God, judges him  nonetheless.
As Rousseau lays out his story for his readers' evaluation and judgem ent, he 
addresses the multiple institutions that judge and, hopefully, accept him. In addition to 
God, Rousseau is now judged by the judicial system; the literary, music, and 
philosophical communities; the aristocratic circle in which he mingles; his family; and 
the general public. The individual now has several private and public selves, quite 
possibly each with its own goals and agenda; this is far more complicated than 
Augustine's single life purpose that directed all facets o f life in his culture. Now that 
society considers the main purpose o f life to be to live well, individuals set their own 
life goals, which for Rousseau include various endeavors in music, literature, teaching, 
romance, and family—none o f  which has anything to do with living for God or preparing 
for an afterlife.
Because Rousseau splits him self among so many diverse groups, he cannot 
possibly be one persona that is identifiable as the same by each distinct group. He 
understands that Jean-Jacques must be different for each o f  these institutions, yet he 
remains surprised by his own behavior: "I think I have already observed that there are
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times when I am so unlike m yself that I might be taken for someone else o f an entirely
opposite character" (126). His recognition that the self is not constant and is sometimes
unrecognizable even to our own person is an idea so far ahead o f its time that it will be
picked up by the modernist autobiographers and remains an issue for scholars even
today. Because there is not a continuous, coherent self, Rousseau must create one. The
fact that a se lf must be created makes the se lf an object left to the perception o f others
(Lloyd 1986, 170). Rousseau is acutely aware o f this, which is why he desperately tries
to ensure that his readers understand who he is within, because the object alone from the
outside does not resemble its inside. In trying to gain the empathy o f  and prove his
worthiness to his community, Rousseau presents a version o f him self that explains why
he is who he is and how he became that complex, sometimes unrecognizable, person.
Obviously memory plays a key role in the creation o f this version, for without it
Rousseau could not select past events that contribute to the image he wishes to portray.
Rousseau, representative o f  a culture that emphasizes individuality, puts forth
descriptions o f his actions that distinguish his life from that o f others around him.
Gusdorf attributes this development in autobiography to the belief that:
The man who takes the trouble to tell o f  him self knows that it will not be 
repeated in the future; he has become more aware o f  differences than o f 
similarities...he believes it is a useful and valuable thing to fix his own image so 
that he can be certain it will not disappear like all things in this world. (30)
In striving to distinguish him self among the other members o f his society, Rousseau
reflects the aim in his culture, which is that individuals establish a permanent place for
themselves in an otherwise fleeting life. However, his desire to establish him self as
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absolutely different in order to ensure his place in history perhaps carries Rousseau to 
the extreme, where he certainly is remembered but in a most controversial light.
The need to assert one's self in a secular culture where the individual must 
answer to numerous institutions destroys any possibility o f a cohesive self, although 
Rousseau tries to create one. However, as he admits, when he tries to assemble the 
fragments o f his life into a continuous narrative, he has gaps that he must fill using his 
imagination (128). He recognizes that there are many sides to Jean-Jacques, and he tries 
to show all o f these in the hope that by presenting all o f  his sides he will create a whole. 
The limits of language in secular culture
Rousseau recognizes the difficulty in trying to construct a single coherent Jean-Jacques 
when he is actually composed o f many different fragments, each corresponding to 
various facets o f his public and private lives. His struggle to represent the self is 
compounded by the inadequacy of language to represent the inner experiences o f  those 
multiple facets o f  the self. Like Augustine, Rousseau is concerned that he will not be 
understood, hence his readers will never know the true Jean-Jacques. As de Mijolla 
writes, "Rousseau [in his autobiographical attempts] has repeatedly found his written 
selves inadequate, as what is private in him has gone public to be wrongly 
interpreted...his elegant verbal selves become strangers as they are read by others, only 
to find, time and again, that his words belong to the world and he is all alone, still 
untold" (1994, 83). Rousseau tries repeatedly, relating story upon story in hope that 
eventually he will tell the one which crystallizes the "true" Jean-Jacques, i.e., the one he 
believes him self to be. However, just as he never comes upon the definitive story of
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Jean-Jacques, he also fails to find the language that fully translates his feelings. His 
failures ultimately occur because none o f these goals is realistically attainable. Critical 
o f  Rousseau, de M ijolla argues that Rousseau's insistence that language fails is actually 
more the shortcoming o f  Rousseau's depth and not that o f  language (1994, 84).
Rousseau may have his shortcomings, but, to his credit, his assessment o f  the limit of 
language is not one o f  them.
Augustine's frustration with language resides in knowing that, in not being able 
to convey meaning or experience exactly, he falls short in his didactic purpose for 
writing his confessions. Rousseau, not interested in being an example o f Christian 
living, is frantic, almost to the point o f neurosis, because, if  he cannot show in language 
who he really is inside, people will not understand and accept his behavior, which from 
the outside appears less than admirable. Early in the text he states, "I should not fulfil 
the aim o f this book if  I did not at the same time reveal my inner feelings," (88) but 
soon follows with the acknowledgment that, "Feelings can only be described in terms o f 
their effects" (105). He articulates the belief that there is no language for describing 
one's inner experiences and changes. The best a writer can hope to do is describe the 
physical or external manifestations o f  the inner experience. Words alone are merely 
suggestions o f what one really thinks and feels, and these suggestions become fainter 
and less effective as culture becomes more secular, splitting the common base o f 
experience into smaller, more numerous pieces.
It makes sense that our ability to understand one another stems from our 
identification with one another. Augustine struggled with the inability o f language to
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express his meaning, and he had the advantage o f a well-defined Christian community
possessing the same set o f  beliefs and goals. As the shared values and common
experiences o f a society begin to disappear, as they do in Rousseau's secular culture, it
becomes increasingly difficult for individuals with separate agendas to identify with
and, therefore, understand one another. N. Katherine Hayles comments on the
breakdown o f  story in postmodern culture;
the texture o f  life [is] created from a wealth o f small shared moments...In the 
absence o f these shared contexts, experience is incommunicable. Facts can be 
told; events can be narrated; but experience cannot be shared, for the cloth out 
o f which it is woven has been destroyed. (1990, 238)
Hayles' observation may be about postmodern culture, but these contemporary ideas are
certainly traceable in Rousseau's The Confessions, where we see the early stages o f  the
unraveling o f common experience in his culture. As individuals are affected by
different stimuli, each person becomes a unique composite, and metaphors cease to have
the same meaning for various people. The metaphors are no longer effective; the
language is inadequate.
Forging the self through narrative in autobiography to reflect cultural constructs
Like Augustine, Rousseau uses writing style in his autobiography to reflect cultural 
constructs and to reinforce his purpose for writing. Rousseau's choice o f the narrative 
frame and picaresque novel styling makes the text more accessible to readers o f  the 
popular literary genre o f the day, i.e., the novel. Furthermore, Rousseau believes his 
stylistic approach infuses The Confessions with a greater sense o f  accuracy and veracity 
because he reportedly addresses an actual audience that is present to scrutinize his story
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and judge his character. In this regard, the form works to Rousseau's advantage in 
helping him to appear to prove his worthiness. The presence o f the audience sitting in 
wait to approve o f Rousseau's story acts as a  substitute for the rest o f society which 
looks upon, hears, and judges Rousseau. If  Rousseau can convince his audience of 
Mme d'Egmont and her companions that he possesses honesty and integrity, then 
perhaps his reading audience (the rest o f society) will be persuaded to follow suit. 
Rousseau is not alone in his position o f  being judged by his society; like Augustine, he 
is representative o f his culture. In Rousseau's society, everyone judges and is judged by 
the community.
The narrative form, in addition to following the popular literary genre and 
creating the illusion o f honesty on the writer's part, imposes a linear order that joins 
disparate events in the autobiographer's life. In The Order o f  Things: An Archaeology 
o f  the Human Sciences, Foucault describes the capacity o f language both to fragment 
the "monotony o f space" while it simultaneously unifies the "diversity of temporal 
succession" (1970, 113). Rousseau, aware o f  the fragmented self that has developed in 
his secular culture, where an individual has many private and public faces, uses 
language in the attempt to unify these different selves, to link together his pieces of 
time, and to create a complete story. This story—made possible through access to 
memory, language, and narrative—fulfills the needs o f both Rousseau (for his own 
sanity and sense o f coherency) and his readers (in their desire for a seamless, finished 
tale).
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The fluid, chronological story that Rousseau presents follows the cultural belief 
that nature follows a linear order—a belief that was prevalent in Augustine's time and 
which went unchallenged until the end o f  the eighteenth century (Foucault 1970;
Hayles 1990). At the time Rousseau was writing The Confessions, the belief that nature 
was linear was still privileged and was reflected in the approach to technology, as with 
the linear model telegraph. However, Rousseau's work reflects the loosening o f  this 
cultural truth. The cultural desire for linear, clironological order remains, but the 
recognition that this order may not be as natural as it was once thought to be is 
beginning to take place—if not yet in the open dialogue between scholars, then at least in 
the subconscious motivations o f writers such as Rousseau. While Rousseau does try to 
arrange the details and letters o f his life into their "proper order," (561) he does so to 
show the succession o f  events in a life that progresses in time.
Unlike Augustine, Rousseau does not write extensively either about the mind's 
power to produce things in a perfect order or at all about its capacity to lead us straight 
up toward God. Culture may still prefer linear order, but the degree to which this order 
is considered natural is starting to come into question, as we see with the difficulty 
Rousseau has in maintaining that order when trying to represent the self truthfully 
without fictionalizing. His claim to have control over memories, unlike Augustine 
whose memories "flood forth" hopefully in perfect order, indicates the need to control, 
to impose a particular order where one realizes (even if one does not acknowledge) that 
particular order does not exist. His claim to "call up" memories like a telegraph is an 
example both o f the influence o f technology on thinking and writing and o f how he
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must impose linear order where it is not present. When he writes, "I can no longer 
reduce my story to any sort o f  order. Henceforth, I shall be obliged to arrange my facts 
haphazard, as they come to my mind," (553) he seems at a loss, as if  he has somehow 
failed because he is unable to impose the expected order on his life. What he does not 
recognize is the cultural implication o f his observation. A shift in cultural 
understanding o f order is occurring during Rousseau's lifetime. The previous belief that 
nature is linear is beginning to give way to other ideas regarding order and coherency. 
Where Rousseau considers non-chronological association o f  memories to be 
problematic and haphazard, subsequent writers will embrace these associations as a 
more natural type o f  order, calling it stream-of-consciousness.
Memory and narrative in Rousseau's The Confessions also reflects the individual 
need within one's culture to establish oneself as a  distinct, respectable entity in a secular 
society. It is only through memory that individuals can tell their own stories, thus 
creating their identities both for themselves and their public. Because society as a 
whole no longer firmly believes that the life story continues and acquires meaning in the 
afterlife, individuals must somehow find meaning and purpose in this life. Memory and 
narrative provide the means through which individuals can do just that—search, 
evaluate, and arrange their lives into a meaningful, coherent story, which in the end 
produces some semblance o f  a unified self. When Rousseau mentions how he 
sometimes acts out o f  character—as when he schemes dinner and lodging out o f  M. 
Reydet (126)— he shows that the self is actually fragmented, many pieces o f which seem 
so different in composition that they cannot possibly be related to one another in one
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person, yet they must be. The difficulty in representing these many selves textually and 
in assimilating these fragments into one whole increases as society becomes more 
diversified. The Confessions reflects the growing problem o f representing a whole self 
that is breaking into numerous fragmented public and private selves. Rousseau's text is 
a pulse point at which we can determine the beginning o f a  cultural awakening to the 
dissolution o f the idea o f a single, unified self.
Rousseau's self-consciousness regarding the split between his private and public 
selves marks a "turning point," as Ann Hartle calls it, in Rousseau's life (1983, 139). It 
is at this point, when Rousseau begins his public life and tries to link it with his private 
life, that he realizes he will always be misinterpreted by others. As the division between 
public and private grows more distinct, he feels alone in his understanding o f the "true" 
Rousseau. His moment o f self-realization when looking back over his life is as 
significant as Augustine's religious conversion. Like Augustine, who relies on memory 
when describing his religious conversion, Rousseau also finds his moment o f self- 
realization when he reviews his life through memory. Rousseau's conversion—the 
instant in which he finds the change that defines who he is—occurs when he recognizes 
the complexity o f the self, i.e., its irreparable splitting. This recognition is also a 
moment o f cultural conversion, for the self will never again be able to be viewed as a 
whole, at least not in the same way that it was in Augustine's society.
Tracing the shift in culture from the time o f  Augustine to Rousseau as reflected 
in their representations o f the self, we can determine that as culture becomes more 
secular and diversified, it also becomes necessary for individuals to distinguish
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themselves in society. Rousseau's culture does not identify or define itself solely with 
the Church, as Augustine's culture did; and as culture identifies with an increasing 
number o f institutions, power to influence individuals is divided among these temporary 
institutions o f  authority. Whereas Augustine concerned himself with always behaving 
as a good Christian and staying on the track to God, Rousseau worries how scholars, the 
aristocracy, the law, and his family perceive his actions. In response to an increasing 
number o f social institutions acting upon and shaping the individual, the self seemingly 
splits into more and more pieces, each very distinct in composition and unlikely to fit 
together again as a whole. Augustine saw that he was a man shattered in pieces who 
would come together finally with the help o f  God once he reached Him. Rousseau, too, 
sees he is a man in pieces but can only try to reassemble him self with the help o f 
imaginative embellishment, which in the end produces what resembles a patchwork 
quilt containing unrelated cloths that are joined only by a common thread, which 
Rousseau admits is imaginative, i.e., fiction. With his admission, the notion o f  a 
continuous, linear, complete selfhood can never again exist as simple fact; it cannot 
exist at all.
Just as Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies reveal the changing ideas 
regarding selfhood, both texts also reveal the effects o f  technology on communication, 
culture, and memory. As technology advanced from Augustine's to Rousseau's period, 
communication changed to reflect the technology, both in the actual tools available for 
communication (e.g., the printing press and telegraph) and in the metaphors inspired by 
these tools to explain the working o f the human mind. Similar ideas from seemingly
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unrelated fields began to emerge, as we see when Rousseau describes the working o f his 
memory in terms similar to the working o f the telegraph.
Along with the shifting views o f how memory works, eighteenth-century culture 
began to develop new schema to differentiate nature and human nature, because nature 
and human nature were no longer seen as reflective o f  one another (Foucault 1970). In 
Augustine's time, nature was thought to possess a linear order, and human nature 
aspired to mirror this "proper" order. By Rousseau's time, however, a fracture between 
nature and human nature was in place, and the linear view o f nature was being called 
into question. Human nature, however, because we are time-embedded creatures, still 
desired order, even if  it had to be imposed. The notion o f order in regard to memory 
and the self only becomes more complex as culture changes and technology advances. 
The avant-garde autobiographers who succeeded Rousseau provided approaches to 
order, memory, and selfhood that were valid and influential for their day, but credit is 
due to Rousseau for leading the way in modern autobiography and in providing the first 
view o f the fragmented self that yet remains an issue in contemporary autobiography.
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CHAPTER 3. AVANT-GARDE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
IN THE MODERN PERIOD:
THE DESIRE TO CREATE A UNIFIED SELF OUT OF PIECES
The emergence of modernism: significant cultural changes in the 100 years 
betkveen Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Gertrude Stein
Relative to the cultural changes that evolved in the 1300 years between St. Augustine 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the advances in technology and science as well as resulting 
shifts in commonly accepted social beliefs occurred at a rapid pace in the 100 years 
between Rousseau and the modernist writers. In his autobiography, The Autobiography 
o f  Henry Adams (1918), Henry Adams, a writer on the cusp on modernism, 
acknowledged the importance o f technology, specifically machinery, to his culture by 
providing a b rief history, noting particularly that the electric tram was introduced in 
1883, followed by the automobile in 1893. No doubt these advances in transportation 
were more than a convenience for Adams; they were an inspiration to his creative 
processes, as he writes, "he hoped to project his lines forward and backward 
indefinitely" (1931, 435) and, "matter was m otion-m otion was matter—the thing 
moved" (453). The advances in technology, in this case those involving movement, 
provided new vocabulary and metaphors through which Adams could convey his mental 
exploration o f  the self.
Developments in science 
The electric tram and automobile were only two o f the inventions that crucially affected 
society. The telegraph, which was introduced about the time o f  Rousseau's death, and 
the telephone, which followed in the early part o f the twentieth century,
63
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also increased the speed at which people communicated. As communication technology 
improved, researchers who studied the brain borrowed the language and models from 
that field to create metaphors to explain the working o f the brain. As Stephen Rose 
points out, "The telephone was even more promising [than the telegraph], for speech 
was here converted into patterns o f electrical flow across a wire. In a telephone 
exchange metaphor the brain processes messages coming in and going out; signals 
from eyes connected to muscle contractions in the leg and so forth" (1993, 77-78). This 
new metaphor simplified the explanation for how the brain and body performed 
mechanical operations; however, it did not explain how the brain handled memory, 
which is critical to defining the self. Although the telephone exchange model provided 
a layman's explanation for the working o f  the brain, this explanation would remain 
strictly theoretical until science could provide physical p roof o f its plausibility.
Advances in technology in the nineteenth century were accompanied by 
changing views in science. Although scientists since antiquity were aware o f the forces 
of electricity and magnetism and even studied them to some degree in the 1600s and 
1700s, significant advances in understanding these forces did not occur until the mid- 
1800s when James Maxwell developed the electromagnetic theory (Penrose 1989, 184). 
In his study Maxwell determined that electric and magnetic fields push each other 
through space, causing the fields to oscillate and carry definite amounts o f energy with 
them (Penrose 1989, 186-187). Maxwell's discovery o f electromagnetic fields coupled 
with communication technology advances involving electricity (e.g., radio waves) 
provided points o f  research for scientists interested in studying the movement o f  energy
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through the brain. In 1885 Hermann Ebbinghaus published a book on memory that 
called for scientists and psychologists to reject speculation and to study mental 
processes with more quantitative methods, such as those used in physics and biology 
(Rose 1993, 107).
As science became more experimental or invasive, theories regarding the brain
began to support the metaphors that had grown out o f fields such as communication
technology. Biochemistry—the predecessor to neurochemistry—emerged in the 1910s
(Rose 1993, 39), bringing with it a new understanding o f the brain. Rose points out the
relationship between communication technology, metaphors o f how the brain functions,
and actual quantitative brain research:
When, during the 1920s, it was discovered that the brain was indeed in a state o f 
ceaseless electrical flux, that electrodes placed on the scalp could detect regular 
bursts and rhythmic waves o f electrical activity changing with thought and rest, 
sleep and wakefulness, this was instantly assimilated to the telephone exchange 
model, with subscribers dialling in and being connected to their required 
addresses by a central operator. (1993, 78)
Possessing a better understanding o f  the physical working o f  the brain, scientists began
to question the more complex issue o f  memory, as evidenced by the more than 200
studies on eidetic (photographic) memory alone that were published before 1935 (Rose
1993, 103). The surge o f  interest in memory would not relent; it remains an issue for
writers and researchers curious with the role o f memory in self-identity.
As science began to solve more o f the mysteries o f life that Augustine's and even
Rousseau's culture attributed to God, providence lost its power as the single force that
directed the world. The providential straight path to God that gave purpose to life in
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Augustine's culture began to splinter in Rousseau's secular culture to suit worldly 
pursuits, but progressed linearly forward nonetheless, ending with death. Paralleling 
this direction during the early 1800s were developments in science, specifically the 
second law o f thermodynamics, which explained entropy. In an isolated system, 
entropy, which is movement toward disorder or the loss o f energy, increases with time 
(Penrose 1989, 309). This would explain our forward progression toward death—a sort 
o f ordered movement toward disorder arising from a total loss o f  energy. Although the 
prevailing scientific laws could not be used to answer all o f the mysteries o f nature, this 
rejection o f  providence as the explanation o f life continued in the nineteenth century as 
scientists later became somewhat familiar with nonlinear equations and their application 
to discontinuous phenomena, such as explosions and high winds (John Briggs and F. 
David Peat 1990, 23). The recognition o f  nonlinearity in nature further diminished the 
authority o f  providence as the controller o f order and life's meaning in a secular culture.
Because nature and human nature continued to be compared, when scientists 
began to detect nonlinearity in nature they also began to investigate what was 
traditionally seen as nonlinearity, or discontinuity, in human nature. As science 
produced more and more ideas that seemed contrary to those for so long accepted as 
God's truths, and the concepts o f nonlinearity in nature and discontinuity in human 
nature took hold, the foundation o f "truth" in society was radically shaken. No longer 
was it possible to consider the world or life as inherently possessing a linear order; this 
was a characteristic that had to be created if  it were to exist at all.
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Developments in art
Artists interested in creating coherency or unity in their work needed new tools for the 
endeavor. To break from the traditions that had apparently perpetuated misguided 
notions o f  order, nature, life, and God, the avant-garde modernists rejected the limited 
literary forms that had been available to them. They celebrated the creative medium for 
what it was instead o f  merely for what it could represent. They questioned cultural 
hierarchies, seeing that each thing was as important as any other thing (Burns 1970, 19). 
They rejected the emotive language o f the Romantics and embraced more direct, 
descriptive language, such as that from the sciences, which were gaining prominence in 
and pervading society.
The rejection o f the traditional view o f  life in light o f cultural changes occurring 
because o f scientific discoveries manifested itself in distinct yet similar ways for the 
various arts. In the visual arts. Cubism reflected the idea that there was no center to a 
piece, but that a composition consisted o f  equally important parts that needed to be seen 
in a completely new way so that they might be seen for the first time again without 
prejudice or preconceived value. Gertrude Stein described Pablo Picasso's Cubism as 
the attempt to see as a child who sees only a part o f  his mother's body or face, not the 
whole as an adult does. She said Picasso paints "to express things seen not as one 
knows them but as they are when one sees them without remembering having looked at 
them" (Burns 1970, 22). According to structuralist Randa Dubnik, "Both Picasso and 
Stein, in their pre-1912 work, present the fleeting, fragmentary nature o f perception, and 
represent the integrity o f the individual moment o f perception before consolidation by
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memory into a conceptual whole" (1984, 4). Dubnik points out that structuralist 
theories see these similarities as evidence that Cubism lends itself well to literature 
because the nature o f  language itself is concerned with perception and signification 
(1984, X V ).
Stein, o f  course, was not alone in her pursuit o f a new approach to writing that 
would reflect the way she saw the world. Because in a given culture similar ideas arise 
in different fields at the same time (Hayles 1990, xi), many avant-garde writers at the 
beginning o f the twentieth century created texts that were described as Cubist, showing 
an idea or subject in disconnected parts from multiple perspectives within a single work. 
For example, Paul Auster in his book on twentieth-century French poetry remarks that 
the works o f Max Jacob, Blaise Cendrars, Pierre Reverdy, and Guillaume Apollinaire 
are frequently described as Cubist because they exhibit "simultaneity, juxtaposition,
[and] an acute feeling for the jaggedness o f the real" (1984, xxxv). He explains that 
Reverdy's technique o f accumulating or synthesizing fragments into a whole in his 
poems was an entirely new approach to the poetic image, which was necessary because 
Reverdy believed that the poetic image was a creation o f the mind, not a representation 
o f what he saw (ed. Auster 1984, xxxv). Fragmenting an image decentralizes it, and the 
artists believed this promoted the sense o f movement in the work, a trait Gertrude Stein 
similarly admired about the painting o f Paul Cézanne and tried to achieve in her own 
writing (Stein 1937, 321).
The concepts o f movement, perspective, fragmentation, and decentralization 
prevalent in the avant-garde art o f  the early twentieth century reflected the concerns o f
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culture at the time. As Rousseau's The Confessions first suggested, the belief in the self 
as a continuous, single being was no longer plausible. This idea is illuminated further in 
Adams' autobiography: " The young man knew no longer what character he bore. 
Private secretary in the morning, son in the afternoon, young man about town in the 
evening" (1931, 194). The division o f the self among numerous responsibilities or 
social institutions continued into the twentieth century, but accompanying these 
divisions that resulted from an evolving society was a change in human character and 
relations. Virginia W oolf wrote that "in or about December, 1910, human character 
changed...all human relations have shifted—those between masters and servants, 
husbands and wives, parents and children. And when human relations change there is at 
the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature" (quoted in Con 
Davis and Schleifer 1989, 15), Changes in every facet o f  society indicate a shift in 
cultural beliefs and hierarchies. When hierarchies are called into question, established 
ideas that center or define a culture are also disrupted, and this is reflected in the art o f 
the Cubists and avant-garde autobiographers in the modemist period that focuses on 
fragmentation, new perspective, and decentralization.
Although the modernists recognized that the shift in established cultural 
hierarchies and human relations shattered how individuals defined themselves, thus 
compounding the problem o f trying to see the self as continuous, they did not embrace 
the idea o f a discontinuous self the way in which the postmodernists would. Instead, 
since the modernists could not represent a unified self, they attempted to create a 
unified self in their art. Adams believed that in 1900 philosophers and scientists were
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continuing to promote a "unity unproved and an order [i.e., linear] they had themselves 
disproved" (1931, 495); and although the avant-garde artists attempted to break from 
established order, they, too, continued to promote a unity that simply did not exist. 
Through either Cubism or stream-of-consciousness or texts containing multiple 
perspectives o f  the same event (as in W oolfs Moments o f  Being), the artists tried 
relentlessly to create something that could represent all o f what composed an individual. 
Despite their numerous approaches, they ultimately felt that they could not achieve an 
accurate picture o f the self in text.
The combination o f  similar developments from the various fields o f  science, 
communication technology, brain research, and art led to a view o f the se lf as a 
discontinuous entity. The coincidence o f ideas from many areas is usually not due to 
chance but to the fact that the ideas are general concerns underlying the entire current 
culture (Hayles 1990, xi). During the modemist period, irreversible changes regarding 
the self occurred. Not only did scientists, philosophers, and avant-garde artists view the 
self as fragmented, but they challenged the idea o f  representing or recreating the self 
through memory. Memory has always been the facility through which any form o f  self- 
identity is possible; however, the shape o f that identity is limited or determined by 
numerous external forces. Artists such as Stein, Adams, Picasso, and W oolf used 
memory in the attempt to construct or create a whole self from partial, inadequate, and 
inaccurate glimpses. They, following in the practice o f Rousseau, presented as many 
perspectives o f the self as they could in their work in the attempt to somehow create a 
cohesive whole within the work itself.
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Representation of culture in Gertrude Stein's autobiographies: The Autobiography 
o f  Alice B. Toklas and Everybody’s Autobiography as reflections of an increasingly 
secular and global society
By the beginning of the twentieth century, science was answering many o f  the mysteries 
o f life that had previously been attributed to God and was dispelling many o f the 
"truths" regarding nature, particularly the belief that linear order was inlierent in nature. 
As the findings o f science gained validity, technology derived from scientific theories 
regarding electricity and nonlinearity also became commonplace in society, in turn, 
further supporting the new truths o f science. While many factions o f the modemist 
movement shunned teclinology, some, such as the Futurists and avant-garde artists like 
Stein recognized the role o f science and technology in society and incorporated it in 
varying degrees into their work. Fascinated by the possibilities she saw available 
through science and having had first-hand experience in the discipline as a medical 
student at Johns Hopkins, she writes, "Science meant everything and any one who had 
an active mind could complete mechanics and evolution, philosophy was not 
interesting, it like religion was satisfaction in a solution but science meant that a 
solution was aw ay  to a problem" (1937, 251). What Stein found so interesting about 
science was not that it provided a final, definitive answer, but that it offered a way to 
explore and alter the hierarchy o f cultural truths, because "the laws o f science are like 
all laws they are paper laws," (1937, 251) thus they and the beliefs o f culture are 
impermanent. For Stein, science and technology have the power to shape culture, and 
she reinforces this idea in her autobiographies by showing how these fields affect her 
very personal world as a writer.
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Some artists considered the presence o f  technology in art, particularly its role in 
the mass reproduction and distribution o f  works, as the demise o f the individual artist 
and art work (Huyssen 1986, 9; De Lauretis 1980, 82; Taylor 1989, 456). Others, 
however, embraced technology for the new  creative potentials it opened in art and for its 
ability to connect art and everyday life. This union made art more accessible to people 
outside o f the art community. Regarding the role o f technology in the post-1917 avant- 
garde art movement, Teresa De Lauretis comments, "Changes in technological 
production bring about changes in the everyday life world which then are taken up 
(reflected, represented, reutilized, transformed) in art and literature. More importantly: 
these changes in technology transform the technological structure o f  art production 
its e lf  (1980, 82). In her autobiographies, Stein makes direct reference to numerous 
technological advances that have been incorporated into her life. In The Autobiography 
o f  Alice B. Toklas, she writes about installing electric radiators in her studio, resulting in 
her servant calling her modern for doing so (246). She goes on to say that her servant 
"finds it difficult to understand why we are not more modern. Gertrude Stein says that if 
you are way ahead with your head you naturally are old fashioned and regular in your 
daily life" (246). Stein and Toklas, however, were far from old fashioned in any sense.
In the case o f their everyday lives, they surrounded themselves with modern 
conveniences like the telephone, radio, and automobile. It is unlikely that anyone who 
could have a car sent from the United States to Paris during World War I was 
considered behind the time. To the contrary, Stein's economic privilege allowed her 
access to new technological inventions that most o f society could not attain.
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In addition to owning the latest conveniences, Stein also had access to the most 
current modes o f  public transportation, including flying in airplanes. The mere presence 
o f these advances in society does not merit inclusion in the study o f  Stein's 
autobiographies. What makes these advances relevant to this study is how they improve 
the efficiency o f  communication in Stein's increasingly global society and how they 
influence how Stein sees and represents that world in her writing. When Stein had 
telephones installed at her rue de Fleurus and Bilignin homes, she joked, "now that I 
was going to be an author whose agent could place something I had o f course to have a 
telephone" (1937, 45). In the same way that the printing press increased the production 
rate o f texts, thus making a writer's work more accessible to a wider audience, 
broadcasts on radio (1937, 204) brought literature into the homes o f  people who 
otherwise may not have been exposed to Stein's work. Likewise, the telephone made it 
possible for Stein in Paris and her agent in the United States to negotiate editorial 
decisions, deadlines, publications, and speaking engagements that otherwise would have 
taken considerably longer to arrange by post.
These tools presented Stein and her work to a more far-reaching and varied 
audience than previously available, in turn, joining people who were geographically or 
economically divided. Stein observed this change in society due to technology, and in 
Everybody's Autobiography she describes it in terms o f walking through Paris: "I used 
to say one o f the things about Paris was that you never met any one you know when you 
were out walking. But now everything is changing and you know that is I well now any 
one often meets them people you know or people who know you" (1937, 12). She is
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fascinated with the double-edged phenomenon, that as technology improves
communication and transportation, the boundaries o f  the world begin to dissipate, thus
homogenizing her global society and allowing once isolated and distinct cultures to
influence each other. Her interest in this subject is explored in greater depth later in this
chapter as I discuss Stein's role o f  the self and representation o f  the individual.
Charles Caramello makes another connection between technology and
communication as it is reflected in Stein's work. He writes:
At a clearly related second level, she is drawing a parallel between increasingly 
modern and technologically accelerated means o f locomotion (standing, 
walking, driving, and in Everybody's Autobiography, flying) and equivalent 
means o f producing and disseminating representations (gossiping, 
writing/painting, broadcasting on radio, and in Everybody's Autobiography, 
filming). (1996, 157)
The parallel between technology and the production and distribution o f art that Stein
presents in her autobiographies later collides in the works o f postmodern artists. Andy
Warhol, for example, blatantly incorporated technology into his art and used it to mass
reproduce his work, exploding the convention o f  the unique art piece. Before this
would happen, however, Stein would show in her work how technology allowed her to
view the world from a new perspective (the air) and at a new pace.
In the next two chapter sections I will discuss how communication technology
affected the structure, and transportation affected the rhythm, o f  Stein's writing.
Leading into these discussions, however, is the distinction that Stein makes between the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Stein, the airplane and Cubism both defined the
line between the centuries by providing a new view o f the world—a fractured, disjointed
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picture that corresponded with cultural developments, including the nonlinear scientific 
theories, their resulting technologies, and industrialization. In Everybody's 
Autobiography, Stein writes that flying allowed her to see what the ground looked like 
from a new point o f view (197), thus giving her a new, twentieth-century perspective o f 
her world. Flying also allowed her to connect once distant and distinct places, bringing 
them into the schema o f her community. She elaborates on the impact o f  the airplane 
on her world view, the twentieth century, and art when, in Gertrude Stein on Picasso, 
she writes:
The automobile is the end o f  progress on the earth, it goes quicker but 
essentially the landscapes seen from an automobile are the same as landscapes 
seen from a carriage, a train, a waggon, or in walking. But the earth seen from 
an airplane is something else. So the twentieth century is not the same as the 
nineteenth century and it is very interesting knowing that Picasso has never seen 
the earth from an airplane, that being o f the twentieth century he inevitably knew 
that the earth is not the same as in the nineteenth century. (Bums 1970, 76)
This change in perspective brought on by the numerous cultural shifts is what Stein
shows us again and again in the content and form o f her autobiographies. She sets
herself up as the quintessential twentieth-century writer—breaking from all that has
preceded her—just as she attributes the airplane in travel and Picasso's Cubism in art as
cultural markers of the new century and new world view.
Narrative structure in Stein's autobiographies: resituating the fractured self in a 
culture that still desires order
Just as the narrative structure o f Augustine's and Rousseau's work reflected their 
culture's trends, Stein's narrative structure reflects the influence o f technology and art on 
her culture while providing a distinctly early twentieth-century idea o f order. Her books
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seemingly open with what Rousseau made the traditional introduction to an 
autobiography. The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas begins, "I was bom in San 
Francisco, California" (1933, 3) and continues with a brief description o f  family 
background. While this may appear to be a typical introduction, Stein has already 
broken from conventional expectations because this is information on Toklas (as Stein 
later reveals that "Gertrude Stein was born in Allegheny, Pennsylvania" [69]); and 
although the book may be titled as Toklas' life story, no one mistook it for anything but 
Stein's autobiography. Stein's break from literary convention with the first line, with the 
title, with the instant that the idea o f  writing the book in Toklas' voice entered her mind, 
is a break that follows throughout the entire text and is a part o f every aspect o f  her 
writing. In Everybody's Autobiography, she drops the pretense o f writing from Toklas' 
voice, but the narrative structure remains as nonconventional and fresh as that o f The 
Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas, refusing to conform to an expected progression o f 
straightforward chronology and singular, definitive perspective. From the moment the 
reader picks up either o f Stein's autobiographies, expectations regarding the form, 
content, and purpose o f autobiography are challenged.
I f  readers were only to peruse the chapter headings in the autobiographies, they 
would find that the texts overall follow a clironological order, starting with some point 
in the past—be it the detail o f birth or moment o f  inspiration to write the book—and 
progressing to the present time o f writing. This chronological development, which was 
also present in Augustine's and Rousseau's texts, more closely parallels Rousseau's 
purpose for such an order. That is, it supports the idea that humans are time-embedded
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creatures who move and develop in time, even i f  meaning or understanding does not 
necessarily coincide with this chronological movement.
This organization o f  chapters is the only element o f linearity that Stein follows. 
Beyond this element, she resists linear notions o f  order that were disputed by science as 
far back as the eighteenth century yet remained characteristic o f the art o f the nineteenth 
century (Adams 1918, 495; Briggs and Peat 1990, 24; Davis and Schleifer 1989, 18; 
and Taylor 1989, 301). Richard Bridgman describes the structure o f a particular chapter 
in The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas: "The fifth section, '1907-1914,' begins with 
Alice Toklas joining the household...and concludes at the precipice o f the first great 
war. Except for occasional notices o f the progress o f  The Making o f  Americans, the 
narrative is virtually random" (1970, 227). While Bridgman singles out a particular 
section, Stein's seeming random structure within chapters is typical o f both o f her 
autobiographies. However, what Bridgman concludes to be "virtually random" is 
Stein's attempt to maintain what she calls a constant present, and she does this by 
repeatedly pulling the reader out o f the story with reminders of, "But to come back to 
Roche," (1933, 45) "but all that will come much later," (1937, 2) and "now it is today"
(1937, 328). This is a way to see the fractured self as it is—moving and developing in 
all directions at once—and not as a fabricated linearly continuous being that has 
developed chronologically. The leaping o f time and stories in her texts also captures the 
movement o f the twentieth century, which is characterized by a shaking up o f order as a 
result o f developments in science and the first world war. She believed that the 
twentieth century had a rhythm that set it apart from the nineteenth century, making
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former approaches to narrative now inadequate or inappropriate. As she writes in 
Narration:
When one used to think o f narrative one meant a progressive telling o f  things 
that were progressively happening...But now we do not really know that 
anything is progressively happening instead there is a movement in every 
direction. (1935, 29)
The attempt to capture movement in every direction eliminates any distinct center from 
the text and is actually characteristic o f postmodernism, as David Antin's works 
discussed in later chapters reveal.
However, still a modernist, Stein ultimately hopes to create some unity or 
cohesion out o f  all this sporadic movement. Her intertextual tangents, repetitions, and 
fragments reflect the working o f  the mind as it remembers, but her overall structure 
remains the modern attempt to create a unified whole. For example, the first edition o f 
The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas contained 16 photographs. Bridgman points out 
that the final photograph, which also concluded the book, was o f the first page of the 
m anuscript-returning the reader to the beginning o f  the book (1970, 219). While the 
narrative moves all over in time within chapters, the chapters themselves progress 
chronologically, only to wrap the reader back around in time at the end o f the book— 
thus, ultimately, creating a type o f circular form o f unity or wholeness and defying 
conventional linearity that has a definite beginning and end.
The wandering structure o f Stein's narrative tracks the wandering o f  her mind as 
she remembers. Beyond this, however, it reveals the influence o f culture on her 
identity, which was a constant issue for Stein. Specifically in the autobiographies.
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Stein's first-hand knowledge o f science, exposure to technology, and personal 
involvement in the avant-garde art community all affect her and, as a result, determine 
how she presents, or rather creates herself in writing.
In part because she was in a position o f economic privilege, Stein was able to 
participate in a lifestyle few could enjoy. She was able to attend Harvard University 
and Johns Hopkins Medical School at the turn o f the century—no small achievement, 
particularly at a time when women were heavily excluded from such opportunities.
While at university and medical school, she researched brain tracts for a comparative 
work (Stein 1933, 81) and also studied automatic writing in psychology (Stein 1933,
78). Both o f  these interests apparently influenced her writing, as she had some sense o f 
the theories regarding how the brain works. Her narrative structure emulates these 
theories by providing a  sense that Stein is searching and presenting stories as they enter 
her mind. She does this with phrases, such as the earlier mentioned, "But to come back 
to Roche," (1933,45) which guide the reader through her mental journey. The 
discovery during the 1920s that the brain was in a constant electrical flux o f rhythmic 
waves (Rose 1993, 78) and studies in automatic writing to mirror this wave-like motion 
o f the brain are apparent in Stein's work, which jum ps from one piece o f a story to a 
piece o f another as an image or bit o f information sparks her to remember a different 
situation.
Stein's switching from story to story, which is more abrupt in Everybody's 
Autobiography than in her first work, demonstrates the concepts underlying nineteenth- 
century nonlinear dynamics. Scientists at the time were beginning to realize how
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prevalent nonlinear dynamics is in nature, which resulted in a better understanding o f
nature and new approaches to technology that affected everyday living (Briggs and Peat
1990, 23). This discovery in science not only led to a better understanding o f nature,
but its implications affected the view o f  human nature and identity as well. Briggs and
Peat distinguish between linear and nonlinear solutions in terms o f contemporary use:
In linear equations, the solution o f  one equation allows the solver to generalize 
to other solutions...nonlinear solutions tend to be stubbornly individual and 
peculiar. Unlike the smooth curves made by students plotting linear equations in 
high school math classes, plots o f nonlinear equations show breaks, loops, 
recursions—all kinds o f  turbulence. (1990, 24)
Nonlinear dynamics has impacted postmodernism more profoundly than it did
modernism. However, it still applies to Stein's period because the products o f the
equations have not changed, and Stein's texts, which also break, loop, and repeat,
exemplify nonlinear theory. She is caught in the modemist middle ground that
accompanies shifts in paradigms, in this case that in science regarding order/linearity
and disorder/nonlinearity.
The effect o f nonlinear solutions on Stein's cultural paradigm is detectable in her
work where individualism and fragmentation are emphasized. This paradigm is
radically different from the paradigms o f  Augustine's and Rousseau's culture. As
discussed previously, Augustine considered him self representative o f his Christian
culture, and this belief was supported by the definitive institution o f his society, i.e., the
Church. Moving away from this direct, providential relationship o f the individual and
the whole, Rousseau felt he was a  unique individual but still o f the same basic nature as
his community. This concept was supported by the cultural belief in linearity (and
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linear solutions, as Briggs and Peat explain, allow us to generalize an entire system 
based on an entity o f  that system), so we begin to see that as cultural "truths" change, 
they affect and reflect the view o f human nature. In this vein, Stein's autobiographies 
show that she is not representative o f  culture, even if  she would like to believe she can 
speak as everyone in Everybody's Autobiography, and her individual, fragmented 
identity is supported by scientific "truths" o f  her time. Stein's disjointed, recursive 
narrative simultaneously shows the movement o f  her mind while demonstrating how the 
principles o f  nonlinear dynamics in nature have changed the view o f individual identity 
in her culture. No longer can the individual represent all o f society, as David Antin's 
autobiographies make even clearer. Therefore, narrative structure must reflect the 
individual writer so that readers may come to understand better who that individual is.
Developments in science manifested themselves in everyday technology at the 
turn o f the century in the form o f inventions such as the telephone, radio, automobile, 
and airplane. These conveniences contributed to the changing face of culture and the 
manner in which individuals fit into and functioned within society. In The 
Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas, Stein references using the telephone, reading over the 
radio, and driving her Ford in service for France during the war. These technological 
advances eliminated geographical boundaries between Stein and her audience and 
worked on the principles that would be used as metaphors to describe the functioning 
mind. Likewise, improved transportation allowed Stein to move about more quickly 
and to reach distant places that otherwise would have been beyond her scope. While the 
automobile allowed Stein to see her environment more quickly in passing flashes, it was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
still a nineteenth-century view o f the world. It was not until the invention o f the
airplane that Stein in Everybody's Autobiography felt the twentieth century had arrived,
and with the new century was a corresponding art movement—Cubism—that influenced
her writing tremendously.
In her book, Ort Picasso, Stein attributes the making o f  Cubism to three factors:
First. The composition, because the way o f  living had changed, the composition 
o f living had extended and each thing was as important as any other thing. 
Secondly, the faith in what the eyes were seeing...commenced to 
diminish...[and]
Thirdly, the framing o f life, the need that a picture exist in its frame, 
remain in its frame was over. (ed. Bums 1970, 19)
What Stein saw as the forces that led to Cubism were the cultural changes that
distinguished the twentieth century from the nineteenth. This breakdown o f hierarchies,
elimination o f boundaries, and questioning o f what had always been accepted as true
created the need to find a new way o f  looking at the world; thus Cubism developed.
The twentieth century that Stein saw as very distinct from the nineteenth is
evident in Cubism. Contemporary art critic Gaston Diehl describes the work o f Picasso
as "simultaneous points o f view o f the same object or o f  fragmentation o f  various
objects glanced at" (1977, 46). No longer is one conventional or expected perspective
considered to be the definitive perspective. In a culture where hierarchies have been
disrupted and traditional centers removed, unfamiliar compositions emerge. Stein
writes about the correlation between what was happening in her society and how these
changes affected the art o f the period. In On Picasso she tells a story o f when Picasso
saw a camouflaged truck and immediately referred to it as Cubism (ed. Burns 1970, 18).
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In keeping with the new century, which was marked by changing beliefs in science and 
subsequent developments in technology, Stein believed that W orld War I was unique 
from any previous war. About the structure o f the war, she comments, "the composition 
was not a composition in which there was one man in the centre surrounded by a lot of 
other men but a composition that had neither a beginning nor an end, a composition of 
which one corner was as important as another comer, in fact the composition o f cubism" 
(ed. Burns 1970, 18-19). The unique composition of her society in the first world war, 
which she saw as Cubist, is what she strove to emulate in her writing. The structures o f 
her autobiographies do not resemble conventional, linear narrative structures, just as 
Cubist paintings do not look like any previous art. However, both o f  these art forms do 
reflect contemporary reality (Caramello 1996, 12) as seen from new perspectives 
brought about by changes in scientific views, cultural beliefs, or technology, such as 
airplanes.
With all these changes taking place, disrupting conventional orders and 
hierarchies, Stein's work, like Cubism, may appear to lack any center or unity. Borders 
may have dissipated and structures may have been rearranged, however, a desire for 
order still exists, and Stein reinforces this desire even within her nonconventional 
structure. In Everybody's Autobiography she describes the human desire for order and 
how she believes she escapes this need for structure by freeing her paintings from 
frames. She writes, "pictures have been imprisoned in frames, quite naturally and now 
when people are all all peoples are asking to be imprisoned in organization it is quite 
natural that pictures are trying to escape from the prison o f  framing. For many years I
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have taken all pictures out o f  their frames, I never keep them in them" (1933, 322).
Like the pictures without frames, she takes away the traditional narrative structure to 
"free" her writing. However, because society is becoming more global and cultures are 
meshing, identity is becoming threatened, and the human reaction is to create some line 
o f definition or organization that will allow one to retain a sense o f self-identity. The 
desire for traditional order, organization, and structure as seen through the resistance to 
the erosion o f recognizable self-identity is the same resistance Stein sees that readers 
have toward her writing, which refuses to follow traditional, recognizable narrative 
structure.
Although Stein's autobiographies do not possess traditional narrative structure, 
and although she proposes that she frees writing from order or structure, ultimately her 
work creates an order or cohesive whole. Like her love o f the detective novel in which 
"The detective, as logical force who, in solving the crime, tames the confusion 
unleashed by the mystery and therefore restores order and rationality," (Berry 1992,
146) Stein restores a sense o f  order and coherence by the end o f  her book, even as she 
sees everything moving in different directions. The solution to the mystery or the whole 
picture o f  Gertrude Stein, like the cryptogram in Everybody's Autobiography  that needs 
to be decoded, is self-contained between the covers o f  the text. Randa Dubnik assesses, 
"Both Picasso and Stein, in their pre-1912 work, present the fleeting, fragmentary nature 
o f  perception, and represent the integrity o f the individual moment o f  perception before 
consolidation by memory into a conceptual whole" (1984, 4). Dubnik sees that Stein's 
work presents a part o f the puzzle that is fully constructed only through memory; and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
although this is true, Stein's work also has a more micro-cohesiveness within the 
individual text, with its repetition and wrapping back to the beginning with photograph 
arrangement. Virginia Woolf, who also presented numerous perspectives and fragments 
to reflect reality more closely, writes in Moments o f  Being XhsA "It is only by putting it 
into words that I make it whole...it gives me...great delight to put the severed parts 
together" (1940, 72). Whereas Stein does not concede to wanting to create a unified 
whole, her autobiographies do exactly that—a point that makes her writing distinctly 
modern, as opposed to the postmodern work o f  David Antin that is discussed in the next 
two chapters.
The overall narrative structure o f  Stein's autobiographies supports the idea that 
humans are time-embedded creatures and reinforces the desire for a unified, cohesive 
whole, while the internal structure reflects the idea that the world is moving in every 
direction. The narrative structure in total, then, presents a view o f the se lf that is 
particularly twentieth century—the fragmented nature and repetition resembling the 
viewing o f  a Cubist painting, with the eye moving over the canvas, hitting the same 
object many times in relation to different things each time. This structure reinforces the 
notion that the self must be seen from a completely new perspective, influenced by 
different borders and removed from traditional hierarchies or roles (as W oolf said, 
human relations had all changed). W oolf gives distinct perspectives o f  the same event 
or person; Cubism breaks apart the expected composition o f an object; and Stein 
reveals a piece o f a story several times in a slightly new way each time out o f  the 
expected chronological order. All o f  these approaches force viewers to step back, to
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"see again" for the first time, because the self as it once was no longer exists. This
approach more realistically represents the se lf in conjunction with or in response to the
early twentieth-century western world. However, all o f these approaches also attempt to
make a whole out o f the pieces, to give the artist and viewer a sense o f cohesiveness and
order which does not exist in nature. Because this order must be created, attempts to do
so always are inadequate and will be abandoned later by the postmodern artists, who,
unlike the modernists, embrace the nonlinearity o f  nature.
Remembering and presenting information: the influence of literary trends, 
science, brain research, and communication on Stein's writing style as 
representation of memory
Stein's economic privilege afforded her opportunities that ultimately influenced not only 
what she wrote but how she wrote, which is generally the focus o f studies regarding her 
work. As a university student she was involved in studies o f automatic writing as well 
as o f the brain. At the beginning o f  the century, when she was in medical school, 
numerous theories regarding the working o f the brain were developing. For example, in 
1875 experimentation on the exposed brain o f  a rabbit revealed that there were electrical 
pulses in the brain (Rose 1993, 180). This finding led to the 1929 published work by 
Hans Berger in which he taped electrodes to the human scalp and recorded continuous 
bursts o f electricity pulsing through the brain. Berger's work was soon followed by 
neurophysiologists Edgar Adrian and Brian M atthews, who in the 1930s determined 
that "the brain's ceaseless electrical activity showed characteristic waveforms that varied 
with sleep and wakefulness, mental activity or tranquility" (Rose 1993, 180). These 
studies are representative o f the work that took place in brain research during the period
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in which Stein was also involved in the discipline. O f primary interest here is the 
pervasive theory that the brain is a system in constant electrical flux. The notion o f 
electrical flux is key, as it influenced the technologies o f the day, as well as the 
metaphors used to describe the way in which the brain operates.
In addition to invasive studies on the electric and chemical reactions in the brain, 
psychologists during the first part o f  the century were studying memory and automatic 
writing. By 1935 more than 200 studies had been published exploring the difference 
between childhood memory, which is eidetic (photographic or timeless), and adult 
memory, which is linear and time-bound (Rose 1993, 103-104). The way in which the 
brain remembers and translates that memory into language was studied in automatic 
writing. Stein's work is often described as an example o f automatic writing, and in 
Everybody's Autobiography Stein addresses this very point. She touches upon a 
newspaper article in which her writing is described as automatic writing, and she 
dismisses the theory, saying, "No. Writing should be very exact and one must realize 
what there is inside in one and then in some way it comes into words and the more 
exactly the words fit the emotion the more beautiful the words that is what does happen 
and anybody who knows anything knows that thing" (1937, 275). This sentence, which 
is typical o f  Stein's style, while dismissing automatic writing at the same time aims to 
create a sense o f  the mind in motion, o f the language bubbling to the surface and 
coming out o f  the pen. And while the content o f the sentence refuses to support the idea 
that it is completely automatic writing, the style contradicts that refusal, actually seems
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far from being language that simmered inside her head until it came out o f  the pen exact 
and perfect.
In The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas, she often thinks through a memory on 
the page as with the passage, "Who was there. We were there...and perhaps Marcelle 
Braque but this I do not remember" (1933, 106). Passages such as this are far from 
conveying perfected, exact thought, but are close to representing Stein's mind searching 
for the memory at that very moment in front o f the page and reader. No doubt when 
language is restructured to represent most closely the emotion it hopes to convey, it is 
most beautiful and perfect; but even Stein (who insists she does not correct, but 
sometimes cuts a little [1937, 320]) must edit to give the sense o f  language evolving in 
her head—which if  not in total is still the basic idea behind automatic writing.
The work that was being conducted by scientists and psychologists at the turn o f 
the century was also evident in the technologies o f the period. Inventions involving 
electric currents, such as telegraphs, telephones, and radios, resulted from the work in 
the sciences and, in turn, were used as metaphors, such as the telephone exchange 
metaphor described previously, to explain more simply to nonscientists the way in 
which the brain worked. While these metaphors continued to reduce explanations to 
basically linear procedures, the idea o f currents and waves that was dominating science 
was beginning to be explored by avant-garde artists as well, who were very interested in 
capturing movement in their works. Virginia W oolf in Moments o f  Being  goes so far as 
to describe what she calls her most important memory as one o f listening to waves, and
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she writes o f  this memory with the same rhythm that the waves originally had as their
sound moved through her senses and brain and into her memory. The passage reads:
If  life has a base that it stands upon, if  it is a bowl that one fills and fills and 
fills—then my bowl without a doubt stands upon this memory. It is o f  lying half 
asleep, half awake, in bed in the nursery at St. Ives. It is o f  hearing the waves 
breaking, one, two, one, two, and sending a splash o f  water over the beach; and 
then breaking, one, two, one, two, behind a yellow blind. (1940, 64)
The rhythm o f waves moving over the beach, pulsing through the brain, carrying the
reader through the text ties together the modernists' interest in capturing movement in
their work while using the metaphors from science that explain the motion o f the brain.
This interest in rhythm, o f  waves moving, be it in nature or writing or the brain, is
evident in all o f W oolfs writing; the bowl that gives one her identity, i.e., memory,
which fills and fills as waves o f experiences move through the senses, is the foundation
o f life that makes any meaning possible.
In keeping with the fascination with waves and motion, artists were also
influenced by other technological advances at the time, such as automobiles and
airplanes. Just as seeing the ground from the air provided a twentieth-century
perspective that related to the changing decentralized composition o f  artworks, such as
in Cubism and Stein's modern texts, modes o f transportation affected the pace o f
society, which Stein and her contemporaries tried to capture through their writing style
and brush stroke. She often refers to walking—how much she enjoys walking and how
much she walks every evening. In writing about her walking, she attempts to
reconstruct the rhythm o f her walking and the way in which the world moves around her
as she wanders and thinks. Her sentences tend to be lengthy and fluid, reemphasizing
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the point she makes while walking with Thomton Wilder: "we talked about writing and
telling anything and I said...I had really written thinking" (1937, 311). Unlike the
autobiographers who preceded her and who had as the center or focus o f  their text some
great conversion or life revelation, Stein believes her autobiography merely shows her
thinking, not her life. As Virginia W oolf points out, however, showing her thinking,
what makes one who one is, is the only way to understand who someone is to any
degree whatsoever. In her own autobiography, W oolf writes:
Here 1 come to one o f the memoir writer's difficulties—one o f the reasons why, 
though I read so many, so many are failures. They leave out the person to whom 
things happened. The reason is that it is so difficult to describe any human 
being. So they say: "This is what happened"; but they do not say what the 
person was like to whom it happened. And the events mean very little unless we 
know first to whom they happened. ( 1940, 65)
By W oolfs account, then, Stein's autobiographies, detailing the way in which Stein
assimilates information and events, reveal far more successfully who Stein is than does
an autobiography in which mere stories are related. Regardless o f what Stein's original
purpose may have been, the second autobiography continues to show her thinking, and
jum ps even more abruptly from thought to thought than the first text, which also
indicates the increasingly disjointed nature o f  a technologically advanced, faster-paced
mid-1930s society.
Stein's interest in capturing the movement o f the world developed as she became 
disenchanted with attempts to represent the inside character o f  people. In The 
Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas she writes, "it was during that summer [in Granada] 
that she first felt a desire to express the rhythm o f the visible world. It was a long
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tormenting process, she looked, listened and described. She always was, she always is, 
tormented by the problem o f the external and the internal" (1933, 119). Her desire is to 
capture the rhythm o f  the world, to show that, like the world, "she has a great deal o f 
inertia and once started keeps going until she starts somewhere else" (1933, 82). This 
inertia drives her text, like she drives her Ford, forward to a new beginning, a different 
way o f viewing or describing an event.
Stein's abandonment o f  representing the inside character o f  people and 
subsequent interest in demonstrating twentieth-century movement resulted in her 
recursive texts, as well as her further admiration for the visual artists o f her time. As 
previously discussed, she had great respect for Picasso's Cubist work as structural 
representations of a society with a new, decentered composition. Her fellowship with 
other painters and writers also influenced her work. Echoing Stein's words regarding 
the existence o f  movement in every direction in the twentieth century (Berry 1992, 140- 
141) was the observation o f her contemporary, French poet Blaise Cendrars, who said, 
"everything around me moves" (ed. Auster 1984, xxxv) and who tried to convey the 
feeling o f a single moment in his poems.
As technology improves, providing more efficient modes o f transportation and 
communication, the pace at which society operates and information travels increases.
The speed at which the external world moves affects the internal processing o f the brain, 
which is forced to accept and assimilate new quantities and types o f information as 
quickly and intermittently as it is presented. Stein gives the reader the impression of 
how information travels to and through her brain as it is first introduced to her and as
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she tries to remember it as she writes. In her attempt to present her working memory to
the reader, she writes lengthy, fluid sentences without much punctuation so that she may
convey the feeling o f  the event she is describing. For example, in Everybody's
Autobiography she tells the following story:
We had a quarrel and I was not expecting to see him, it was very easy seeing 
him everything being in confusion, I said and how did you come, oh Carley is 
outside in the car, we were o f course not seeing him, we had completely 
quarreled with him, so I went outside the gate and once more kissed Francis and 
thanked him and shook hands with Carley, but did not stop not seeing him, and 
then we had lunch and then we sent Jean and the Polish woman away, she said 
she had not come to be as happy as she hoped to have been but then she was 
certain it never could happen that she could come to be happy again and then 
Janet and her friend left Janet never does believe in staying, and the other two 
the Frenchwoman and the Englishwoman left and there we were once more 
looking for servants to have come in the house without our knowing anything 
about them. (64)
The passage, the length o f a full paragraph, is a single sentence with sparse punctuation 
that requires several readings for clarity. By the end o f  the sentence, Stein has used 
rhythm, length, and language successfully to create an atmosphere o f confusion and 
exhaustion to reflect the content o f  the passage. In this instance her writing style, as 
Dubnik points out, conveys "a sense o f process and duration, and o f the time it takes to 
know a person or understand an idea" (1984, 9). It is as if  Stein were aiming to create a 
sense o f what is referred to as real time, i.e., the actual time it takes for an idea to move 
through the brain as represented by the time it takes to read her words.
In trying to show another way in which the brain absorbs information, she uses a 
fragmented writing style to show the speed at which information travels in her society. 
When she abruptly changes topics or leaves ideas unfinished only to return to them
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later, especially in Everybody's Autobiography, she creates the feeling o f driving or 
flying, with images speeding past her. She cannot get all o f  her story out fast enough, as 
she begins so many passages with one idea and ends them with, "but all that will come 
much later," (1937, 2) prompting the reader to expect more o f  the tale to unfold later, 
but also creating a sense o f  urgency, o f being unable to say all she wants to say as it 
comes back to her. She tries to create the sense o f simultaneous communication 
reflective o f  the new reality o f  the twentieth century that postmodern writers later will 
develop more completely in their work.
The modern self in Stein's autobiographies
As the pace at which the world operated changed due to new technologies and scientific 
perspectives, the role o f  the individual in that society changed as well. Rousseau's The 
Confessions showed that the self was already becoming multifaceted as a result o f 
secularization. Henry Adams' autobiography further developed this idea, speaking o f 
the self in numerous persons and addressing the difficulty o f  trying to be one consistent 
being in many varied professional, social, and private situations. By the time Stein 
composed her autobiographies, the perception o f the self had fragmented to the point 
that reassembling the fragments had become the very subject o f  many works produced 
by modern artists, as evidenced in Cubist paintings and in the poetry o f  writers such as 
Pierre Reverdy, who synthesized fragments to form an image that he felt was "pure 
creation o f  the mind" (Auster 1984, xxxv). Likewise, Virginia W oolf in her 
autobiography, as mentioned previously, used her writing to assemble the severed parts 
o f her life into a whole story (1940, 72).
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Stein certainly wrote her autobiographies in this vein, providing readers with 
fragments and perspectives that together created a sense o f Stein's world, which was 
completed in the text even i f  in reality it lacked cohesion. She mentions in The 
Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas that the fragments o f  The Making o f  Americans when 
placed together produced a cohesive, whole view o f otherwise unrelated people (1933, 
249). In a similar manner, both The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas and Everybody's 
Autobiography present a collection o f stories and insights that alone may seem almost 
trivial but when considered with eveiything else in the text provide a Gertrude Stein for 
that particular text.
On Stein's use o f  autobiography as a genre, the critic S. C. Neuman comments, 
"Stein specifically sets herself against the tradition o f the composite portrait" and does 
not attempt to trace continuity in the self (1979, 16). While Stein sets herself against 
the traditional autobiographies that preceded her, she does not, as Neuman believes she 
does, abandon the notion o f  continuity in the self completely. She, like her 
contemporaries, attempts to create, not represent, a continuity, or sense o f  a complete 
self, that derives from many perspectives in the text. In her cryptogram in Everybody's 
Autobiography, the words m ust be decoded by the reader to reveal a comprehensible 
message. This whole must be formed out o f the pieces and is a fabrication o f the artist 
(whose work is completed, in part, by the reader), perpetuating the cultural desire for 
order. A more accurate representation o f the fragmented self would not come until the 
postmodern artists finally reject the attempt to restructure the fragments o f  the self into a 
false whole.
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Improvements in technology contributed largely to changes in culture which
demanded that individuals become more multifaceted in their social, professional, and
personal roles. It is virtually impossible to read Stein's autobiographies without
noticing her interest in how the technology o f  the twentieth century made all areas o f
the world more accessible. While this was, indeed, an advance in terms o f
communication, human relations, and experiencing the world in general, it also brought
with it a loss o f distinct communities or boundaries. And when boundaries disappear,
individual identity is threatened. Stein addresses this point in Everybody's
Autobiography. Regarding the difference in perspective between composing The
Making o f  Americans and Everybody's Autobiography, she writes:
At that time I did not realize that the earth is completely covered over with every 
one. In a way it was not then because every one was in a group and a group was 
separated from every other one, and so the character o f  every one was interesting 
because they were in relation but now since the earth is all covered over with 
every one there is really no relation between any one and so if  this Everybody's 
Autobiography is to be the Autobiography o f every one it is not to be o f  any 
connection between any one and any one because now there is none. ( 102)
As technology provides the means by which different cultures may be joined, the
boundaries between those cultures fade. As boundaries disappear, the need to maintain
a sense o f individual identity, o f  self-preservation, forces the individual to create new
lines o f  definition that make that person unique in a more homogeneous, secular world
(Daniel Dennett 1991, 174).
Unlike in Augustine's Christian community where the individual was at ease
being a microcosm o f his community, Stein's secular society encouraged its members to
make their own individual marks. Making one's mark becomes more challenging as the
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world becomes inereasingly homogeneous. The publisher's note in Everybody's 
Autobiography says, "Stein transforms herself into the representative American, turning 
her story into everybody's story" (1937, viii). While this may sound like a neatly 
packaged transition at first, Stein is hardly representative o f any typical American. At 
some point throughout the text, readers may identify with a particular part o f Stein; 
however, it is improbable that many Americans at all have experienced her privilege o f  
being independently wealthy, highly educated, openly lesbian (and, therefore, allowed 
to forgo the constraining social custom o f  marriage to a man), and associated with 
influential circles o f artists and political leaders. She mentions having tea with 
President and Mrs. Roosevelt (1937, 264) as if  it were almost commonplace, which is 
an indication either o f  her arrogance or o f  her ignorance o f how most "typical" people 
really do live.
Aware o f the breakdown in cultural boundaries, Stein strove to find and 
maintain a sense o f  individual identity in her world while accepting that her identity was 
increasingly intertwined with the influences around her. As she puts it in Everybody's 
Autobiography, "the world is getting all filled up with people and they all do the same 
thing" (1937, 46). I f  everyone does the same thing, differentiating the interchangeable 
becomes more difficult (Caramello 1996, 134). In The Autobiography o f  Alice B.
Toklas, Stein presents numerous stories about Picasso, Apollinaire, Matisse, as well as 
many other artists and friends specific to the life o f Gertrude Stein. Her sense o f what 
composes an autobiography is farther reaching than that o f Augustine or Rousseau, 
whose stories were always in some direct way about themselves. By expanding the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
boundary o f what is considered to be appropriate for her autobiography, Stein sends the 
message that this circle o f friends—the art and literary community o f  Paris during World 
War I—is who she is. This extension is necessary to defining Gertrude Stein. The idea 
o f the self as existing in any way other than as a part o f  all that surrounds her is not 
plausible.
As the parameters o f what is considered to be autobiography expanded in Stein's 
twentieth-century society, the position o f  the self within those parameters split and 
shifted, disrupting the traditional center or focus o f the life story as seen in works like 
Augustine's and Rousseau's. Certainly, each person was still the center o f her own 
existence. However, unlike in Augustine's and Rousseau's texts where every story was 
strictly about them, Stein's autobiographies position her alongside many other people. 
She shares space in her autobiography with the people in her life, and the portraits o f 
these other people do not necessarily have to have meaning for Stein or reveal anything 
about her at all. In her autobiographies, these other lives are important in their own 
right.
Like a Cubist painting in which familiar objects are dismantled and reassembled 
from a new perspective to allow the viewer to see again for the first time, Stein 
dismantles the conventional autobiographical form and reassembles it with 
discontinuous parts o f stories from many people's lives. She calls her studies o f  her 
friends "portraits," (1933, 114) and by dispersing bits o f them throughout the text next 
to stories about herself, she creates a type o f  coherency that is based on recurring 
themes and that is dependent on the text. W ithout the text, there would be no unity—
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there would be only random fragments o f stories. By using this technique, Stein forces 
the reader to reevaluate expectations concerning autobiography and what composes the 
self. She is making us see the self from a new perspective—much like a Cubist painting 
or landscape from the air—that is outside o f ourselves and that attempts to encompass 
the many varied roles o f  the self.
As Stein shows in her autobiographies, to represent the self as the sole focus o f 
the text is no longer possible or reasonable. To be more realistic, the self must be 
presented as part o f a more global community. Stein writes in Everybody's 
Autobiography that when she composed The Making o f  Americans she started with a 
history o f her family, then expanded it to a history of everyone her family knew, and 
then expanded it further to be a history o f everyone (1937, 113). The inclusion o f a 
more global community as the story o f  one's life indicates how the growing 
communication technology o f the early twentieth century had made the world more 
accessible. As a result, once unfamiliar cultures and people were now integral to 
defining individual identity and had to be acknowledged as part o f one's own personal 
history. This is not to say the self is a microcosm o f  the community or world, as it was 
in Augustine's culture. As philosopher-scientist Bart Kosko describes in his book Fuzzy 
Thinking: The New Science o f  Fuzzy Logic, "Every whole contains its parts...But in 
general the part differs from the whole. Here the part cannot totally contain the whole. 
But it always partially  contains the whole" (1993, 58). The pieces o f  the self that Stein 
presents do, in part, contain what defines Gertrude Stein, but none o f  the pieces can 
contain a representation o f  all that defines Stein. Again, like a Cubist painting, each
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piece holds something o f Stein and reveals something quite different each time it is 
considered in respect to another piece o f information or perspective. The parts are split 
and dispersed, eliminating the conventional center o f self and forging a new one, i.e., 
the art work itself.
Bringing the pieces o f the self together in the text as a way to create a whole 
picture o f  the self at the time o f writing reflects the fragmented nature o f early 
twentieth-century society while it also reflects the desire for order in human nature. The 
problem with this m odem approach is that it still promotes linearity, which contradicts 
all that had been discovered in science at the time. In a nonlinear world, the parts do not 
add up to the whole. However, it is human nature to try to force a linear model on a 
nonlinear world (Kosko 1993, 108). Although the avant-garde works o f the modem 
artists at first appear to reject linearity because they break from nonconventional 
presentation o f linear order, they still, nonetheless, achieve the same result—a completed 
whole. Writers and artists such as Stein recognized that the self was actually 
fragmented and developed in a nonlinear manner; however, trapped in the gap between 
reality and desire, they still attempted to force a linear model o f  "the parts add up to the 
whole" in their works. These artists have made steps to reflect the society around them 
by breaking objects into pieces, but all o f the pieces come together to create a false 
whole in the work.
Language as more than a tool of communication
The inadequacy o f language in the writer's quest to find just the right way in which to 
convey meaning has been addressed by all o f the autobiographers in this study.
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Undoubtedly, this issue is o f  great importance to all writers but is particularly a focus 
for writers who grapple with defining and revealing the self in their work. Augustine 
and Rousseau, as mentioned previously, were both concerned with ensuring that readers 
understood their intentions. Rousseau was somewhat distraught over the fact that he 
believed no one would ever understand who he was no matter how he said things in his 
book; therefore, he felt he would be misjudged by society. However, he continued 
trying to convey his inner emotions, hoping to be understood, but ultimately aware o f 
his failure in this venture.
The possibility o f representing the inside to the outside became more critical to 
modern writers as they reacted to the se lf splintering further in a growing technological 
and secular society. Henry Adams marked a turn in autobiography writing in that he 
departed from Rousseau's approach o f  attempting to reveal the self by laboriously 
describing one's inner emotions. Instead, he wrote o f the exterior, o f  the universe that 
had contributed to the development o f  the many sides o f  Henry Adams. Through 
understanding the world that acted upon Adams, the hope is that the reader will, in turn, 
recognize some o f those influences and experiences, assimilate them onto her own 
schema, and then arrive at some level o f  knowing who Adams may be beyond his public 
face.
Likewise, Stein's concern with what she called the inside and the outside was so 
great that she wrote about it specifically and at length in both o f  the autobiographies. In 
The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas she mentions her interest in "mixing the outside 
with the inside" (1933, 156) and how in Tender Buttons "she began to describe the
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inside as seen from the outside" (156). She, like many writers, however, found that it 
was virtually impossible to translate clearly the inside to the outside. The attempt to 
describe either in tem is o f the other was as futile as trying to represent a painting in 
music; the two mediums are not reducible to each other's terms. She had come upon 
the same problem o f  defining the inner self to outside people with which other 
autobiographers had struggled. Her contemporary, Virginia Woolf, wrote in her 
autobiography about the difficulty o f  making one's self understood, o f describing the 
human being to whom things happened, and, therefore, conveying the implications o f 
personal experiences (1940, 211). In the same vein, Stein argues in Everybody's 
Autobiography that everyone likes mechanics because they can only mean one thing to 
everyone, whereas everything else (e.g., emotions) has a different meaning for every 
individual. She writes, "nobody means the same thing by what they say as the other one 
means and only the one who is talking thinks he means what he is saying even though 
he knows very well that that is not what he is saying" (1937, 299). Even as one is 
uttering the words to describe the inside, she is conscious that the language is failing 
and the meaning is distorted.
Realizing the certain failure in trying to describe the inside in terms o f  the 
outside, and "possessed by the intellectual passion for exactitude in the description o f 
inner and outer reality," Stein broke from "associational emotion in poetry and prose" 
and embraced, instead, the "exact reproduction o f either an outer or an inner reality" 
(Stein 1933, 211). Neither emotions nor their results should be either the cause or 
material o f writing. This clinical attitude toward writing resembles the objective.
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detailed approach toward description in the sciences with which Stein was intimate.
Her insistence on keeping the inside and outside separate, as she says in Everybody's 
Autobiography, maintains their unique functions and by doing so makes it necessary for 
the self, whatever that is, to exist as the vessel between the two (1937, 271-272). 
Establishing distinction in order to maintain identity or selfhood parallels Stein's 
comment regarding the dissipation o f  geographical borders as global communication 
technology improved, making it necessary to find and assert one's uniqueness in a 
society where everyone seems interchangeable.
Stein's effort to establish objectivity and maintain the distinction between the 
inside and the outside translated into the distancing o f the narrative voice from the 
subject's life described in her autobiography. However, she is not the first writer to 
address the difficulty in describing a self that is constantly changing and, therefore, 
indefinable. Prior to Stein, Henry Adams attempted to establish objectivity in 
representing the multisided, changing self by writing his autobiography in the third 
person. For Adams, when he considers how his existence is reflected in his memory, he 
sees many forces and perspectives o f Henry Adams, but he does not, cannot, see the self 
or 1 o f  the present moment. As a result, Adams refers to him self as Henry Adams, the 
boy, he, one, the secretary, the traveler, and so on, but never as 1, myself, or me. The 
voice he uses in the text reinforces both the reality that memory recalls a past self that 
no longer exists in the present and the notion that because the inner self cannot be 
conveyed adequately in the language o f the outside, the writer may as well speak o f
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one's own life as an outsider would, because when looking at our past selves that is 
ultimately what we are anyway.
Adams' use o f  the third person when talking about him self provided a way in 
which the autobiographer could attempt to view his own life objectively, without the 
emotion o f the internal experience coloring the description o f the outside. Taking 
Adams' approach even further, Stein, in The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas, writes 
about herself in the third person and behind the screen o f  another person as narrator 
altogether. In addition to letting Stein ignore information that she does not want to 
reveal to readers, writing in the voice o f Toklas provides Stein the distance o f an 
objective external voice. Using this technique, she writes about the outside from the 
outside, like a scientist, eliminating the problem o f inept translations she had found in 
trying to write about the inside from the outside.
Even in Everybody's Autobiography when she drops the voice o f Toklas, she 
continues the search for identity and the attempt to give language to that which has no 
language. Assuming her own voice, she describes the life o f Gertrude Stein as 
objectively or clinically as an external narrator by providing pieces o f stories as if she 
had merely turned on a recorder and absorbed all that was occurring around her. 
(Actually, some postmodern artists do take this very approach in their experimental 
writings; however, the recorder was not yet available when Stein was writing.)
Neuman sees Everybody's Autobiography as the fusion o f  theoiy and practice in that, 
"Both its subject and its form are the 'human mind.' 'Human minds,' lacking identity 
contact rather than relate to things" (1979, 47). Because o f its almost postmodern
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structure, Stein's second autobiography feels even more detached from the inside o f 
Gertrude Stein than the first. The second book does, however, create a picture o f how 
Gertrude Stein's mind processes the information and stimuli around her, even if  she is 
unable to give appropriate language to the effect that the information and stimuli have 
on the self. Readers may see how a human mind in the twentieth century reacts to the 
increasing pace o f society, but they also see that giving language to the internal changes 
that occur in reaction to society remains an unresolved problem for writers. Readers 
also get the sense that the inability to describe the inside is not entirely the shortcoming 
o f language, but that it is not possible to describe effectively that which is not 
completely understood. What is the self remains a universal unanswered question, and 
for Stein, even after probing the issue from numerous perspectives, voices, and persons, 
she still comes up unsatisfied in the end—reduced to the point o f saying, "perhaps I am 
not I even if  my little dog knows me" (1937, 328).
Stein's attempt to capture the motion o f the mind is the closest she brings readers 
to any representation o f the inside. While critic Ellen Berry (1992) argues that the 
fragmented nature o f Stein's narrative is postmodern, it actually aligns itself more with 
Cubism in that the artist's aim is for the fragments ultimately to compose a whole—an 
idea fundamentally modem, not postmodern. Many critics, and Stein herself in her 
autobiographies, have discussed the connection between Cubism or art in general and 
Stein's writing (Bridgman 1970; Burns 1970; Caramello 1996; Dubnik 1984). In 
Everybody's Autobiography, Stein acknowledges her admiration for the work o f the 
French poets, Cézanne, and the Cubists. Cézanne, she says, had the ability to paint "a
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feeling o f movement inside the painting not a painting o f a thing moving but the thing 
painted having inside it the existence o f movement" (1937, 321). Her own writing 
conveys a sense o f walking or flying in the world or thinking through an idea and 
arriving at a new place or epiphany at the same time that the pen does. Likewise, she 
felt that by destroying the centralization o f composition the Cubists "would arrive at 
movement being existing" (1937, 321).
When trying to convey a sense o f movement that corresponds with twentieth 
century culture, the visual arts prove more adept at simultaneously presenting 
information. Dubnik argues "that in painting, the isolated fragments are seen almost 
simultaneously, and each bit o f  visual information remains on the canvas while the 
mind reconstructs the entity portrayed. Reading goes much more slowly. Images are 
presented serially, and the entity portrayed appears less immediately than in painting" 
(1984, 24-25). Because painting is able to present images simultaneously and because, 
as stated previously, the movement o f  the eye allows the viewer to see a distinct image 
in relation to other different images numerous times, it surpasses writing as a medium 
for conveying the feeling o f the twentieth century. Stein knew this, but, as she was a 
writer and not a painter, her challenge was to imitate in her writing, which is a very 
linear medium, as closely as possible, the effect o f painting, which could be a nonlinear 
medium. In what was surely a limitation o f  language, Stein tried to realize potential.
To create a feeling o f  movement in her writing, she went beyond the use o f a disjointed 
narrative structure and long fluid sentences. She used language itself, in conjunction 
with structure and style, to construct a version o f the human mind in motion.
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Stein's use o f plain language in unusual linguistic constructions is directly linked 
to the ideas in Cubism o f capturing movement in the work and seeing familiar images 
new, as for the first time. These ideas were present in the works o f avant-garde artists in 
the early twentieth century, as Ezra Pound called for artists to "make it new." Literary 
theorists Robert Con Davis and Ronald Schleifer in describing the motivation o f 
Formalism write:
Since language is a medium o f  communication before it is used in art, its 
expressions and conventions inevitably will be overly familiar to the reader and 
too feeble to have a fresh or significant impact in a poem. To be made new and 
poetically useful, such language must be "defamiliarized" and "made strange" 
through linguistic displacement, which means deploying language in an unusual 
context or effecting its presentation in a novel way. (1989, 20)
Stein and the Cubists were both accused o f producing compositions that did not look
like reality, when, if  fact, these works came closer to contemporary reality and nature
because o f their shattered, decentered form than any work that presented a false,
continuous whole (Caramello 1996, 12).
Wliat critics and readers considered to be Stein's lack o f  clarity in her writing
(Stein 1933, 35) was actually a way for Stein to show language as more than only a tool
o f communication. By taking away standard punctuation and word order, Stein forces
readers to see language in unexpected combinations and to reread even the simplest o f
words for comprehension and subtleties in meaning when the same words or phrases are
considered in relation to a slightly different combination. Readers have to view each
word in relation to what precedes and follows it, often backtracking in an attempt to
pick up Stein's intention. This both causes the readers to see language new again, as if
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they are ju st learning to read, and provides an alternative to the strictly linear (or serial) 
method o f  reading. Stein's built-in repetition o f ideas along with the readers' going back 
and forth to reread adds a circular type o f progression to the text. I f  not entirely 
circular, the aim o f  the text certainly is to be nonlinear or recursive, like the movement 
o f the mind. In this, even though writing can never present simultaneous images as 
effectively as visual art can, Stein still manages to give a new dimension to writing— 
thus raising the potential o f  language beyond the inadequate communication o f the 
inside.
Forging the self through memory and writing style to reflect cultural constructs
Like the ground-breaking autobiographers before her, Stein uses writing style to present 
a picture o f  a self that aims to be both representative o f  society and unique at the same 
time. In Stein's case, the self is forged rather than reproduced in the text. To create the 
Gertrude Stein who appears in The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas and Everybody's 
Autobiography, Stein tracks the working o f her mind as it functions in early twentieth- 
century culture. Unlike her predecessors, however, she does not choose to write in an 
already popular literary genre, but, instead, leads the literary world by creating a style 
comparable to the compositions in other avant-garde art works that responded to the 
changing culture. Because these forms were avant-garde, they met with great resistance 
when introduced into society, as Stein tells about critics mocking and scratching at the 
paint o f  a Matisse work that they did not understand (1933, 35). These forms, as we 
know now, became standards for art and later proved to reveal more about
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contemporary culture than conventional forms, which were out o f touch with the day's 
accepted scientific ideas and technology.
Stein's autobiographies indicate that the literary theories prominent in what 
would become known as the modernist period were similar to ideas in other fields, such 
as art, science, and communication technology. The theories and ideas from these 
various disciplines (specifically those regarding nonlinearity in nature, electromagnetic 
currents, and the decentralization o f  established hierarchies) affected the role o f the 
individual in society and, in turn, how that individual defined selfhood. In the literary 
community, groups that would be termed the modernists, Russian Formalists, and New 
Critics had their own philosophies that often contradicted one another. Regardless o f 
where each group stood on the specifics o f  issues, the fact that between them they 
incited a dialogue on coherence, order, and unity challenged long-held cultural beliefs 
and called into question conventional hierarchies. While the literary community was 
doing its part to raise social awareness o f  changes in cultural constructs o f  "truth," it 
was sharing company with art movements such as Cubism and Surrealism, which also 
reflected the decentering o f established hierarchies and prevailing recognition that 
nature is nonlinear. These ideas, as discussed earlier, resulted directly from discoveries 
in science (such as nonlinear dynamics and electricity) and the technologies that were 
then developed using this knowledge (electrical appliances, telephones, radios, 
automobiles, and airplanes for example).
The many changes in the make-up o f society that, in part, resulted from new 
perspectives in science and developments in technology naturally affected the view o f
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the self and how writers expressed that self. By working backwards (as with memory) 
and examining how the self is presented in Stein's autobiographies, we can see the 
effects that the changes in culture had on the self. What is o f  partieular interest in this 
study is that the changes taking place in society did cause artists to be more 
introspective and to reveal that introspection in their work. This was a move away from 
nineteenth-century fictional novels and representational or external-to-the-self painting. 
In Everybody's Autobiography Stein tells o f a conversation with Dashiell Hammett 
during which they discussed how in the nineteenth century, men created interesting 
characters in literature but women always seemed to make their characters mere 
reproductions o f  themselves (1937, 34). However in the twentieth century, she says, the 
men, too, only write about themselves, and she asks Hammett why he him self does this. 
His response is that when writers have confidence they can make other people in their 
work, but when they have no confidence, as in the twentieth century, they cannot make 
other people because they need to hold on to themselves. What Stein and Hammett 
leave unsaid but understood is the reason men lost confidence in the twentieth century. 
Women—like any minority who, for the most part, were traditionally excluded from the 
literary community—when they were able to write needed to assert their own existence 
before they could even consider creating another character. For centuries, they had not 
been in positions o f privilege that would allow them to examine and determine who 
they were and, therefore, were not ready to create another; they first needed to create 
themselves. Likewise, in the twentieth century with the onset o f  two world wars and 
changes in science and technology, all contributing to a shift in cultural hierarchies and
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social roles, all notions o f  the self, including men's, became unstable. Because the "I" 
was no longer a singular, centered entity, as Rousseau began to address in The 
Confessions, the autobiographer needed to find the "I" through writing, through 
gathering the pieces in memory and assembling them into what could be labeled a 
whole person.
In attempting to create a whole person, Stein writes about what she calls the 
inside and the outside and that, because both are necessary to the formation o f the whole 
self, they must be kept separate and distinct. Although she theorized that she could 
keep the inside and outside separate when describing one or the other, they affect and 
change one another beyond human control. While the external world affects what we 
can do and how we can respond to its effects, our minds create and influence what 
occurs in the external world. The self acts more like a permeable membrane than a solid 
barrier or "vessel" between the two, and memory is necessary to translate information 
between the internal and external. The combination o f internal and external factors 
assembled by the faculty o f memory forges what we call our identity or self. As 
Richard Terdiman points out, memory is "the means by which the coherence o f our 
identity and our history is constructed and sustained" (1993, vii). W hat type o f 
coherency is possible in twentieth-century culture, as we have seen, is at best limited 
and is at least unconventional. O f note, though, is Terdiman's recognition that 
coherence and identity are constructions, not representations, o f the writers. Stein, as 
we know from previous discussions, was very interested in identity but was never able
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to determine satisfactorily what identity was, although she did construct a composition 
o f the self that reflected the composition o f  a fractured culture.
Stein's disjointed narrative mimics the nonlinear order o f nature and the 
fragmented manner in which actions and information from the world enter Stein's 
senses. Likewise, the fluid style o f her writing parallels scientific theories regarding the 
brain, with the development o f biochemistry and the resulting finding that the brain is in 
ceaseless electrical flux (Rose 1993, 78). The determination that nature is actually 
nonlinear led writers to reconsider the development o f the self, as well. In Everybody's 
Autobiography Stein writes about the relationship between the development o f  the self, 
time, and memory:
I meditated a good deal about how to yourself you were yourself at any moment 
that you were there to you inside you but that any moment back you could only 
remember yourself you could not feel yourself and I therefore began to think that 
insofar as you were yourself to yourself there was no feeling o f time inside you 
you only had the sense o f time when you remembered yourself (1937, 307)
In this passage we see the path o f her thinking as she questions whether the self is
actually aware o f the construct o f time. Her arrival at the answer that the self is only
aware o f time when we use memory to situate it in a particular time supports the idea
that the self, like nature, does not develop linearly but, rather, in circular loops and
jum ps—just as the brain works and her writing reflects. She is showing the creation and
development o f a self. Her writing style also captures the rhythms o f  the world, o f  Stein
walking or driving or flying; and although she would like to maintain a sense o f the
constant present, she still needs memory to recall these rhythms. In reconstructing how
these external rhythms and fragments o f information move throughout the writer's mind
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via electrical and chemical means and back out again, the mind asserts itself, creating a 
picture o f a unique individual-only that person's mind is reflected in the text.
Therefore, even if  Stein is not intentionally describing the inside and the events 
described could be anyone's experience, the form still comes from the inside (Olney 
1972, 17). It is the mark o f  the writer and reveals that specific person. Showing a 
unique mind working, selecting, and prioritizing is how the writer maintains a sense o f 
individuality in a fast-paced, global society where individuals seem interchangeable and 
superficial.
Finding the balance between asserting individuality and living in a community 
has been an issue for writers, notably since Rousseau was torn between wanting to be 
both like everyone else and unique at the same time. Finding this balance and coming 
up with a whole, coherent self becomes increasingly difficult as society requires us to 
live on many levels and in many roles. At some point, the idea o f a unified self must 
give way to the fact that we are too split by culture ever to form a cohesive whole again 
(Taylor 1989, 480), a belief accepted by the postmodernists. The modernists, however, 
Stein included, persisted in their attempts to salvage the idea o f  a unified self. They did 
this using memory to create a unified and coherent self that existed as a work o f art—the 
text. Unlike Augustine and Rousseau who use their autobiographies to reveal a great 
conversion or epiphany, Stein uses her autobiographies to create a unique and complete 
self in the text. Her writing style and narrative structure progress in a somewhat 
recursive, electrical current fashion to bring the reader full circle (like her signature "a 
rose is a rose is a rose") and to create a complete, self-enclosed text. Perhaps this is
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Stein's epiphany: In a global society where the self is so fractured and disjointed that it 
cannot be reconstituted into a cohesive whole in society, it must be created in text.
The desire for unity persists, even as Stein notes, "Human nature is so permanent 
in France that they can afford to be as temporary as they like with their buildings"
(1933, 16), and memory is necessary to the consolidation o f the many fragmented selves 
into one (Dubnik 1984, 4), even if  it is a false, textual creation. Ultimately Stein 
combines elements she wished to keep separate—the external, the internal, and memory- 
-to form a complete identity recognizable as Gertrude Stein that is reflective o f the 
culture in which she lives. Like a Cubist painting in which all the pieces are present, 
only in an unfamiliar or unconventional fashion, and more specifically like the painting 
o f her by Picasso, she came to look like the created art work because the self had to be 
created anyway. Both The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas and Everybody's 
Autobiography, in their experimental approaches that led the literary world to accept 
new forms and ideas, in the end reinforce the traditional cultural desire for unity and 
order. For all o f  Stein's intellectual discussion about the difference between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the prevalence o f  nonlinearity in nature and 
disrupted hierarchies, her autobiographies, in their Cubist resemblance, reinforce 
cultural conventions o f closure, cohesion, and wholeness, o f the ability for everyone to 
find "his own self inside him" (1937, 271). She is torn by the disparity between the 
human desire for unity and cohesion and the search for reality, which is disjointed. At 
the end o f her autobiographical quests, she has not determined either who the self is
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inside o f  her or how a unified self can exist within this system—a question that 
postmodernists will answer, not so simply, it cannot.
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CHAPTER 4. THE PARTS DO NOT ADD UP TO THE WHOLE: 
FRAGMENTATION, COLLAGE, AND DISAPPEARANCE (RELOCATION) 
OF THE SUBJECT IN DAVID ANTIN'S 
A U T O B I O G R A P H Y "AUTOBIOGRAPHY 2"
Significant cultural developments between the 1930s and 1960s
Although only 30 years elapsed from the time Gertrude Stein published Everybody's 
Autobiography in 1937 to the appearance o f  David Antin's 1967 text, simply called 
Autobiography, numerous significant developments occurred in this relatively brief 
period. World War II brought about the widespread use o f  and dependence on emerging 
technology. For example, communication advancements such as telephones and radios 
allowed for more efficient tracking o f  troops and distribution o f orders. And, as N. 
Katherine Hayles points out, "by World War II, transportation and aircraft had 
progressed sufficiently so that rapid troop movements were possible, which in turn 
made accurate and timely information as critical to the war effort as weapons and 
soldiers" (1990, 269). What had begun in World War I, previously referred to as the 
Cubist war because o f its effect upon and perpetuation o f dissipating geographical 
boundaries and decentralization o f power, reached new levels as orders could be 
communicated immediately from great distances away from the actual fighting zone. 
Thus, a major center o f  power need not even be physically present in the obvious 
structure o f the war.
After the war, technology developed exponentially compared to previous time 
periods. An increasingly global society and advances in technology mutually 
perpetuated one another and influenced developments in other areas o f  culture as well,
115
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
such as science, education, communications, and the arts. All o f  these factors affected 
the role o f the individual in what had become a technology-driven world.
Developments in technology and science 
As the victor in war directly correlated with who had the best equipment, which was 
now associated with the best technology, governments dedicated research to the 
development o f technology that could be used for tactical purposes and then later used 
to maintain a position o f global leadership. This emphasis encouraged research in 
electronics and computers, which utilized breakthroughs in sciences that included brain 
research. The thinking was that by understanding how the human brain and memory 
worked, scientists could further their understanding o f  how to build machines that 
functioned like intelligent beings. Ironically, as computers have become more 
sophisticated, they have provided insight regarding how the brain works; therefore, 
both fields have been able to progress mutually. During the post-World War II period, 
several seemingly disparate fields began to influence one another more directly than in 
the past—specifically, for the purposes o f  this study, technology and brain research, as 
just mentioned, as well as literary theory, which will also be addressed in this chapter. 
These interacting fields, in turn, responded to and affected culture and the role o f the 
individual within society.
Improved technology allowed us to gain a better understanding o f the world. A 
resulting battle to possess the best technology and the brightest scientists ensued 
between governments because to lead the world technologically was to have control and 
superiority. This struggle for world supremacy determined not only what scientists
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researched and developed but also what schools taught children. Between the modem 
and postmodern periods, technology developed exponentially compared to similar time 
periods in the past largely because o f  this struggle to gain control in an increasingly 
global society. The airplane, which was introduced in the early part o f the twentieth 
century, became commonplace, and air travel began to take on greater challenges o f 
space and time. This period also saw the advance o f video and electronic technology 
with talking movies, television, video cameras and stereos in almost every American 
home. Access to remote areas o f the world and galaxy was increasing, and satellites and 
television made it possible for the general public to witness current events. A result o f 
the increased interest in visual and electronic technology was a shift in the cultural 
paradigm away from print and once again toward oral communication, conveyed 
through technological means.
On its way to becoming common at this time was the computer. Although 
computers would not actually become practical for home use until the 1980s, 
development for government use (i.e., military) began in the 1940s. Since their 
inception, computers have been used as metaphors for the brain, while the two fields 
have been essentially intertwined in their research developments. The comparison 
between the two fields begins when we consider the language used to describe 
computers. Terms such as memory and neural networks are taken directly from 
biology. In turn, the language used to describe the biological processes o f the human 
brain and memory since the advent o f the computer encompasses terms such as input.
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access, process, store, and recall-all o f  which give the brain a mechanical, inanimate 
quality.
The sharing o f language between these disciplines is not surprising considering 
that developments in computers have all along been inspired by a desire to model the 
brain. According to Laurene Fausett, who offers an excellent history o f the 
development o f  neural networks in the recent textbook. Fundamentals o f  Neural 
Networks: Architectures, Algorithms, and Applications, "The development o f artificial 
neural networks began approximately 50 years ago, motivated by a desire to try both to 
understand the brain and to emulate some o f  its strengths" (1994, 1). Fausett chronicles 
that in the 1940s Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts developed what is considered to 
be the first neural nets, which aimed to arrange neurons to represent logic functions o f 
the brain. The entire history o f this field, she says, has been grounded in the "interplay 
among biological experimentation, modeling, and computer simulation/hardware 
implementation" (1994,22).
Biology continued to inspire research in technology. Alan Turing, who 
developed the code-breaking machines that helped the Allies to win World War II, used 
how his mind worked to approach the building o f a computer. As Daniel Dennett points 
out, "he took the important step o f  trying to break down the sequence o f his mental acts 
into their primitive components" (1991, 212). By figuring out his mental processes step 
by step, he could attempt to simulate this function in the construction o f  his machine. In 
the 1950s John von Neumaim, generally considered to be the father o f  modem 
computing, built on the work of Turing, also modeling the brain's functions (Fausett
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1994, 23). The new von Neumann machines, Dennett explains, "were called 'giant 
electronic brains,' but they were, in fact, giant electronic minds, electronic imitations— 
severe sim plifications-of what William James dubbed the stream o f consciousness, the 
meandering sequence o f conscious mental contents famously depicted by James Joyce 
in his novels" (1991, 214). As Dennett's example shows and as the previous chapters 
here have demonstrated, the developments in technology and brain research made 
themselves apparent in the avant-garde literature o f  the period that reflected culture.
Additionally in the 1950s, Frank Rosenblatt performed computer simulations 
with a system that he called a "Perceptron" (Rose 1993, 82). The perceptron attempted 
to model the brain's neurons by learning from possible experiences introduced into the 
system and then changing the system's output as a result o f this learning. The system 
behaved like the brain by learning, remembering, and adjusting—much like the neural 
network systems currently used by post offices to read and sort hand-written addresses 
automatically.
The capability o f the computer for all o f its advanced complexity, however, 
remains rather simplistic in comparison to the human brain and is not a substitute for or 
representation o f the brain or memory. The interest in this study is with how these two 
fields intertwine, affect one another, and shape culture both in research developments 
and in the metaphors used to explain how each works. Constructing metaphors using 
the language and developments in brain research and technology to compare the 
intricate workings o f  elements within the two fields has been practiced since Descartes 
created his hydraulic model o f  memory. As earlier chapters here show, Rousseau
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claimed he possessed the ability to "call up" memories in a manner similar to the 
electric telegraph which was emerging at the time, and Stein, who had, in fact, studied 
the brain extensively at university, made the science and technology o f  the day part o f 
the subject and writing style o f her autobiographies. As brain research became a more 
prominent area o f  study, the results o f  that research inspired constantly changing 
theories o f how memory worked, which avant-garde autobiographers tried to capture in 
writing about the self.
As discussed in the previous chapters, human nature and nature have been long 
compared, so when scientists note new ideas in one area, they usually investigate how 
these ideas may also prevail in the other area. This is the case in point; As members of 
the scientific community increasingly agreed that nature is primarily nonlinear and 
applied nonlinear equations to explain many phenomena in nature, they also began to 
investigate how human consciousness might, likewise, follow nonlinear order since 
attempts to explicate consciousness using Newtonian linear equations had failed. While 
these radical developments were taking place in science, a general acceptance o f 
nonlinearity in nature and the existence o f chaos as an actual order was only beginning 
to root and would not take hold until the 1970s, after postmodernism had peaked. 
Avant-garde artists and writers, however, captured these shifts in the scientific 
understanding o f nature and the se lf in their postmodern works, which eschew linearity 
and classical ideas o f  Newtonian order.
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Developments in memory research
The roots o f brain research are considered to be in biochemistry, a field which first 
developed in the 1910s and 1920s. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
biochemist Henry Mcllwain helped to bring about the emergence o f a new a rea - 
neurochemistry—or, the biochemistry o f  the brain (Rose 1993, 41). The research 
conducted in the 1950s focused on brain disorders, such as Alzheimer's and epilepsy, 
because it was easier for scientists to determine how the brain worked if  they 
experimented to correct an obvious abnormality. The processing brain during this era 
continued to be described in metaphors o f  electric currents and waves, directly 
reflecting the day's technology. Consequently, during the 1950s, the first invasive 
experiments on the human brain were conducted to see what conscious subjects 
experienced when parts o f the brain were stimulated electrically by placing electrodes 
on the surface o f the cerebral cortex (Rose 1993, 129).
Karl Lashley was also conducting invasive experiments on the brain during the 
1950s. His work, however, involved removing various quantities o f cortex tissue in rats 
in an effort to pinpoint which areas o f  the brain corresponded to specific types o f 
memories. After being unsuccessful in determining if  any one area o f the brain was 
responsible for specific memories, he concluded that "memory resided simultaneously 
everywhere and nowhere in the brain" (quoted in Rose 1993, 281). Lashley's 
conclusion about the brain and memory would ring familiar in the next decade as 
postmodernism emerged with its notion o f the self—which is constructed through 
m em ory-as an assortment of fragments lacking any distinct center but, instead, having
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multiple dispersed centers. Thus, according to postmodernists, the self, i f  it existed at
all, did so simultaneously everywhere and nowhere specifically in one's mind, therefore
allowing for numerous combinations o f possible selves to be recalled or constructed.
Aside from invasive experiments in memory research, the 1950s saw the
beginning o f  a new branch o f  science-Artificial Intelligence, commonly known as AI.
Like every science, dialogue within the AI community itself is diverse, sometimes
contradictory. In his text. The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds,
and The Laws o f  Physics, mathematician Roger Penrose points out that the strongest
proponents o f AI compare the mind to a serial computer, or Turing machine. He writes:
There is an input (like the Turing machine's input tape on the left) and an output 
(like the machine's output tape on the right), and all sorts o f complicated 
computations being carried out in between...when one simply thinks, calculates, 
or muses over recollections o f the past. To strong AI supporters, these activities 
o f  the brain would simply be further algorithmic activity. (Penrose 1989, 379)
This metaphor adopted by strong AI supporters echoes Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape
(1958), in which memories are recorded on and represented by the spools o f tape that
feed from one side o f the machine blank and wind around the other full o f  recollections.
Beckett's metaphor o f  the tape recorder, which is rich in layers o f memory and meaning,
is merely an audio version o f the electronic computer Turing machine. As technology
changes, so do the metaphors used to describe brain processes; and as the computer age
emerges along with developments in science, comparing the mind to electric wires and
currents becomes an insufficient metaphor. Scientists have found the brain to be much
more complicated and, thus, use some o f the same metaphors as AI proponents in
describing the brain's neurons and "logic gates," which are necessary to memory
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(Penrose 1989, 394). The sharing o f language and metaphors reinforces the influence o f 
computer technology and AI on brain studies.
As further scientific research revealed that the brain functioned nonlinearly (a 
theory that was proposed at the turn o f  the century), the comparison o f  the brain and 
serial computer became obsolete. In the early 1960s, AI supporters who believed that 
linear equations might not suffice for conscious, living entities tried to develop a 
nonlinear mathematical model to represent the mind (Penrose 1989, 294-295). Other 
members o f the AI community, such as Penrose, had problems with this theory because 
they believed that consciousness or awareness relies on the progression o f  time—much 
like what we have seen again and again in the autobiographies in this study: the self 
develops in time.
While Penrose thinks the nonlinear mathematical model is inadequate, he 
maintains a belief that science, specifically quantum physics, is the key to understanding 
more about the mind and self. He explains that, according to classical physics, because 
our bodies and brains are part o f the physical world, they, too, evolve like other 
elements in the physical world, i.e., they are fixed by precise classical mathematical 
equations (1989, 226). However, these classical equations fail to account for the 
phenomenon o f consciousness. Therefore, he offers quantum theory as an explanation 
o f consciousness. He clarifies that quantum descriptions, while different from classical 
ones, are just as precise and are necessary to explain many properties and phenomena in 
nature, such as the existence of solid bodies, chemistry, colors, and freezing and boiling. 
Likewise, he believes that the phenomenon o f consciousness, which cannot be
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understood entirely in terms o f classical physics, must be explained in quantum terms 
because "Perhaps our minds are qualities rooted in some strange and wonderful feature 
o f those physical laws which actually govern the world we inhabit, rather than being 
just features o f some algorithm acted out by the so-called 'objects' o f a classical 
physical structure" (1989, 226). Classical physics alone is not sufficient to explain how 
everything in the world works but must be considered with quantum theory, and that 
combination, Penrose writes, "forces us to change our view o f  physical reality" (1989, 
225). With a change in perspective o f physical reality comes a change in view o f the 
mind, as Penrose says, and that affects how we define and construct the self. So, as we 
have seen numerous times, a shift in perspective in science affects the theories 
governing the self, which then enter the discourse o f  various disciplines.
In the 1960s and 1970s, memory research in general suffered setbacks as 
experiments turned into catastrophes, seriously harming the validity of, and advances in, 
the field. Various studies involving biochemical exchanges in the brain or even 
physical isolation o f brain sections attempted and failed to answer the questions of 
where memory existed and how it could be transferred (Rose 1993). The rejection o f 
any belief in the physical transfer o f memory, however, eventually led to a theory in 
which memory is considered to be a property o f the brain affected not only by chemical 
changes in the body and brain, but also by which cells and synapses undergo chemical 
changes (Rose 1993, 201). This whole-body approach, in which memory depends on, 
as Rose says, "a multitude o f specific neuronal circuits," (1993, 204) raises the question 
o f the possibility o f transferring any memory meaning at all. Because every individual
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body is so distinct in its chemical makeup and interaction with the nervous system, 
producing the same meaning in two separate people seems impossible.
As previously addressed, the struggle to translate the inner experience to the 
exterior world by way o f language has been a frustration for writers for centuries. In 
chapter three we saw how Stein tried to address this problem by separating the two, 
which, ultimately, she could not do. Antin's perspective on the same issue is that "there 
is no such thing as a perfect medium thats why they call it a medium because its in the 
middle so to speak its between it mediates a transaction and deflects it" (1984, 56). 
However, at the same time that the scientific community began to understand just how 
distinct the individual is, postmodern writers not only acknowledged the futility in 
trying to transfer meaning, but they saw that the problem existed beyond the limits of 
language: it began at the level o f  the physical composition o f the body.
Developments in art
As we saw with the modern period, avant-garde artists responded to and perpetuated the 
ideas prevalent in culture. Likewise, postmodern artists and writers captured in their 
work the constructs o f  culture. Avant-garde works o f the period concentrated on the 
increasingly problematic role o f the individual in society and on the effect that 
technology had on the individual and art—very often glorifying technology or making it 
the subject o f a piece. Wliile the art community saw the arrival and passing of 
numerous movements inspired by technology, it also experienced a newly found social 
and commercial acceptance because o f its incorporation into everyday life and o f an 
improved American economy.
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In the 1950s, modernism remained, as avant-garde artists continued to represent 
the internal experience o f the self through their work. Because translating the internal to 
the external was inherently problematic and because the se lf was changing its definition 
in response to culture, attempts to represent the internal or evolving self resulted in 
more ambiguous styles o f abstract expressionism, action painting, and gesture painting, 
where representation and interpretation were key to understanding the art (Sandler 1988, 
17). However, as the 1960s approached, technology and economics altered art 
significantly. After World War II, the economy o f  the United States improved so much 
that the gross national product doubled from 1955 to 1965 (Sandler 1988, 82), allowing 
broader access to technology and education. By the late 1950s, more than forty million 
American homes had a television, as opposed to ten thousand a mere ten years earlier 
(Sandler 1988, 81). For the first time in history, people could turn on a switch and 
instantly view wars, natural disasters, political events, and the daily routines o f others. 
Also, with the improved economic status o f the country, many people who could not 
attend college in the past now could, and they were there exposed, often for the first 
time, to contemporary art and literature courses. A continued interest in the arts 
beyond college requirements led to a greater popularity o f art in general. The increased 
interest in art, coupled with artists' attempts to appeal to mass culture, contributed to the 
changing style and production methods o f art.
The presence o f technology continued to depersonalize many aspects o f culture 
while it also provided people ways with which to watch and scrutinize world events 
more closely. At the same time, art, because it is o f  culture, reflected the effects of
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technology on the individual. Postmodern art evolved through several phases— 
including minimalist sculpture and painting, pop art, optic (op) art, process art, earth art, 
and conceptual art. While these movements were each unique, their commonality was 
that they all stressed the external object over the internal experience. Art critic Irving 
Sandler, in his text American Art o f  the 1960s, distinguishes the avant-garde o f  the 
1950s from that o f the early 1960s as "instead o f  the hot, dirty, handmade, direct-from- 
the-self look o f fifties art, sixties art looked clean, mechanistic, and distanced from the 
s e l f  (1988, 60). Clearly, this was the general motivation behind works o f artists who 
strove to achieve mechanical reproduction o f  objects, geometric shapes, and other 
materials external to the self. Andy Warhol went so far as to say, "I think somebody 
should be able to do all my paintings for me...The reason I'm painting this way [with 
silkscreens] is that I want to be a machine" (quoted in Sandler 1988, 8). That an artist 
would want to be a machine contradicted every traditional conception o f what an artist 
should be—original, distinct, cerebral.
While postmodern artists may have striven for mechanical depersonalization in 
their work to reflect the increasing role o f technology encroaching on the individual in 
society, the mark o f the individual artist still managed to prevail to some degree. Just as 
we have seen in past works, the idea or style that originates within an individual reveals 
itself in that person's approach to and form o f  work. While the works o f  Frank Stella, 
Robert Morris, and Carl Andre, or o f  Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein, and James 
Rosenquist may initially seem indistinguishable in either their geometric presentation or 
silkscreen, cartoon-like reproduction, the artists each actually use painstakingly
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meticulous methods to produce what appear to be spontaneous, commercially 
manufactured pieces (Sandler 1988, 149). On the production and creativity o f his 
commercial art, Warhol comments, "I was getting paid for it, and did anything they told 
me to do. If  they told me to draw a shoe. I'd do it, and if  they told me to correct it, I 
would...I'd have to invent...after all that 'correction,' those commercial drawings would 
have feelings, they would have a style" (quoted in Sandler 1988, 9). This style, 
invented from within Warhol, is what makes his work uniquely and unmistakably his— 
even in its machine-replicated form. The mark o f the individual artist, even in the face 
o f technology and the dissipating existence o f the traditional self, remains in 
postmodern culture, despite all claims to the contrary.
In its aim to capture the pulse o f culture, postmodern art generated shows with 
revealing titles, such as "9 Evenings: Theater and Engineering" and "Technology for 
Art's Sake" (Sandler 1988, 236). The infusion o f technology into the mindset o f  culture 
in the 1960s forced artists to find a new way to express themselves because, as Richard 
Estes points out, "All the things I was trained to paint—people and trees, landscapes and 
all that—I can't paint. We're living in an urban culture that never existed even fifty years 
ago" (quoted in Sandler 1988, 217). With people and landscapes being replaced by 
computers and skyscrapers, many artists saw a responsibility to fuse art and everyday 
life, especially since art was more popular than ever due to its extensive use in 
commodities such as fashion, television, and advertising. John Cage, like many artists 
and critics in the past (such as Stein and Picasso in the last chapter), believed that art 
could both reflect and lead culture. He asserted that "if the new teclinologies were
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central to contemporary life, then they and art ought to merge. The purpose o f  art was 
to sensitize the public to the radical changes taking place in their life" (quoted in 
Sandler 1988,236).
If  one purpose o f  art is, indeed, to sensitize people to radical cultural changes, 
then postmodern art aimed to prepare the public for "radical" ideas that had actually 
been developing since the time o f Rousseau—that the representation o f  the internal 
experience is doomed to failure, that the notion o f a unified self is unrealistic, and that 
nature is nonlinear and chaotic. Whereas modem artists acknowledged these ideas but 
did not use them extensively (if at all) in their work, postmodern artists embraced them 
wholeheartedly. In general, the work o f the period aimed to reconstitute the object, the 
external, as art itself and not as a representation or metaphor for some internal 
experience or meditation. Increasingly, artists and writers viewed the se lf as incapable 
o f being a whole, cohesive entity. And as they more than ever considered nature to be 
nonlinear or chaotic, they tried to reflect these ideas in their work by emphasizing the 
ongoing process over the finished product. This is seen in works such as those o f Philip 
Pearlstein, whose painting seems arbitrarily cropped, showing that any slice o f  reality is 
as worthy o f being presented as another (Sandler 1988, 208)—an approach that David 
Antin takes in his postmodern autobiographies as well.
Furthermore, in stressing their belief that nature is nonlinear and that the self is 
not a cohesive concept, artists, such as Robert Smithson with his earthworks, used the 
outside natural environment as a way to juxtapose the human construction o f geometry 
against the chaotic composition o f nature (Sandler 1988, 333). By taking the artwork
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out o f the conventional museum space, avant-garde artists also exposed a greater 
population of people to art and diminished the long-held view that art was high-brow 
and incomprehensible to the masses. Also, in using geometry, modules, grids, and other 
mathematical or technological themes in their works, artists reinforced the idea that a 
cohesiveness was possible in work, but only i f  the work was o f  nonhuman quality, i.e., 
an invention or machine that can be manipulated and controlled. These works did not 
show a human mind in action; they showed a lifeless object that existed strictly for 
consumption by humans.
Performance art and interactive exhibits also emerged during the postmodern 
period. Live performance gave an immediacy to art, and because o f  the nature o f the 
form, changed in response to its audience. This is much like Antin's idea o f  the self, 
which he believes takes its shape by colliding with and responding to external factors 
(1993, 98). Performance art, then, possesses the capability o f  presenting a  more 
accurate perspective o f a self than any other art form because it is temporary, constantly 
changing or adjusting its shape in reaction to external influences, yet composed o f the 
same basic material at its core.
While performance art has the potential to be highly interactive, the postmodern 
period also saw the introduction o f  nonperformance interactive museum exhibits.
Pieces such as these usually depend upon technology, such as recorders, film, lights, 
and sound equipment, to motivate viewers to participate in the exhibit and then to 
incorporate their contribution into the piece. This extremely technologically busy 
approach to art did not appeal to Antin; however, interactive work as a means to
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enhance the viewer's experience o f meaning did. Therefore, in one o f  his 1960s art 
exhibits described in tuning  ( 1984, 252), he arranged tape recorders in various rooms o f  
a museum and allowed participants to listen to stories told by other museum visitors. If  
inspired, they could then tell, record, and incorporate their stories into the exhibit. If  not 
inspired, they could simply leave silence. In doing this, Antin hoped to infuse art with 
meaning for viewers who now had a personal investment in the piece, which was never 
possible in conventional art forms.
The debate over the emergence of postmodernism 
Academicians and theorists have varying views on the emergence, definition, and even 
the existence o f postmodernism. To begin, depending on the critic, postmodernism 
emerged sometime between the 1940s and 1970s (Best and Kellner 1991). However, 
the majority o f critics—including Fredric Jameson (1991), Andreas Huyssen (1986), and 
Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1991)— trace the appearance o f postmodernism to 
sometime near either the end o f  the 1950s or beginning o f  the 1960s (which coincides 
with the technological developments discussed earlier) and see its wide acceptance (in 
the world o f artists and critics, that is) as occurring in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Just as it is difficult to pinpoint an exact date for the emergence o f 
postmodernism, it is even more difficult for critics to decide if  it actually emerged (or, 
was merely a continuation o f  modernism), and, if  it did, then why. To them I say look 
at the world. Regardless o f what that period in history is called, something undoubtedly 
changed in American culture between 1940 and 1970. Ihab Hassan acknowledges the 
debate over postmodernism in The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory
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and Culture. He writes, "postmodernism suffers from a certain semantic instability: 
that is, no clear consensus about its meaning exists among scholars...Thus some critics 
mean by postmodernism what others call avant-gardism or even neo-avant-gardism, 
while still others would call the same phenomenon simply modernism" (1987, 87).
The debate over the existence or non-existence o f  postmodernism complements the 
argument o f the decentered (or non-existent) self. This period in time especially is 
marked with the upheaval o f cultural truths regarding coherence, order, hierarchies in 
nature, and society. Therefore, it is feasible to view the mercurial quality o f 
postmodernism as an extension o f the same quality o f  the self. That is, the inability to 
pinpoint or define cultural change during this period reflects the same difficulty in 
locating or determining the existence o f an identifiable self within this changing culture. 
General instability at the time put everything and every concept on shifting ground.
Instead o f  debating whether modernism or postmodernism is superior, this study 
focuses more on the concrete actuality that they are working toward different goals. 
While both movements share characteristics, such as multiple perspectives and 
nonlinear narrative, they ultimately split in opposite directions. Whereas in modernism, 
the aim was to take multiple perspectives and create some semblance o f  a unified self or 
whole, postmodern artists revel in knowing that the fragments can never be put together 
again to create a traditionally recognizable self.
In his text. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism, (1991) 
Fredric Jameson explicates the significant differences between what he terms 
postmodernism and high modernism. Generally he describes postmodernism in terms
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o f flatness; superficiality; multiple surfaces; fragmentation o f the subject; pastiche; 
the waning o f affect, feeling, emotion, and subjectivity from a work; the end o f 
individual artistic style resulting from the emergence o f  mechanical reproduction. 
Beyond describing the characteristics o f  postmodernism, he focuses on why he believes 
postmodernism emerged and writes, "what happened to culture may be one o f the more 
important clues for tracking the postmodern" (1991, 16). Jameson's assertion is correct, 
if  not obvious, and is the reason why examining what occurred in culture between the 
late 1930s and the late 1960s is critical to this study.
Ihab Hassan and Andreas Huyssen express views similar to Jameson's. Like 
Jameson, Hassan sees modernism and postmodernism as two very distinct movements.
In addition to fragmentation, multiple surfaces, and lack o f unity. Hassan recognizes 
other, more strictly postmodern, characteristics, including an emphasis on process, 
performance, absence, anti-narrative, play, and the signifier (1987). Huyysen, in line 
with Jameson and Hassan, sees the rejection o f unity and the decentering o f the self as 
markers o f postmodernism (1986). However, he rightly emphasizes the role o f 
technology in his definition of the postmodern. He believes that mass culture depends 
on technology, and that modern technology allows for and encourages mass 
reproduction (thus echoing Warhol's comments on art and machines).
Like Jameson and Walter Benjamin, Huyssen sees the results o f modem 
technology manifest in collage, montage, and photomontage, i.e., art forms that can "not 
only be reproduced, but are in fact designed for mechanical reproducibility" (1986, 9).
As we have seen in the previous section, Huyssen's assertion is supported by
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postmodern artists' works and philosophies. Huyssen and Jameson, like many artists 
and critics, argue that mass reproduction destroys the individual artist's identifying 
brushstroke. However, as countered earlier, the signature o f the artist remains even in a 
culture with advanced technology because technology merely provides the art tools; the 
individual is still responsible for creating a work with those tools. This is why, in 
theory, anyone can produce a work exactly like Warhol's. But, in practice, when I view 
a four-panel work o f  Queen Elizabeth II in London's National Portrait Gallery, I know it 
is a Warhol without looking for his signature. It is also why the postmodern poems of 
Frank O'Hara, Ted Berrigan, John Giorno, or Allen Ginsberg are distinguishable. 
Individual style continues to emerge from the mind, despite machines, technology, or 
postmodern classification.
Two critics who also focus on the role o f  technology in society and literary 
theory are Steven Best and Douglas Kellner. In their book. Postmodern Theory:
Critical Interrogations (1991), they divide postmodern theorists into two groups: one 
believes that technology and changes in the socioeconomic system have produced a 
postmodern society; the other believes postmodernism developed out o f  the global 
homogenization that resulted from widespread capitalism. According to Best and 
Kellner, both o f these processes produce "increased cultural fragmentation, changes in 
the experience o f space and time, and new modes o f experience, subjectivity, and 
culture" (1991, 3). As the previous chapters and sections on technological advances 
demonstrate, technology, economics, global homogenization, and capitalism (or the
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quest to dominate) are all very much intertwined and cannot realistically be separated as 
Best and Kellner would like to categorize.
However, in continuing to present their argument, Best and Kellner see the 
emphasis o f postmodern theorists on plurality, fragmentation, microanalysis, 
individuality, and singularity as a rejection o f totality, collective struggle, and the 
system (1991, 222). In rejecting the system, postmodern theorists tend to map 
fragments and to ignore the systemic features that help us to see how elements either 
work or do not work together in our culture. On this point. Best and Kellner seem to 
possess an understanding in common with theorists who study chaos. Going beyond 
Best and Kellner, I believe that presenting fragments in writing demonstrates that the 
fragment is the only commonality o f  the whole; therefore, the fragmentation, in its 
attempt to reject, actually recognizes and is a part o f  the totality after all. The totality 
may not be attainable using conventional approaches, but it did exist in some form once 
and the concept remains as a goal for artists and theorists who succeed postmodernism.
Perhaps what is most intriguing about Best and Kellner is that they go to great 
lengths to explore the various concepts in the discourse o f  postmodernism only to reject 
any acceptance o f its existence in the end. They offer two possible definitions for the 
prefix "post": one as signifying a rupture from what came before it, and the other as 
indicating a continuity with or dependence on what preceded it (1991, 29). Ultimately, 
after they explore the claims o f numerous postmodern theorists, they find that none 
offers significant empirical support for the theorized rupture in society. They conclude, 
"We thus argue that no adequate analysis o f  the imputed break between modernity and
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postmodemity has yet been produced, nor is there an adequate account o f  the allegedly 
new postmodern society" (1991, 274). I am inclined to agree with Best and Kellner in 
that I see society, in general, desires to achieve a type of unity and coherence. But, I 
also see that to meet this desire, society is willing to look beyond conventional ideas to 
consider different types o f unity (such as chaos models) and coherence (as with 
nonlinearity). However I must emphasize that the defining difference between 
modernism and postmodernism is that modernism works to restore some semblance o f 
traditional or Newtonian ideas o f unity and coherence, whereas postmodernism rejects 
the attempt to impose or create a traditional unity (unless it is a nonhuman entity such as 
geometry or a toilet) out o f  apparent fragments.
The postmodern embracement o f fragmentation and nonlinearity is directly 
related to and is a reflection o f  the technology in postmodern society. For example, 
imagine recording the landscape and dialogue in a situation where someone is driving in 
her car on a busy city street while, at the same time, she is having a telephone 
conversation and sending a fax. All o f this is now possible and common (if television 
commercials are to be believed) because o f  technology; and because this scenario has 
become common to us, we may not immediately see its incoherence in conventional 
terms. Avant-garde artists who try to capture "reality" in their works have dealt with the 
changes in perception brought on by technology and shifts in cultural constructs o f 
truth, as we have seen with Stein in the preceding chapter and as we will see with David 
Antin in this one.
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David Antin's postmodern problem: what is this piece?
David Antin opens his 1993 collection o f  autobiographical essays or sketches, what it
means to be avant-garde, with a quote from Denis Diderot: "Foreigners because they
never have enough words to express their ideas, often invent remarkable new modes o f
expression. Poets are all foreigners." That Antin places this quote at the beginning o f
his book in interesting because Antin's work itself defies classification, as he says in one
o f the book's pieces:
i have a publishing problem with publishers I used to have difficulty convincing 
new directions that they shouldnt list me in the poetry section i could never 
convince them. ..people pick up my book expecting to find some kind o f verse in 
it and not finding verse in it theyre afraid they havent found poetry which is not 
so much o f a problem for me but it is for a publisher i f  he starts to get returns 
because this somebody says "this is not poetry take it back" (1993, 125)
New Directions, incidentally, lists this book as poetry. Furthermore, Antin refuses to
categorize him self as any particular type o f  artist. In an attempt to describe his creative
technique, he refers to him self as several things, including poet, performance artist, talk
poet, and language artist.
Like Diderot's description o f foreigners and poets, Antin invents new modes o f
expressing his ideas by refusing to adhere to what has by now been established as
coherent, traditional, or expected, methods o f writing autobiography. His early work is
postmodern or avant-garde or on the fringe. But how can Antin create what are
considered to be postmodern autobiographical works when the very construction o f
postmodernism is one which, supposedly, debunks subjectivity, authorship, coherence,
history, and unity? Since the publication o f  his first book. Autobiography (\961), Antin
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has incited debate over the genre o f  his texts and even over the classification o f  h im self 
as a postmodern writer. W herever one finds herself in the Antin debate, he is certainly a 
writer with whom to be reckoned, if  not for his monstrous body and bald head, then for 
his abilities to incorporate his theories into his creative texts and to provide insight into 
how technology, science, and culture have shaped the individual and relocated the self. 
The paradox  o f postm odern  au tob iography
As the previous chapters have shown, autobiography reveals much about the culture in 
which it is written. Writers simultaneously make conscious decisions and follow 
subconscious tendencies that are ingrained in them by the society in which they live. 
They are parts o f  the system regardless o f how they may try to observe it objectively 
(which is not possible). These decisions regarding content, narrative structure, and 
writing style, as we have seen with Augustine, Rousseau, and Stein, reflect the society 
o f  the time. Therefore, autobiography during the postmodern period should be expected 
to support the characteristics o f  postmodernism—among them superficiality, montage, 
simultaneous communication o f  information, and complete loss o f center and unity.
Some critics, among them Fredric Jameson (1991, 16), argue that autobiography 
cannot exist under the conditions o f  postmodernism. The short-sightedness o f  this 
view is that these critics are using traditional methods o f evaluation to study postmodern 
writing. Whereas traditional autobiography cannot exist within the constructs of 
postmodernism, resituated autobiography can. As Antin in "Autobiography 2" writes, 
"the terrible thing Gadaliah said would be if all our ideas o f  reality were based on the 
evidence o f 200 years o f experimentation and measurement and the constitution o f  the
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universe was changing all this time" (1968, 45). Because our ideas o f  "truth" constantly 
shift with culture and discoveries in science, we must adjust our understanding o f  reality 
to fit the current cultural frame. Likewise, as culture changes, writing that represents 
that culture also changes, and we must also adjust our methods o f reading new texts.
For a critic to state that postmodernism is all about a break from the conventional and 
then to use conventional expectations to evaluate a piece o f postmodern writing is 
unreasonable. For critics who insist on using outdated tools to examine contemporary 
writing, it is easy to say that if  postmodernism entails the disappearance o f  the subject 
then autobiography cannot exist in the postmodern period. However, critics, including 
William Epstein, Jonathan Culler, Stanley Fish, and Sharon O'Brien (ed. Epstein 1991), 
argue that postmodernism does not preclude autobiography, but is about accepting the 
disappearance o f the traditional or conventional idea o f self. The self cannot completely 
disappear from this world; that is not possible. Its role or how it is perceived, however, 
can change, as we have observed in earlier autobiographies, particularly Adams' and 
Stein's.
In her essay, "Feminist Theory and Literary Biography," O'Brien questions 
whether or not biography is possible in deeonstruetion and Lacanian psychoanalysis (ed. 
Epstein 1991, 125). She proposes, "Leaving aside the question of language and 
representation, how can any genre purport to give us the 'presence,' 'essence,' or 
meaning o f a self? Is not biography then inevitably naive—if not downright dangerous— 
insofar as it promotes the outmoded and bourgeois ideology o f the individual" (quoted 
in Epstein 1991, 125). To a degree O'Brien plays both sides o f the fence here, as she
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immediately follows with an example that addresses these questions. She discusses 
David Nye's "anti-biography" o f Thomas Edison, which she says abandons chronology 
and linearity, challenges the notion o f  a unified self by presenting numerous Thomas 
Edisons rather than one definitive Edison, and refuses to synthesize ideas for the reader 
(Epstein 1991, 126). Arguably, while Nye's attempts are characteristics o f 
postmodernism, they are not all new. These writing strategies, as we saw, are present in 
Stein's and Adams' modern autobiographies. The difference between these modern texts 
and Nye's biography is that he, in writing a postmodern text, presents multiple views 
and fragments o f the self to challenge the idea o f a unified self, whereas Stein and 
Adams present multiple views o f the self in the attempt to create a unified subject.
Nye's account o f Edison is one example o f postmodern biography. However, beeause it 
is biography, it does not have to account for issues associated with autobiography, i.e., 
how the subject, who is also the writer, can disappear (not just write from another 
person's perspective as Stein did) from the text and still produce what is considered to 
be an autobiography. David Antin addresses the paradox o f postmodern autobiography, 
as I will show in the remainder o f this chapter, as well as the role o f the self after 
postmodernism, which I will discuss in the following chapter.
Representation of culture in David Antin's Autobiography and "Autobiography 2"
In the same way that the introduction o f  the airplane and telephone into early twentieth- 
century society increased the speed o f communication and access to all parts o f the 
world, television and satellites in the late 1960s when Antin's autobiographies first 
appeared were bringing together previously unfamiliar cultures by broadcasting into our
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living rooms immediate coverage o f events such as the Vietnam conflict, the 1968 
Democratic convention and riots in Chicago, and the U.S. expedition to the moon.
Daily montages o f  chaotic war-related events, interspersed with commercials and lighter 
stories during our evening meals may have been shocking initially, but ultimately 
worked to desensitize the effects o f  the war on viewers. Additionally, pictures o f  
Vietnam and the m oon—far-away places that may have been either unknown or 
unimaginable to most Americans prior to television broadcast—made a very large, 
remote world easily accessible via satellite signal. As a result o f  this onslaught o f 
communication and information technology, concepts o f immediacy and coherency 
were completely revised at this time. Once unrelated events and information gained a 
new type o f coherency, a "radical coherency" as Antin refers to it, that would have 
never existed in any other situation had it not been for the technology o f the day.
In addition to these changes, the role o f language was also being challenged 
during the postmodern period. The way language functions in society ties together 
political and cultural studies and literary theories and practices—all o f  which Antin is 
familiar with, as his writing to come will indicate. In The Order o f  Things: An 
Archeology o f  the Human Sciences, Michel Foucault theorizes about the changing role 
o f language in society from the Classical period to the present. At length he fully opens 
the dialogue concerning concepts that have been simmering since the eighteenth century 
regarding the conflict between the order o f  nature and the order o f  human nature and 
how these ideas o f order have affected language. He explains that "nature, through the 
action o f  a real and disordered juxtaposition, causes difference to appear in the ordered
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
continuity o f  being; human nature causes the identical to appear in the disordered chain 
o f representations, and does so by the action o f a display o f  images" (1970, 309). This 
statement summarizes what we have seen addressed by philosophers, scientists, and 
writers since Rousseau's period; nature inherently possesses a random disorder that 
human nature works to structure and order. In the attempt to organize the jum bled 
elements in a manner that is comprehensible to the mind, to establish a pattern in what 
may otherwise be considered noise, humans have arranged language in a linear 
sequence that allows all the components to be processed one at a time because we have 
not learned how to absorb everything as it is actually presented in nature, i.e., all at 
once.
Foucault's reasoning supports accepted theories o f  language and processing 
because it works with how we have been taught to read. His argument, however, does 
not recognize what writers o f the time are attempting to do, which is present multiple 
elements simultaneously, even if  they can only be read one at a time. In saying that 
humans process thoughts linearly, Foucault neither considers the possibility that this is a 
trained skill nor that it may not at all be completely "natural." It is no accident that 
writers who are trying to recreate their thinking in process produce very little o f  what 
resembles a strictly linear text. As previously revealed, the modernists tried to represent 
thought processes through stream-of-consciousness and fragmentation encased by 
repetition or circularity. Postmodernists, in contrast, use fragmentation that refuses to 
meld in the end in order to show thought processes in a high-speed-information world.
To represent the working mind accurately, the style o f writing, or the structure of
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language, needs to reflect process as it occurs in society. Antin comments on this 
concept in his 1976 book, talking at the boundaries. He writes:
all
these considerations are based on this mans way o f  talking about his 
way o f  seeing theres no way around it a report is a report
it has the problem o f  adequacy its not only a question o f 
whether the report is true but whether its adequate whether his 
way o f talking is an adequate way o f  representing his way of 
seeing and whether his way o f seeing is an adequate way o f 
representing the way something is happening (123)
In describing how he believes the telling o f something should represent how it is
coming to and tlorough the mind, Antin illustrates his philosophy because the
description seems to come straight from his mind and land on the paper, no time even
for formal punctuation, which is not present in the thought process.
As simultaneous communication or distribution o f information became more
prevalent in postmodern culture, the demands o f an increasingly fragmented and faster-
paced society impacted the individual. The effects o f  society on the individual have
caused significant division o f  the self since secularism took hold, and, whereas
modernism stressed the need to maintain individuality, as we saw with Stein,
postmodernism emphasizes the loss o f  the individual to society (Hassan 1987, 92).
Antin's autobiographies show the absorption o f the individual into society to the degree
that the individual Antin is not discernible in his own life story-em phasizing the point
that he exists merely because, and only as a sliver, o f his family and social schema.
This movement away from the self-important "I" as the only driving force o f  one's life
story began to emerge in Stein's work as she included stories o f numerous friends in her
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books. More substantially in Vladimir Nabokov's Speak, Memory (1947), Nabokov 
stresses finding his place in the ongoing pattern o f his family's history. While these 
writers show the changing role o f  the individual, from one o f absolute center to one that 
is increasingly a part o f  a social structure, they continue to emphasize that the self is, 
ultimately, the absolute authority and controller o f one's life story. Antin, in the 
postmodern period, yields his position o f absolute center, authority, and controller when 
he produces two autobiographies that refuse to identify voices, stories, or time lines.
His collection o f snippets reflects his culture's pace and technology. Like avant-garde 
writers before him, he uses the technology o f  the day as a metaphor for how the mind 
works as demonstrated through the presentation o f  the text. In this case, Antin's texts 
are like a television set and remote control, where the viewer/reader continues to hit a 
button, flipping through the various channels o f David Antin's relatives, friends, 
acquaintances, and overheard conversations to date. All o f these snippets combine to 
produce the story o f "David Antin," even if  he is not necessarily present in them 
because, in keeping with the postmodern cultural construct, he is lost or absorbed into 
society and, therefore, not the center o f  his own story.
Even though Antin does not limit his autobiography to one set o f people o f one 
particular time period, his texts, like Stein's, Rousseau's, and Augustine's before him, 
include references specific to his postmodern culture. To begin, he starts 
Autobiography (1967) by introducing his mother as a woman with the desire, and, more 
importantly, ability to leave her husband repeatedly. While this may seem innocuous, 
almost humorous, to readers today, the idea o f  a woman leaving her husband six times
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is allowable only in a society where all wom en (not only the economically privileged 
like Stein) are considered as more than property or dependents, where they are viewed 
at least as independent, free-thinking humans like their male counterparts. Such a 
society, unfortunately, did not begin to take form in the United States until the latter part 
o f this century. Other more blatant indicators o f popular culture in Antin's texts include 
driving high-speed vehicles; talking o f naked women and diaphragms and condoms; 
and referencing the National Football League, science fiction stories, and transvestites. 
Similarly, "Autobiography 2" (1968) refers to hitchhiking, the invention o f  electric eyes 
on advanced machinery, extensive interest (approaching paranoia) in Communists and 
the Secret Service-all o f which are markers o f  the 1960s.
Narrative structure in Antin's autobiographies: fragmentation as reflective of a 
culture that has shattered and absorbed the individual
As previously noted, evaluating a postmodern text using the same criteria traditionally 
used to evaluate conventional texts is unreasonable and impractical. Antin's splintered, 
nonconventional autobiographies force readers to find new ways in which to locate and 
evaluate the self in these texts. One way that Antin proposes we approach both texts 
and the self in today's culture is to consider the self in terms o f narrative and story 
(1993, 95). He believes the two are specific and distinct, and that story is the 
"configuration of events or parts of events that shape some transformation," (95) 
whereas narrative, which defines the self, is more o f  a psychic function involving a 
paradoxical collision. More reductively, he is saying that story is what occurs 
externally to cause a transformation, and narrative is the internal change that takes place
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because o f the transformation. Once again, the distinction between representing the 
internal and external arises in the thinking o f the avant-garde. In this sense, narrative 
defines what the self is and what it is capable o f  assimilating into its structure or schema 
o f  coherency.
Like other avant-garde texts, Antin's autobiographies break from the established 
popular convention in both narrative structure and writing style. However, because his 
approach to autobiography is particularly postmodern, these features become even 
farther removed from convention as they take form to support the radically changing 
role o f  the self. Narrative structure is perhaps the most immediate property o f 
Autobiography and "Autobiography 2" to strike readers as completely different, even 
from the fragmented modern texts o f Stein. To begin. Autobiography is only 12-pages 
long, by far the shortest autobiography I had ever encountered until 1 read 
"Autobiography 2," which is just over nine pages. "Autobiography 2," included in Code 
o f  Flag Behavior, was, according to Antin, completed a couple o f months after the first 
autobiography but could not be included in the original Great Bear pamphlet because o f 
a lack o f space (1991, 15). The two autobiographies are quite distinct from one another 
(apparently affected by even a couple o f months separation) and, therefore, actually 
work better as two separate texts. Aside from the shocking lack o f  length, the 
autobiographies possess other anomalies, such as strings o f  unrelated paragraphs, 
unattributed quotes, incomplete sentences, and a biographical sketch.
The first autobiography consists o f  an assortment o f story pieces and quotes that, 
for readers coming to Antin's work for the first time, lack any sense o f coherence.
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narrative, or meaning. For example, the text typically presents a quote (which may or
may not be Antin) followed by a brief story (which may be, but usually is not
obviously, related to the preceding quote) followed by a part o f a sentence (which often
sounds like something heard on the television). A representative series reads:
"You know what's the most dangerous animal alive?—Wolverines. They fierce. 
We goin up to Connecticutt and hunt em with bows and arruhs."
in high school I used to visit the offices o f  the Cannonite wing o f the Trotskyite 
party, where we were greeted by a lecturer who began each session with the 
words 'what are the contradictions in the world pattern today, comrades?'[...]
—the tree was smaller, the dogs were older and Getzler didn't have the grocery 
anymore— (1967, 5-6)
To begin, the quote that opens this block is not attributed to anyone, even though Antin
sets it o ff in quotation marks. The speaker's relation to Antin, and in particular to his
life story, remains a mystery. The section that follows also concerns an unidentified "I,"
who may or may not be Antin because the speaker is recalling memories o f communist
rallies in an unidentified location. He follows the story o f  the Cannonite rally with a
sentence, not set o ff in quotation marks, that sounds like a sentimental reminiscence o f
an aged adult returning home after a very extended absence.
As already stated. Something Else Press calls these informal recollections by the
poet; however, many o f these "recollections" very well may not b e -as  the Cannonite
example demonstrates and Antin's later writing attests-A ntin 's at all. In talking about
autobiography in what it means to be avant-garde, Antin proposes that the genre should
go beyond the first person and should, instead, aim  to address the truth (1993, 163).
Apparently, to Antin the idea of tmth is more difficult and important to determine than
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establishing who is speaking. Providing an accurate representation o f  the culture that
defines him (finding the contradictions in the world pattern today) is more critical and
valid in autobiography than knowing who is saying what. This philosophy is almost
alien to the centralized, egocentric works o f previous writers, including the modernists
who addressed the shifting role o f the individual in a global society while still
attempting to maintain some construction of self, and seems contradictory to the very
definition o f autobiography.
In presenting the various voices that define who he is, Antin borrows from the
postmodern art community by creating a collage o f text comparable to photomontage.
The collage is assembled without transitions to link the fragments meaningfully for the
readers. Sometimes the relationship between, or at least the leap to, fragments seems
clear. For example, in "Autobiography 2," several o f  the passages contain common
elements, sueh as references to sport jackets or teeth. These ties, however, are not the
smooth, recursive themes that emerge in the modernist writings to bring together
various ideas that form a satisfying picture in the end. Instead, in many cases, they
seem to repel any attempt to form a complete picture. The images bounce off o f one
another, taking the piece in a new direction each time, usually never to return to a
previous idea in the way that Stein's and Nabokov's pattern-driven texts do. For
instance, consider the following string o f text from "Autobiography 2":
he asked me if I was a Jew and told me they were the greatest people in the 
world. They invented the sport Jacket-
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Kneeling in a sugar drift beside the stalled machine—taking in the little girl 
leaning idly against the gum racks—Honey colored hair, brown eyes lighting into 
a welcoming grin. She had no teeth.
She went to the clinic because she had a toothache and the dentist was a young 
guy so she told him  how she was Rimbaud going up in smoke and they wouldn't 
let her out (1968, 43)
and then five sections later:
he disappeared into a room in his parents' house and came out with a sport jacket 
and a wife who had five children (1968, 43)
These fragments apparently are related only in that they contain some o f  the same
words. For the most part in the autobiographies not even this connection between
sections is evident. The second autobiography, although written only months after the
first, has many more transitional phrases and, at times, what could be considered
legitimate or blatant cross references. However, these transitions and recursive images
reinforce the spontaneity o f the text, which contrasts to Stein's writing, in which they
indicate what is to come. For example, in one instance Antin describes what he calls,
"the only image o f my father" (1968, 39). However, soon after, he returns to his train of
thought in mid-sentence with, "another/carefully fitting together the corners o f
cardboard boxes" (1968, 40). The manner in which he returns to the memories o f his
father creates a sense that the poem is being written as a recorded conversation, or as the
reader turns the pages. This is a way that Antin builds a feeling o f  process—which is
key to postm odernism -in his work.
In presenting incomplete passages without regard for time or apparent
relationship or ranking o f importance, Antin's work reflects and perpetuates the way
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information is presented in his culture. His autobiographies may seem absurd in what 
they include at times and in the jarring juxtaposition o f images; however, Antin 
believes, in retrospect, that the works are still too connected thematically and are not 
"quite arbitrary enough to represent our American fate" (1991, 18). While the second 
autobiography at times possesses some connective tissue, the first autobiography seems 
connected only in that it contains information that somehow was channeled through 
Antin. His disappointment, then, can only be in his inability to determine "the 
contradictions in the world pattern today" by conceding more than he would like to the 
human desire to find patterns or cohesiveness in an apparently random world.
In keeping with his creation o f  a nonconventional narrative structure to represent 
the changing position o f the self in postmodern society, Antin includes a biographical 
information section at the end o f the first autobiography that provides some o f  the life 
details that readers usually expect to find within the body o f the text, but do not come 
across in this case. Antin's inclusion o f a nontraditional feature in his autobiography, 
however, is not new. Nabokov's Speak, published in 1947, serving as a
transition between the modern and postmodern periods—contains an index. While the 
index itself is unexpected, some o f its listings are even more surprising, particularly 
those for "Nabokov, Vladimir." In approaching autobiography, especially that which 
precedes postmodernism, readers generally expect every page o f the text to be somehow 
relevant to the author/subject. Yet, by including his own name in the index, Nabokov 
both indicates his life story is in partnership with all the other names that surround his 
and foreshadows the postmodern construct that the self is not the absolute or constant
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center o f  one's life story. The expansion o f  what is considered to be appropriate for 
autobiography during and after the modem period, however, was just that—an 
expansion. As Stein pointed out in Everybody's Autobiography, "Anything is an 
autobiography" (1937, 3). In the postmodern period, writers do not merely build upon 
what has preceded them. The ideas regarding autobiography do not expand to include; 
they change and break radically, indicating that a new order is emerging to replace 
conventional ideas which prescribe unrealistic and unattainable goals o f linear 
cause/effect development and completion. They present, as Antin does, some pieces o f 
truths—no matter whose—and then undermine publishers' and readers' expectations for 
the genre by providing a sardonic look at the "facts" o f the writer's life that usually fill 
out a lengthy book.
Antin's biographical sketch concludes the brief collection that seemingly does 
not reveal much, if  anything, about the writer. Made to resemble a common publisher's 
biographical sketch, the paragraph comments on the futility o f the feature by presenting 
both conventional and ridiculous information, such as, "At four he visited his uncle's 
business in the garment center where he went out on the fire escape and looked down at 
the people below. He also made two cardboard boxes. His first prose works were 
published at age 9 (Kensington Magazine). [...] In after years he had his apartment 
painted and is now considering moving" (1967, 15). Biographical sketches typically 
conform to a boilerplate o f required facts and, therefore, neither reflect the individuality 
o f the writer nor reveal anything particularly insightful or unique. In mocking the 
convention—and, in doing so, undermining its authority—Antin provides a better view o f
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his subject than many autobiographies achieve in an entire text. His approach exhibits 
his penchant for hum or and for challenging traditions, while reinforcing the postmodern 
belief that a whole, cohesive se lf does not exist.
Antin's use o f the biographical sketch to end his autobiography achieves an 
effect in complete opposition to Stein's use o f photographs at the end o f her first 
autobiography, and in doing so illustrates the difference between postmodernism and 
modernism. Whereas Stein's photographs wrap readers back around to the beginning o f 
the work, thus creating a circular, cohesive whole by means o f the book, Antin's 
biographical sketch jars readers, making them even more conscious that the conventions 
o f autobiography and life writing fail to provide a whole, "real" view o f the subject at 
hand. It reminds readers that to reflect the individual within culture accurately, writing 
cannot create or present a definitive self.
Although Antin's autobiographies aim to eschew any conventional, familiar 
organizational structure and emphasize entropy over unity, they ultimately possess a 
preconceived approach to form. I argue that nothing, not even the most daring 
postmodern work, is created without some type o f  organization, regardless o f  how 
difficult it may be to detect in the finished piece. As the next chapter reveals, new 
approaches to order and organization become more evident as writers begin to apply 
chaos models o f  order to the seemingly random fragments o f postmodern culture and 
writing. Antin certainly approaches his texts with ideas o f order in mind, even if  his 
aim is to produce a work that looks as arbitrary as his American culture (Antin 1991,
18). His autobiographies, which appear random, are actually reminiscent o f  the very
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traditional poetic form, the ghazal, which dates back to the thirteenth century. The 
ghazal consists o f  a series o f unrelated couplets that are written at numerous sittings so 
as to ensure that the writer's mind has been cleared. The final couplet contains a 
reference to—or signature of—the poet, adding a touch o f blatant autobiography to a 
genre that is already imbued with unacknowledged autobiography. Like the ghazal, 
Antin's autobiographies possess a quality o f being written at numerous sittings after the 
mind has cleared (as much as possible) the memory o f  what was written previously. In 
the end, the arbitrary appearance o f the form somehow makes a type o f sense, if  for no 
other reason, because it is o f  and shaped by the writer's unique mind, and, thus, provides 
a picture o f his character at the moment. This is the same feeling one gets after 
completing Antin's autobiography. Antin, who is first and always an extraordinary poet, 
provides a sense o f who he is at the time, as shaped by everything acting upon him, 
emerges, even if  what he did in high school or how he decided to become a writer does 
not. As the next chapter shows, his interest in conveying the general shape o f the self 
and how it changes across time becomes more evident in his later works, which present 
ideas that support chaos models and challenge us to reconsider the genre o f 
autobiography.
Unlike the modernists, Antin's earlier work is decisively more splintered, 
refusing to help guide the reader through Antin's mind and leaving it up to the reader to 
construct a meaningful narrative out of the stories. After all, trying to convey Antin's 
interior narrative would lead to failure anyway. It is this desire to infuse a piece with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
some type o f  meaning that inspires the interactive works o f Antin's career, whether it is
his performance/talk poems or audience-participation museum exhibits.
Emphasizing process: the influence of literary trends, science, brain research, and 
communication on Antin's writing style as a reflection of the working mind
With David Antin, more so than with previous writers examined in this study, narrative
structure and writing style blend into the same discussion. Whereas Stein often changed
lines o f thought abruptly in her narrative structure to reflect the external communication
o f  information in society, writing within individual sections remained fluid, lucid, more
stream-of-consciousness in style as a reflection o f the scientific theory that the mind
operates through the flow o f electrical impulses. Antin, however, uses both random
narrative structure to reflect the presentation o f information in culture and irregularly
punctuated, often incomplete, images and ideas to mirror the movement o f those ideas
through his mind. In making these structural and stylistic choices, he reinforces the
postmodern emphasis on process as perpetuated by developments in literary theory,
science, and technology o f  the time.
Antin, much like Stein, uses present tense in his texts in order to capture a sense 
o f  process—of the mind and pen reaching an understanding simultaneously. Unlike 
Stein, though, Antin does not remind the reader that this is a written and edited text as 
she does by mentioning what stories will come on later pages. In that sense, he achieves 
a feeling o f spontaneity and process more successfully than Stein. According to literary 
critic Ihab Hassan, one o f  the characteristics that distinguishes modernism from 
postmodernism is that, whereas modernism aims to achieve the finished art work or
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object, postmodernism strives to show process, performance, the occurrence as it is 
happening (1987, 91-92). In Stein's work, she, too, was driven by the motive to capture 
a "constant present" as she called it in her writing. Her goal was to have her writing 
represent the immediacy o f  thoughts entering her mind, even if  those thoughts were 
recollections. Although Stein strove to capture process, ultimately her work followed a 
plan, as evidenced by her alerts to readers that a particular story would come later, and it 
did. In doing this, she created what amounted to a type o f false spontaneity. Antin, on 
the other hand, because o f  what his society's technology affords him that it did not for 
Stein, is able to represent—particularly in his later works—a sense o f  process, the 
"constant present" about which Stein wrote.
This sense o f process is certainly what Antin spends his career trying to convey- 
-first in his written texts and then later, when he finds writing to be inadequate, in his 
performance pieces. He is more interested in how to go about doing something than in 
what actually results from that endeavor. His preference for process over product is 
closely tied to his discussion o f oral and written cultures and how these cultures view 
art. In his book, talking at the boundaries, Antin argues that in oral cultures (which is 
what American culture during the 1960s and 1970s postmodern era has been called), 
process is privileged over product. To illustrate this, he points to the art o f  pot making 
in certain oral cultures, explaining that very often there are extensive and elaborate 
routines for making pots as well as many other objects (1976, 192). The art in these 
cultures, he states, is in the making of the object, not in the finished object itself. He 
says that he keeps this in mind because sometimes people will forget which stage is
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really the art and will rush to look at the pot to see the art, which is both wrong and 
probably disappointing. Antin's autobiographies support his view that the value o f art 
should be in the making, not in the end result, o f the work. His texts are built from his 
selection o f  details and stories as told in the voices o f the people who have touched his 
life (Antin 1991, 15). By preserving the voices o f these people in the present tense, he 
achieves Stein's goal o f the constant present, o f the story in the making, because 
distinguishing between details that have been related two days or forty years ago is not 
possible.
Antin's penchant for process, as illustrated by writing style, reflects the cultural 
shift toward orality with the widespread appearance o f television and other nonprint 
media as primary sources o f information and communication. However, it is important 
to bear in mind that he, in breaking with convention, is actually following the tradition 
o f being an avant-garde or forward-thinking artist. By incorporating the latest theories 
and technologies into his style and subject matter, he follows in the vein we have seen 
since Augustine, who used the popular tools o f  his day, rhetoric, when writing The 
Confessions. Like the writers considered avant-garde before him, Antin adopts the 
cutting-edge approach o f his day that reflects the movement o f society as affected by 
advances in science and technology. Also like the avant-garde writers before him, his 
style is on the fringe, and, therefore, popular only within an eclectic group. The 
majority o f writing remains what has up to this point become conventional, 
comfortable, familiar to the masses. All things become mainstream in time. In Antin's 
case, as with postmodern art in general, it may take 30 years before dissolution o f
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center, jarring juxtaposition o f  images, and indeterminable jum ps in time become 
comprehensible to the general audience, who will then probably think it is all new, even 
though the roots o f  this thinking are in modernism at the turn o f the century.
The pace at which society functions increases with new communication 
technologies, and this is especially true with the introduction o f computers and visual 
media. The challenge for writers is to incorporate in their work the effects o f  these 
advances on the individual. Writers who try usually attempt to have their writing style 
mimic stimuli moving through the mind. As previously discussed, since the advent o f 
computers in the 1940s, the human brain and computers have been compared and have 
inspired research in each other's discipline. Changes in technology and science affect 
how society is structured and viewed, which, in turn, determines how texts are created, 
read, and discussed. Sometimes the effects are subtle, as previously illustrated by 
military strategies ultimately affecting what school children are taught; other times they 
are more explicit, as with the corresponding work in brain research and computer 
technology. Gordon Shaw points out in Brain Organization and Memory: Cells, 
Systems, and Circuits that, in some regards, brain research has been the leader in 
cultural developments. As an example, he refers to psychologist Donald Hebb's 1949 
work in brain organization, which the technological community adopted almost 
immediately to create a mathematical model o f  memory as a neural network and then to 
incorporate this model into a computer simulation (McGaugh 1990, 301).
While biology may have been the initial inspiration or model for computers, 
developments in computers have led to a better understanding o f how the brain does not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
158
work (Rose 1993, 83). The belief that brains "carry out many operations in parallel, and 
in a distributed manner, [with] many parts o f a network o f  cells being involved in any 
single function, and no single cell being uniquely involved in any" (Rose 1993, 83) may 
not have gained significant credence in the scientific community until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s; however, it has been a viable theory since the 1950s, when, through his 
experiments on rats, Karl Lashley proposed that memory existed everywhere and 
nowhere specific in the brain. This distribution o f memory throughout the brain as a 
simultaneous processing o f  information directly corresponds to the transmission of 
multiple pieces o f information in postmodern society and how that information makes it 
way through the individual's mind.
Antin, who trained both as a linguist and an engineer, also draws comparisons 
between computers and brains while trying to capture in his texts the movement of 
information through his mind. In what it means to be avant-garde, he reveals his long­
standing interest in computers when he writes o f an interview he had for an editing job 
early in his career. During the interview, he explained, "so far the main problem with 
computers was the mechanical nature o f their memories and here was a chance to 
introduce a kind o f organic randomness into the system which was maybe more like 
human memory afterall" (1993, 13). Yet again, we are seeing the awareness o f the 
randomness prevalent in nature and in the biological processes o f humans (i.e., 
memory), who are, in fact, o f nature. Just as the postmodern art community addressed 
randomness in their works, the science and technology experts also incorporated it into 
the focus o f their research when trying to advance the understanding o f  the brain and
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improve the performance o f computers by taking their model inspirations from the 
human brain. Antin, obviously current with developments in engineering, art, 
linguistics, and the sciences, applied the latest theories to his craft, thus producing his 
seemingly random selection and bombardment o f fragments that he calls his 
autobiographies.
As with the narrative structure and content o f the texts, the writing style o f 
individual sentences and passages is also random, refusing to adhere to a pattern. The 
length, tone, and rhythm o f sentences varies unpredictably from that o f  the long and 
fluid to the short and poignant, the drab, the poetic, the profound, the silly, the 
incomplete, or the sometimes baffling. For example, his texts include long, poetic 
observances o f "The water was warm and calm as glass. The jellyfish were out and you 
could see them glitter when you'd dive. Everytime we splashed the surface there was a 
shower o f sparks" (1967, 13) as well as brief quips such as "they brought their problems 
to him and he always decided that both sides were exactly half right" (1968, 40). He 
jumps from poignant recollections o f "when he was a kid his father took him to the zoo 
and forgot him there, he spent the whole night locked in the lion house" (1968, 10) to 
incomplete messages or unexplained lists such as "Rinso/ Luxor/ Thebes" (1968, 43).
The break from pattern or predictability and embracement o f randomness reflects the 
ideas o f postmodernism, as we saw in art, studies regarding human memory, and 
computer advancements. These ideas stem from culture, where attention spans, thought 
processes, and communication are very often interrupted—to be redirected either 
temporarily or permanently—by an onslaught o f  incoming stimuli all at once. The quiet
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meditation allowing for the introspections that Augustine, Montaigne, Rousseau, and 
even Stein record no longer is available to individuals in postmodern society. 
Interruption has become the norm, and it is the postmodern writer's job to illustrate how 
this constant interruption o f thought affects one's ability to look at, define, and construct 
a self—if that is even possible at all.
"where are you": the role of the individual and relocation of the self in 
postmodern autobiography
In his 1993 book, what it means to be avant-garde, Antin discusses his past work as he
responds to criticism that he had "suffered from a belief in the unitary self and had not
enjoyed the benefit o f  french deconstruction which should have disabused [him] o f  this
illusion" (93). To this comment, Antin replies:
i have felt the french breath o f 
deconstruction unimpressed with it as i am but i am 
still interested in the self though i never thought i 
believed in its unity in so flatfooted a way as all that 
i always thought the idea o f the se lf was surrounded by 
questions [...]
and one o f  the questions im interested 
in asking is what is the locus o f the source or ground 
o f  the self (93)
He continues in his reply to explain that it was this interest in the ground o f the self that 
led him to arrive at a discussion for one o f his live talk pieces. Because he sees no point 
in asking questions for which he already has answers, he posed the ancient and yet 
unanswered question, "where are you," i.e., where is the self located? This questioning 
o f the source, ground, or center o f self is evident in the autobiographies, as no distinct 
voice pervades, or authority governs, the texts. Instead, his autobiography—Aü life
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story—emerges from a collection o f voices and ideas from people who surround and 
shape him, i.e., his "family" in a most collective, expanded definition. Antin's opening 
words, "it's a tradition in my family to write an autobiography," (1967, 3) indicate the 
approach to and direction o f  all his work. He is a writer who refuses to be limited by 
categorization. He says he follows tradition, and he does, but only on his unique terms. 
He redefines what constitutes family, what determines one's own story, and what is 
tradition. In doing so, he calls into question all notions o f  center and relocates the self 
among pieces whose locus is all o f  society and culture.
To demonstrate that one's life story can no longer assume a state wherein the 
traditional self is the absolute center or focus, Antin uses ambiguous pronouns in 
recounting stories both about him self and about others. Just as the first person "I" is not 
always Antin, it is unclear whether the second and third person pronouns that appear in 
some o f  the passages actually refer to other people or if  they refer to Antin himself. For 
instance, in one passage an unidentified "he" and "she" discuss how unhappy he is with 
teaching and how he would like to return to school to study engineering (1967, 7-8).
The male here may be Antin because he is, among many diverse things, an engineer. 
However in light o f  the rest o f the text, I would assert only with reservation that this 
passage is absolutely about Antin. Antin's use o f  ambiguous pronouns ties with his 
view o f  the self and the absence o f  a single, authoritative voice or subject. By 
eliminating the authoritative voice and blurring the clarity o f pronouns, Antin shatters 
the conventional notion o f a centered self, dispersing it alongside numerous voices, each 
o f which carries an indeterminable weight in shaping Antin's life. Every voice
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contributes to the act that, according to Antin, is performed by "a number o f  actors 
whose interaction we could call the s e l f  (1993, 94). This combination o f  multiple 
voices to provide various views o f the self or even various selves goes beyond the 
modem texts that paint different perspectives o f  the self. Antin, like the avant-garde 
writers before him, is consumed with the idea o f  representing the self truthfully, and the 
conditions o f his culture force him to show the individual as a mere sliver o f the society 
that contributes to what he is at any given time, and that he, in turn, also affects. Antin's 
point and purpose is to show as much as he can all that has contributed to the defining 
o f his self so that he can approach as accurately as possible a description o f  who he is. 
Ultimately, however, he draws attention to the belief that complete truth or accuracy is 
not attainable. Because external readers cannot understand Antin's internal narrative, it 
is o f no consequence whether he includes a detail typically expected in autobiography or 
an obscure list that seems meaningless. Both types o f information are actually fully 
comprehensible only to Antin if  they are only about him.
In presenting his succession o f memorable quotes and stories from his family 
and the people with whom he associates closely, Antin captures the essence o f an oral 
culture that defines itself by its stories and endures by passing them down. The 
difference here, however, is that Antin preserves his oral culture by committing voices 
and stories to paper. The stories o f others are a part o f  Antin because he defines himself 
only (not also, as with Stein and to a lesser degree Nabokov) in terms o f how he exists 
in relation to others. This emphasis on the individual as it relates to the whole ties in 
with developments both in social theory and in science and technology during the late
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1960s. Whereas modernism stressed the attempt to maintain individuality, as we saw 
with Stein, postmodernism emphasizes the loss o f the individual to, or its absorption 
into, society (Hassan 1987, 92). For Antin, the self is made by the internal narrative, 
which composes itself from factors more far-reaching and incidental in society than 
even the modernists, with their extended considerations o f autobiography, 
acknowledged. Whereas Augustine limited the self to its definition in terms o f  the 
Christian community, Rousseau was affected by the people in direct contact with him. 
Later, Stein defined her life story in relation to people in her social circle, and Nabokov 
in terms of his family history. In the 1960s, Antin saw the self as shaped by cultural 
factors which may have been remote, yet affected him nonetheless, like a wave 
travelling through water. This is not to say the self has no boundaries; in order to have 
shape, boundaries are implied. Antin asserted strongly that the self must "survive the 
collision or union with other things and endure it has to somehow rebound and remain 
distinct otherwise it is everything and nothing which is not a s e l f  (1993, 98). Unlike 
the modernists who portrayed the self as firmly defined, even among its influences,
Antin saw the self as a narrative at core that maintains its essential composition but that 
is able to react with other factors. Likewise, during this time, research in science and 
technology focused on the possibility o f multiple neurons and circuits working in 
conjunction rather than alone to accomplish designated tasks (Rose 1993, 83, 281). All 
o f these developments indicated a simultaneous shift in various disciplines away from a 
single-unit and toward a multi-organism structure.
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In tuning, published almost 20 years after the autobiographies, Antin writes that 
in the 1960s he was interested in interactive work because incorporating other people's 
experiences into his own work made his work more meaningful to everyone ( 1984,
252). Although he is referring here to an interactive exhibit he had created for a 
museum that responded to, and changed depending on, participant input, his philosophy 
applies to his autobiographies, which are highly interactive as printed texts go. M y own 
reductive description o f these books to someone who is unfamiliar with them is to 
imagine walking with a tape recorder through various-sized rooms containing people 
from different time periods telling personal stories. Because the room sizes are 
different, the amount o f material recorded from each speaker also varies. Some rooms 
are empty, and it is in these rooms that you record some o f  your own stories. The 
hallways between rooms are silent, providing the gaps between story pieces. Once you 
have travelled through all o f  the rooms, the autobiography is ready for transcription onto 
paper. In a way the method is similar to Stein's in Everybody's Autobiography in which 
she provides stories about the people around her to show all that has contributed to her 
life. Stein, however, never allows her text to become interactive to the degree o f  
relinquishing control o f  the narrative; her voice directs every word o f  the text. Antin, 
on the other hand, allows the other voices to speak for themselves in his attempt to 
maintain some form o f  the "truth" about the stories that have created the narrative inside 
o f him. In maintaining what he considers to be an accurate representation o f the 
individual in culture, he shows the self as a participant—not the controller or focus—in
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the making o f the life story. What has become the ground o f the self is culture, wherein 
the self is shattered and dispersed.
Language in postmodern autobiography; representing the inside to the outside
there is no such thing as a 
perfect medium thats why they call it a medium because 
its in the middle so to speak its between it mediates 
a transaction and deflects it (Antin 1984, 56)
In the Postmodern period, theorists, linguists, and academics in general continued to
debate at great length the nature o f language, particularly its capacity to represent
meaning. Common dialogues among the structuralist, semiotic, deconstruction,
poststructuralist, and feminist camps focused on the changing roles o f  the signifier and
the signified, death o f the referent, and depoliticization o f language. Underpinning all
o f these concerns, however, is the questioning o f  language's ability to possess, carry, or
indicate meaning at all. The various theorists proposed that meaning was socially
determined, examined the cultural conditions that allowed for meaning to arise in the
first place, and reevaluated the appropriateness o f that meaning in contemporary society.
While the social understanding o f language and meaning is undoubtedly o f tremendous
importance, the physical processing o f  language by an individual cannot be ignored.
Antin, who trained as a linguist, is an expert in structuralism and semiotics, as
evidenced by his continued interest in conveying meaning and understanding the role o f
social frames in that process. In what it means to be avant-garde he even devotes an
entire talk to the subject he calls "the structuralist." He also, however, sees the problem
o f conveying meaning as more specific than the generalized theories o f social
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constructs; he believes the difficulties or impossibilities begin at an even more basic
level—that which is physical and chemical in the body. To illustrate this idea, he
presents in definitions a metaphor o f a beetle in a black box. The section reads:
each one carries a black box around with him in which he has a bettle and since 
no one can look into any one elses box whenever anyone speaks o f his beetle 
everyone looks into his own box and supposes all the other beetles are identical 
with his it is possible to imagine everyone having a different colored beetle in 
the box or some other kind o f  insect or even nothing at all which he nevertheless 
chooses to call a beetle (1967, 33).
Whereas literary theorists are debating what cultural conditions allow for a particular
black box and its contents to prevail or carry meaning, Antin is arguing that the contents
o f the black boxes are possibly all different—or even empty; no one knows for sure
because we cannot see inside each other's box, so we ineptly and immaturely assume
what we have is the same as what someone else has. Already subject to this level o f
miscommunication, any true understanding o f one another is not possible. We can only
understand how someone else's situation/story would play out in our narrative, so
meaning is presumptuous and, most likely, incorrectly.
Antin's primary interest as a trained linguist is with the limits o f  language.
Regardless o f what structural combination it is given, language is still composed o f  the
same basic material that has yet to evoke the same meaning—and, therefore, translates
no real meaning at a ll- in  two separate entities across separate media (Antin 1993, 164).
While in tuning {\9?,A) he states stoically, or resignedly from experience, that language
is an imperfect medium, his autobiographies from almost 20 years earlier show
disillusionment with the shortcomings o f  language. For example, in the first
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autobiography he includes a story about incurring for the first time the problems
inherent in translating between two media. O f someone's, perhaps even his own,
charming childhood reminiscence, he writes:
I learned to read at an early age and had a firm grasp o f  the color words before 
entering public school. Red Blue even Orange. When 1 got there one o f the first 
things i had to do was draw a picture o f  my house. I lived in a two story red 
brick house with green coach lanterns on the porch so i drew a firm outline with 
a pencil and colored everything in with a red crayon but though the crayon was 
red and the bricks were red the color o f  the drawing was nothing like the house.
1 became suspicious and gave up art. (1967, 4)
The child here who carries in his head what he considers to be the accurate, true idea
(color) o f his house finds that any attempt to reconstruct or represent that idea by
translating it into another medium (in this case a crayon drawing) produces an
insufficient image and, therefore, the child becomes cynical about the power and
possibilities o f art. Likewise, Antin, in the vein o f  so many thinking writers, finds that
the words we have to convey the interior does not match adequately at all. The
translation between the internal and external, narrative and story, "character and external
physiognomy" (Antin 1968, 45), emotion and language, image and paint, truth and
representation will always be inept because, in crossing the middle, the essence of each
is deflected; "both sides [look] different" (Antin 1968, 45).
Because Antin never assumes a role o f authority in his autobiographies, he does
not write directly—as Stein, Rousseau, or Augustine do—about the difficulties he has
representing his internal narrative in a different form, i.e., in words. His later
publications and talks do present his theories o f  language and meaning, however, and
are helpful when considering the anecdotes found in the autobiographies as metaphors
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for his philosophy o f  language and representation. When Antin asserts that complete 
truth or accuracy is not attainable when trying to define the self, he is, to a large degree, 
addressing the problem o f using language to represent one's internal narrative. As we 
have seen in this study, writers since Augustine have wrestled with language—both as an 
excellent translator and an inadequate tool for representing what has been termed 
everything from emotions, to inner experiences, to the internal, to narrative. The 
ineffectiveness o f language to translate the internal experience to the external world has 
been a thorn in the sides o f all the autobiographers discussed here. Antin, like most 
postmodern writers, on one level chooses to abandon the attempt in his early texts 
because failure is inevitable every time. That is, he does not directly try to convey the 
effect that events have had on his inner self. However, some o f  his anecdotes 
intentionally serve as metaphors to allude to a philosophy shaped by the experience 
described.
In the second autobiography, Antin relays a humorous account o f  being in an ice 
cream shop. The story also reveals his thoughts on language as representation. The 
section reads:
they asked if  he wanted an ice cream and he said he'd like a creamsicle. But 
they supposing dixie cups were healthier said they didnt have any. He pointed 
to the overhead fans where bright green and orange images o f  creamsicles were 
hanging from the switchstrings, reasoning they wouldn't advertise what they 
didn't stock. They couldn't stop laughing—"those aren't creamsicles, they're just 
pictures." (Antin 1968, 42)
Up to this point in time, writers were obsessed with conveying some meaning through
language, "reasoning they wouldn't advertise what they didn't stock." That is, although
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they knew the translation would not work fully, they still tried, perpetuating the 
misguided notion that achieving adequate meaning was possible—the challenge was to 
find a way for the words or advertisement to correlate with the meaning or stock.
Hoping to reconstruct complete meaning was as much a naive goal as contriving a 
complete self in text, although a definitive self certainly did not exist in reality. Antin, 
like his postmodern colleagues, reevaluates language and the self in respect to reality 
and concludes, "those aren't creamsicles, they're just pictures." Language is pictures, 
words, representations—«0 / reality. The meaning that the writer intends never 
adequately coincides with the meaning that the reader expects or finds, so in a way no 
meaning is present at all. Therefore, the writer may as well cease the futile, fraudulent 
approach o f making it appear that meaning exists but no one can convey it properly. 
Perhaps meaning, like the creamsicles, does not exist at all, but is merely a fiction like 
the single, cohesive self.
As the postmodern artists earlier in this chapter show, because meaning may not 
have been possible—as a result o f the inability for two entities, media, or people to 
connect completely—they abandoned the attempt to represent meaning. Instead, they 
made objects (toilets, dust pans, and such) the subject and purpose o f  art. In response to 
the disorderly order o f nature, they imposed human constructs o f linear order (such as 
geometry) on the environment to elevate viewers' consciousness about order and reality. 
As with art, where the paint does not stand for anything—it is just paint—Antin tells us 
that words are just words and pictures are just pictures, not creamsicles, not inept 
representations o f some stored away reality.
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Because an interpretation o f  one's internal narrative, which defines the self, 
cannot be conveyed through a medium to an external entity, Antin says, "its tim e we got 
rid o f this fantasy o f understanding you have to go a fair way with someone to come to a 
common knowing or at least some way o f  knowing" (1984, 141). Any true 
understanding o f  another person's narrative or self is not possible; therefore, the details 
o f one's life in an autobiography are merely inane and superficial. The reader does not 
leave the text with any knowledge o f  the subject's self; she leaves only with the 
subject's story, which then must be interpreted into her own schema, never to arrive at 
the writer's intended meaning. Undoubtedly inspired by Wittgenstein, Antin's metaphor 
o f the beetle in the black box addresses the idea that because we each have individual 
experiences and a unique biological composition we are inherently limited in our ability 
to know or understand what exists inside o f someone else. Using this metaphor, Antin 
challenges the structuralist argument that the reality or meaning o f language exists in its 
intellectual—as opposed to physical—processes. While the meaning o f language 
certainly depends upon the cultural frame, Antin asserts that, if the physical structure 
within each o f us is unique, then what is signified in each o f  us by a common signifier is 
also unique and, therefore, cannot possibly be the same.
His theory regarding the inability to transfer meaning or signify the same thing 
is supported by developments in the scientific community in brain and memory research 
during the 1960s. At this time, scientists determined that each individual has a distinct 
chemical make-up that interacts with the cells and synapses o f  the nervous system; 
therefore, no two people can experience the exact same chemical reaction in their bodies
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(Rose 1993, 201). Because the brain and memory are now believed to function in terms 
o f chemical interactions specific to the individual's biological composition, it would 
seem impossible for language to evoke the same meaning or effect in two people when 
differences originate at such a basal level.
Relocating the self in postmodern autobiography using memory and writing style 
to reflect cultural constructs
In contrast to the lengthy introspections found in the autobiographies o f Augustine,
Rousseau, and Stein, only one passage o f Antin's autobiographies addresses the se lf and
identity. In the first text he writes:
looking into the dark oblong mirror into which a triangle o f light had fallen 
through partially open doors as into a pool o f  water I somehow became 
convinced o f  my identity with that luminous figure. We were both completely 
empty, devoid o f properties and totally lucid (1967, 4).
For Antin, the self, which is situated retrospectively and, therefore, through memory
(1993, 107), takes its shape in glimpses, slivers o f light falling tlirough cracks in the
door and colliding with, partially filling, the mirror. It is a collision, once again as we
have seen in all o f the previous cutting-edge autobiographies, o f  the external and the
internal. However, unlike the previous autobiographers who combined the internal and
external to create a whole self, Antin sees the two as interacting at that precise moment
to create a very specific and ephemeral composition, which he considers to be only a
glimpse or piece o f the self because to pretend a whole picture is possible would
perpetuate a false construction o f reality. Like the light in the mirror, the self is
intangible and always changing form in response to other factors, such as doors moving
or objects travelling through its path. It hovers about, distributed among many different
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things—its presence known yet unrestrained. However, because it exists in space, it 
does have a shape with specific boundaries at a given moment. While the basic 
composition o f  light remains the same, what it illuminates in the mirror depends upon 
the angle at which it lands and what else is reflected in the mirror, contained in the room 
at that particular moment. We see many parts, pieces, fragments, yet they do not add up 
to a whole. The whole is partially in the parts, but the parts do not contain the whole.
To put forth this idea o f the self, Antin creates autobiographies that attempt to 
capture a sliver o f the self as it exists in space at a specific moment. In this way he can 
portray what he considers to be an accurate representation because he tries to show both 
that a glimpse o f  an entire self is not possible and that the self is not autonomous. To 
show the se lf accurately, he provides a view o f a piece o f  the self—like a single page or 
two out o f a diary—as it exists without the value assessed through retrospection. To 
accomplish this he writes in present tense, eliminating any sense o f time passing, and 
includes the stories o f other people with whom he has collided and reacted. These story 
pieces are written in a fashion that reflects the culture that allowed them to arise and 
come to Antin in the first place. His use o f memory and writing style illustrates the fast 
pace at which information bombards the individual; reinforees the futility o f attempting 
to transfer meaning from the internal to the external through language; and emphasizes 
the postmodern constructs o f  process over product, the absorption o f the individual into 
society, and the acceptance o f  entropy over linear conventional order in nature.
Although the autobiographies provide a sliver of what composes David Antin at 
a particular moment in time and, therefore, are random in the sense that any material
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defining any moment could have been included in the books, this idea o f  seeming 
disorder—what actually reflects reality -does not tend to agree with the human desire for 
linear order. Antin's postmodern texts, and the works o f other postmodern artists, 
emphasize the reality o f  nonlinearity or what was, at the time, considered to be disorder 
in nature. However, other artists o f  the period, as we saw earlier with the earthworks o f 
Robert Smithson, opted to portray the human desire for order as imposed on, and in 
stark contrast to, nature. The desire for order remains, and despite the postmodern 
embracement o f entropy over order, a general trend toward a different, larger view o f 
order would emerge as developments in science and mathematics led to 
interdisciplinary theories regarding concepts o f order and patterns and how 
consciousness functions in such systems. Unlike his early postmodern autobiographies, 
Antin's later texts (which have yet to be given a convenient literary label) continue to be 
on the fringe as they work toward some type o f coherency, what he calls a "radical 
coherency," that requires one to locate the self in a larger more tangentially and 
disproportionately related system. This means that, in order to find continuity or 
Antin's place in the historical pattern, all o f Antin's work must be considered as a 
system wherein pieces o f Antin exist. Only by taking in his entire body o f  work can the 
reader begin to achieve a sense o f the pattern that refers to Antin. Yet because the self 
is constantly evolving, a complete whole is still not possible: only more o f  the picture 
pieces are.
Just as Antin's work evolves to reveal more o f  who he is, it also, in doing so, 
brings to light the increasingly interdisciplinary nature o f current culture. As the next
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chapter will discuss, Antin, as a linguist, engineer, poet, art critic, and philosopher, 
addresses ideas in art, math, literary theory, science, philosophy, and sociology. These 
ideas concerning coherency, identity, and consciousness in an expanded system lend 
themselves well to discussion in terms o f  developments in neural networks, chaos 
theory, and quantum physics, which have affected the way in which the self is evaluated 
and defined. Antin believes that the self has a definite shape in space and, therefore, has 
boundaries. His later works will track his move away from the postmodern idea that the 
self can be both everywhere and nowhere simultaneously because, for him, that would 
make it nothing. Instead he continues to relocate the self as a dispersion o f  pieces (as he 
did in the early autobiographies), only now among a larger scale that has many levels. 
The dispersion o f pieces is specific and nonlinear, reinforcing his claim that he is not a 
globalist (1984, 55) and supporting ideas of chaos. For Antin, this is a way in which he 
is able to locate a ground for the self and maintain some sense o f distinctiveness in what 
otherwise appears to be an increasingly homogenized, global society.
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CHAPTER 5. BEYOND POSTMODERNISM:
FROM THE FRAGMENTS OF SHATTERED TRADITION EMERGES 
A NEW ORDER IN DAVID ANTIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WORKS
Significant cultural developments between the late 1960s and 1990s
Finding that the constructs o f postmodernism eliminated the possibility o f  a location 
where the self could exist, writers and scientists interested in determining just such a 
place began to explore new ideas and theories. Beginning in the 1970s, cultural 
developments leaned toward more global or expansive answers to age-old questions 
concerning order, nature, and consciousness. However, these ideas—while a return to 
pre-postmodern notions o f pattern and order—were unique because the concept o f  order 
was radically different from the linear order o f convention or even the linear geometric 
order used by postmodern artists to contrast with the nonlinear order o f nature.
Emerging simultaneously at this time in the various disciplines was an understanding 
that much o f what had been dismissed as disorder or randomness was actually part o f a 
very precise nonlinear order or pattern inherent in nature and humans. For a lack o f 
nonconventional and, therefore, geometric language with which to describe this concept, 
this new understanding o f order exceeded our previous notions o f scale, overlaying a 
grid beyond our universe and quantifiable mathematical formulas.
Coming together to explain concepts of order and pattern, while also satisfying 
the human desire for some type o f order (which postmodernists dismantled and exposed 
for its superficiality in its conventional form), ground-breakers in science and 
technology as well as in art and literature proposed radical explanations which, if  not 
completely accepted as absolute, are at least familiar terms in today's culture and are
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plausible arguments in philosophical and theoretical dialogues. An emerging field made 
possible by cultural developments but also serving as a catalyst in philosophical and 
theoretical debates is the relatively new area o f study known as chaos theory. This new 
field o f chaos theory, which actually applies to numerous fields, including physics, 
computers, memory research, art, and literary theory, suggests concepts that, while they 
are distinct to particular areas and languages, share a general tendency to search for a 
new idea o f order that makes organization and sense possible.
In his book Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies, Barry Smart 
discusses how recent technology has transformed culture by affecting the scale on and 
manner in which society interacts. He argues that the new electronic technologies 
decentralize communication o f information, changing the "scale, structure, and pattern 
o f  human activities and relationships" (Smart 1992, 116) to that which is global, 
nonlinear, and highly interdependent. These changes have proven to be problematic for 
Western cultures because, as Smart points out, we tend to view anything that is not 
linear or continuous as irrational (Smart 1992, 116), and our new technology allows for 
exactly those "irrational" conditions to reveal themselves as typical rather than as 
exceptional in nature and culture.
To build upon what Smart presents, it is critical to note that the seeming 
irrationality is actually necessary for us to allow for a new type o f  order to emerge, one 
which is nonlinear. The traditional view o f  the world has been dismantled during the 
postmodern period, forcing us to rebuild our understanding o f  nature and order as 
something significantly different from what is conventional and comfortable. Because
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these ideas and theories resulting from chaos theory and continuing developments in 
quantum physics, are such a radical break from conventional knowledge and 
perspective, they appear irrational or senseless upon introduction. However, as history 
has shown repeatedly, as science and technology advance, more evidence supporting 
these theories surfaces to answer questions and to provide understanding o f just what 
patterns and order exist in nature and how the human consciousness or view o f the self 
fits into that pattern or order.
Developments in science, mathematics, and technology 
As Western culture immersed itself in the electronic age, computers emerged as the 
standard technology. In the 1970s and 1980s, computers became more widespread and 
sophisticated, providing scientists and mathematicians the means for in-depth study o f 
concepts such as complex dynamics, quantum theory, chaos theory, and neural 
networks, which were previously beyond the scope and capability o f the available 
technology (Briggs and Peat 1990, 23-24; Hayles 1990, 2). Since scientists in the late 
1800s began to acknowledge nonlinear order in nature and mathematicians then in turn 
began to develop nonlinear equations for studying such phenomena as explosions and 
winds, nonlinearity has increasingly become recognized as the rule rather than as the 
exception in nature (Hayles 1990, 144). This wide acceptance by the scientific 
community is relatively recent and directly correlates to improved technology which has 
allowed for more advanced mathematical interpretations tlirough applications o f 
complex dynamic equations, including those used by physicists and chaos theorists. 
Mathematician Roger Penrose points out that the development o f  quantum theory was
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used by scientists and mathematicians to explain properties and phenomena that 
classical physics could not answer, such as "the very existence o f  solid bodies, the 
nature o f chemistry, the colours o f  substances, the phenomena o f  freezing and boiling, 
[and] the reliability o f inheritance" (Penrose 1989, 226). Penrose argues that, while 
classical physics does explain much o f our complex universe, the very precise 
descriptions o f quantum theory are necessary to explain other still unanswered 
questions, particularly those regarding the physics that underlie our thought processes or 
consciousness (Penrose 1989, 226). This argument seems reasonable because if  we are, 
in fact, o f the universe, it would follow that we, too, should follow the same laws of 
nature or the universe. To view the human being as something separate from the 
universe seems either naive or arrogant. The science o f  quantum theory, then, could in 
part provide a fuller understanding and new perspective o f the world, much as scientific 
developments in the past clarified many o f  the mysteries which at their time were 
attributed to God or viewed as beyond the scope o f human comprehension.
Quantum theory, much like other recent theories and fields o f  study in the 
sciences, is a return to find some order in nature, a concept that we saw dismantled in 
the postmodern period. The search for pattern, to place ourselves in the structure o f a 
larger cosmos, however, did not merely appear with the sudden emergence o f quantum 
theory, fuzzy logic, or chaos theory. The early twentieth century works o f Albert 
Einstein regarding relativity and curved space as an alternative to Euclidean geometry, 
Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle addressing a particle's momentum and 
position, and Kurt Godel's responding proof all paved the way for contemporary
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scientific thought outside the realm o f linear order and geometry (Hassan 1987, 56-59). 
Establishing the matrix for all o f  these contemporary ideas is Kurt Godel's 1930 proof 
which proposed that even mathematical structures have limits o f  completeness and that, 
while no structure can ever be complete, it is nonetheless part o f  an even larger or 
stronger—yet still incomplete—structure (Hassan 1987, 59; Briggs and Peat 1990, 75).
In other words, while a pattern may be incomplete, therefore seeming to be random or 
lacking order because its linear continuity is broken or absent, the pattern is, in 
actuality, present; it is merely difficult to see within the scale o f  its present system. If  
the scale is increased, the pattern can be seen to exist as part o f  a larger system or 
structure. This concept o f order or pattern across multiple systems on global scales is 
what scientists, mathematicians, and other theorists who were left unsatisfied with the 
constructs o f postmodernism built upon in the 1970s when technology advanced enough 
to perpetuate the search for mathematical theories that might explain how the universe 
works.
In his text. Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science o f  Fuzzy Logic, Bart Kosko—who 
has degrees in mathematics, electrical engineering, philosophy, and economics—argues 
from the stance that all things are not, as we have been taught to categorize, either true 
or false (1993, xv). Instead, all things are a matter o f degree, i.e., fuzzy, vague, or 
inexact. From this fundamental assumption, Kosko develops ideas regarding fuzzy sets 
that reside in our brains, allowing us to group things loosely according to these sets and 
to look for connections (Kosko 1993, 123). He extends the use o f fuzzy sets to the 
development o f computer systems known as neural networks that supposedly function
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more like the human brain than regular computers do and which will be discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter. What is important to note at this point is that the 
advances in technology in current culture have allowed various branches o f science to 
further their investigation o f theories that were previously impossible to explore. Fuzzy 
logic, quantum theory, and chaos theory all support general tendencies to establish 
patterns in larger systems that are not linear and were previously limited by 
computational capabilities.
Perhaps one o f the most popular and culturally influential developments in 
science since the 1970s is that o f chaos theory, which has seeped into our cultural 
subconscious as evidenced by its presence in discourses involving science, philosophy, 
economics, politics, and the arts. At one time, the term chaos evoked only thoughts o f  
randomness, chance, confusion, or general disorder. However, this view began to 
change when, in the late 1800s, French philosopher, mathematician, and physicist Henri 
Poincaré drew attention to problems in the attempt to explain all natural phenomena in 
terms o f closed Newtonian systems (Briggs and Peat 1990, 26-29). That is, the 
tendency to focus on individual units and to follow these units through time with the 
assumption that all the individual actions will add up to the system's collective behavior 
proved to be inadequate when open systems were in question. These problems, which 
scientists, including Einstein, Heisenberg, and Godel, addressed with theories on 
nonlinearity in the early twentieth century, inspired the beginnings o f  what is now 
considered to be chaos theory.
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Modern-day chaos theory provides an alternative view o f order—one that is not 
based on linear. Euclidean geometry where everything is plottable on the traditional x-y 
axes relative to time and that forces us to view the world from a new perspective. Much 
like quantum theory which, Ihab Hassan suggests, requires that we view the universe 
"not as a collection o f physical objects, but rather as a complicated web o f relations 
between the various parts o f a unified whole" (Hassan 1987, 61), chaos theory also 
supports the belief that the universe is a very interconnected structure. Strongly 
demonstrating this proposed interconnectedness is the aspect o f chaos theory known as 
turbulence. Turbulence, which traditionally has been viewed as proof o f  fragmentation 
or disorder, actually exists because the pieces o f the system are related; movement o f 
any one piece causes movement o f the others (Briggs and Peat 1990, 52). Turbulence is 
not plottable using Euclidean geometry, but, instead, is represented by fractal geometry 
in the form o f  self-perpetuating feedback that exists in the dimensions intermittently 
somewhere between that o f  a point (one dimensional) and a line (two dimensional) 
(Briggs and Peat 1990, 105). In fact, Briggs and Peat argue that the breakup o f  order 
into turbulence is actually "a sign o f the system's infinitely deep interconnectedness...of 
its wholeness" (1990, 52). The notions o f interconnectedness and a unified whole 
contrast sharply with the constructs o f fragmentation and decentralization put forth by 
postmodernism and provide the possibility o f determining a locus or ground for the self 
that accommodates a culture in which meaning seems tangential and ephemeral at best.
The view o f  chaos changed more radically because o f  scientific developments in 
physics and cultural changes discussed in the previous chapters. During the 1960s,
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postmodernists and deconstruction theorists were breaking apart conventional ideas o f
order and hierarchy. In the midst o f  postmodernism, critics and scientists began to
reevaluate chaos now that the world was being understood as dynamic and nonlinear.
Because this was a time during which the definition or perception o f chaos was
changing to accommodate new views o f the world, different disciplines used the
principles o f chaos for dramatically different emphases. As Hayles points out:
Literary theorists value chaos primarily because they are preoccupied with 
exposing the ideological underpinnings o f  traditional ideas o f order. They like 
chaos because they see it as opposed to order. Chaos theorists, by contrast, 
value chaos as the engine that drives a system toward a more complex kind o f 
order. They like chaos because it makes order possible. (1990, 22-23)
As we move away from the unrelated fragments o f postmodernism in search o f a new
order, chaos provides a theory whereby order, and perhaps wholeness, is possible. The
current movement in science is to see life and order as possible because of, not in spite
of, entropy (Hayles 1990, 100). Scientists are now using the laws o f chaos to explain
and understand for the first time the working processes o f nonlinear systems, including
the human heartbeat and thoughts, the aging process, storms, the structure o f galaxies,
and perhaps even the origins o f life (Briggs and Peat 1990, 14, 71). These chaotic
systems are considered to be "locally unpredictable but globally stable" (Briggs and
Peat 1990, 74) because, while they are constantly undergoing change—as with weather
and the total recycling o f  proteins and cells in the human body every seven years—
overall, the system remains essentially the same (Briggs and Peat 1990, 68, 74). By
studying such chaotic systems, we can see how even minute events affect the dynamics
and change the shape o f the whole system, contributing to the maintenance o f the
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system's overall stability. If chaos can provide answers about human thoughts and the
evolution o f life itself, then perhaps it, as well as quantum theory, may also lead to
insight regarding ideas o f the se lf and where consciousness is located.
Because chaotic systems are so sensitive to even the smallest changes, they urge
us to view the world qualitatively as opposed to quantitatively, a concept that
proponents o f linear equations. Euclidean geometry and space, and clear-cut
cause/effect relationships may find difficult to embrace. The attempt to interpret chaotic
systems quantitatively produces what is considered to be noise or randomness because
the fluctuations o f chaotic systems are sporadic and do not lend themselves to
conventional linear explanation. Instead, they require a different set o f rules, so to
speak, in order to be interpreted. Demonstrating the different approaches to thinking
with quantitative and qualitative mathematics, Briggs and Peat explain:
In the old quantitative mathematics the measurement o f a system focuses on 
plotting how the quantity o f  one part o f the system affects the quantities o f  the 
other parts. By contrast, in qualitative measurement, plots show the shape o f the 
system's movement as a whole. In a qualitative mode, scientists don't ask. How 
much o f this part affects that part? Instead, they ask. W hat does the whole look 
like as it moves and changes? How does one whole system compare to another? 
(1990, 83)
The implications o f qualitative mathematics are far reaching. In terms o f viewing 
autobiography, we no longer feel required to determine or trace the path o f how every 
incident in a person's life caused or eventually led to another incident. The writers who 
are examined in this dissertation and who preceded Antin thought in predominantly 
quantitative ways. First Augustine saw every occurrence as the natural unfolding o f 
events on the path to God. Then Rousseau felt he must recount the direct connection o f
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incidents to his behavior to the public's misperception o f his true self. Next Stein 
wanted to show how her actions (such as telling Picasso to give up writing and return to 
painting) directly affected other people and improved society.
Breaking from quantitative thought in search o f something that at the time had 
not taken shape are Antin's two early postmodern autobiographies, which do not define 
relationships between events but which do exhibit the beginnings o f the "locally 
unpredictable but globally stable" (Briggs and Peat 1990, 74) thought behind chaos 
theory. It is important to clarify here, however, that this does not mean Antin is a 
globalist; he would very much object to that categorization (Antin 1984, 55). Rather, 
Antin illustrates the idea that the self as a system, while constantly colliding with forces, 
maintains its overall basic essence. The shards we see in Antin's early autobiographies 
may be random and unpredictable; however, the core material o f  the self overall 
remains the same, survives the collision—as Antin refers to it-w ith  these random events. 
The shape o f the system -in  this case, the self—while pliable, remains essentially 
recognizable. The quest for Antin at this time, though, was to determine just what the 
core of that system looked like and where its boundaries lie.
Thinkers like Antin who were not satisfied with the unanswered question o f 
postmodernism—if the self exists, then where—searched new territory necessary to map 
out for the self a possible location at a time when such a location had become 
unchartable using the available tools o f  society. Antin reinforces with the closing poem 
o f his 1968 text, code o f  flag behavior.
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there must be a sense 
in this madness 
only
he was not in a position 
to discover it (65)
The order o f  logic, o f coherency, for understanding the world and his place in it is not 
attainable using the strategies currently available; he must leave his current position or 
way o f thinking and seeing in order to find where sense or coherency is possible. 
Discussions in chaos theory focusing on open systems, or "autopoietic structures," echo 
the later writings o f Antin (particularly what it means to be avant-garde 1993, 98), 
wherein he speaks o f the self as interacting with society while also maintaining its 
boundaries, its definition. Autopoietic structures are paradoxical because they are 
simultaneously autonomous and interwoven within a larger environment (Briggs and 
Peat 1990, 154).
Antin's idea that the self has definitive boundaries that hover about as it collides 
and interacts with factors in society reads like the description o f autopoietic or self­
organizing and self-renewing structures, which Briggs and Peat point out include 
Jupiter's Red Spot, whirlpools, and even ourselves (1990, 154). Each open 
system has an internal organization that continuously adjusts to the environment. As 
they explain, "Each autopoietic structure has a unique history, but its history is tied to 
the larger environment...autopoietic structures have definite boundaries, such as 
semipermeable membrane, but the boundaries are open and cormect the system with 
almost unimaginable complexity to the world around it" (1990, 154). Using this 
explanation o f open systems that chaos theory provides, we can begin to understand
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how an individual may be able to maintain a sense o f  se lf while also actively 
participating in our very complex society. The self, as an open autopoietic system, 
hovers, expands, and collides with other elements, continually undergoing change while 
maintaining its individual sense o f definition through self-renewal and self-organization 
o f  a pattern  o f individual pieces, not necessarily the individual pieces themselves, which 
are interchangeable (Penrose 1989, 25).
Many aspects o f chaos theory are also found in the principles o f neural 
networks, a teclinological field that operates on the concepts o f  feedback and self­
organization. The development o f neural networks began in the 1950s when computers 
in general were developing, and the aim was both to understand better how the brain 
works and to emulate it (Fausett 1994, 1). Unlike regular serial- or parallel-processing 
computers that both operate on linear circuits, however, a neural network is an entire 
system o f neurons and weights communicating across numerous layers, much more like 
the human brain than parallel or serial computers ever could emulate. In the same way 
that chaos theory stresses the interconnectedness o f structures and quantum theory 
emphasizes patterns throughout increasingly encompassing systems, neural networks 
consist o f multiple layers o f neurons that communicate with each other to complete 
patterns o f information through the system o f neurons with unique associated weights 
(Fausett 1994, 3).
Neural networks were originally modelled after the human brain and, therefore, 
are capable o f mathematically mimicking many o f  the same characteristics. However, it 
is important to note that while all neural networks are not constructed for the purpose o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
studying human cognition, the attempt to model biology may lead to better mechanical 
computational capabilities (Fausett 1994, 7). Furthermore, mathematical models that 
have been developed to explain neural dynamics and pattern generation o f the brain 
have radically affected how scientists view the way our brains work. Particularly, 
Skarda and Freeman point out, as a result o f neural network technology, biologists now 
view the brain as a physiochemical system that is highly self-organizing as opposed to 
being purely reactionary to outside stimuli (ed. McGaugh et al. 1990, 377). In this 
approach, we see the mutual influence that these two disciplines have had on each other 
and which will also emerge in the dialogue o f  current experimental autobiography 
writing.
In her introduction to neural networks, Laurene Fausett describes these networks 
in simple terms as a system o f layers which house a large number o f processing 
elements referred to as neurons, units, cells, or nodes (1994, 3). She goes on to explain 
that "[e]ach neuron is connected to  other neurons by means o f  directed communication 
links, each with an associated weight. The weights represent information being used by 
the net to solve a problem" (Fausett 1994, 3). As the system gains experience and the 
neurons send signals to other neurons in the system, the strength o f  the neuron's 
associated w eight-or synapse between it and another neuron—strengthens. In keeping 
with biological models, it is within these weights or synapses, not the actual neurons, 
that long-term memory resides (Fausett 1994, 5-6). The existence o f a working long­
term memory is what makes it possible for neural networks to store, classify, group, and 
recall patterns (Fausett 1994, 3). This advanced ability to recognize patterns connects
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the system's individual neuronal layers, allowing the system to function as just that—a 
system, a cormected whole. Furthermore, because the system is so advanced, as weights 
or synapses gain experience, they, like their biological models, become better able to 
recognize patterns and can also teach themselves to group more efficiently, even when 
the information provided to the system is noisy or incomplete (Kosko 1993, 39). The 
system uses its patterning skills to complete or at least approximate what the total 
information would look like (Subramanya 1994, 9). The echo here with Godel's proof 
o f incomplete structures within other incomplete structures and with chaos theory in 
which pattern generation as a system feeds into itself results directly from cultural 
undercurrents in various disciplines, all searching for a way to establish order in a very 
fragmented culture.
Because the network's interconnectedness and design to search for patterns make 
the entire system sensitive to changes in any layer, the network also needs to possess 
fault tolerance similar to biological neural networks in order to be useful or reliable 
(Fausett 1994, 7). It must avoid the inefficient crashes or slowdowns associated with 
serial or parallel computers that encounter system damage or excessive data input. 
Describing this fault tolerance common to both biological and artificial neural networks, 
Fausett points out:
In spite o f our continuous loss o f neurons, we continue to learn. Even in cases 
o f traumatic neural loss, other neurons can sometimes be trained to take over the 
functions o f  damaged cells. In a similar manner, artificial neural networks can 
be designed to be insensitive to small damage to the network, and the network 
can be retrained in cases o f significant damage (e.g., loss o f data and some 
connections). (1994,7)
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The comparison o f biological and artificial networks that Fausett describes is supported 
by other scientific research, such as that found in Stephen Rose's text, The Making o f  
Memory: From Molecules to Mind, wherein Rose recounts the results o f  work with 
trained chicks that compensated for brain damage by either rerouting information or 
reconstructing incomplete data patterns by relying on memory o f  the information or 
patterns (1993, 278). Unlike regular computers that can perform only tasks that they are 
programmed to do and that cannot self-renew or survive system damage and, therefore, 
crash, neural networks demonstrate more human survival or repairing capabilities. This 
is not to say, by any means, that they are o f  human quality or any near substitute beyond 
computational and mechanical machinery.
Although many o f the mysteries o f how the human brain and memory work 
remain in question, many scientists and computer enthusiasts believe that understanding 
more about how artificial neural networks behave may, indeed, provide insight 
regarding biological neural networks (ed. McGaugh et al., 1990, 350). Following up on 
this approach, scientists in the 1980s began to experiment directly on real neural 
networks in the brain, whereas models o f neural networks have been around since the 
1950s (ed. McGaugh 1990, 377). The hope is that advances in this technological field 
will guide researchers who are interested in the learning and memory processes. Work 
in both o f  these fields has affected the approaches that some writers take and 
particularly the way in which they try to represent the construction o f the self in current 
society.
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Developments in memory research
As advances occurred in science, math, and technology, and as new information about 
the brain arose, theories regarding how memory works also shifted to reflect these 
developments. M embers o f the memory research community representing different 
research areas proposed various ideas-often  conflicting—o f how we remember and 
where the seat o f  memory and consciousness exists. Regardless o f  the area o f  study, 
however, theories generally resembled ideas prevalent in other disciplines, again 
reinforcing the trends seen throughout history for cultural ideas to develop 
synchronously across multiple disciplines.
As stated in the previous chapter, memory research during the 1960s and 1970s 
struggled as a result o f  numerous failed experiments. What did emerge from these 
failures, though, was the rejection o f  any belief in the physical transfer o f memory, 
despite the residual and misleading use o f this idea by the science fiction publishing and 
movie making industries. The beginning o f  theories that viewed memory as a property 
affected by chemical changes to the whole body—its brain, cells, and synapses—became 
the new focus for scientists and researchers. Improvements in technology have allowed 
scientists to image and record chemical fluctuations in the brain as it is stimulated. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that technology may not automatically answer 
all questions about the brain and memory. As Rose warns, "Showing that a brain region 
is active when a person is learning o r remembering is not the same as showing that the 
memory 'resides' in that part o f  the brain" (1993, 133). Quite contrary, most scientific 
research has, if anything, discredited the notion that memory can be assigned to any one
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part o f the brain. Instead, even though the hippocampus has been determined to play a 
vital role in transferring short-term memory to long-term or permanent memory, this 
region is not where the memories are stored (Penrose 1989, 379-380). Penrose believes 
that they are actually stored simultaneously in many places within the cerebral cortex. 
This vague explanation and assignment o f where memory resides is about as clear as 
our understanding currently gets.
Since the 1980s, some memory research has been performed, none o f  which has 
produced concrete answers. Some studies include a return to classical conditioning o f 
simple reflexes, such as eye blinking in rabbits, where neural circuitry is then mapped; 
a biochemical focus to determine which proteins may affect memory; and work with 
molluscs to see how neurons and the nervous system work (Rose 1993, 214-215). All 
three o f these areas share an interest in observing changes to the neuronal structure in 
the brain and how this, in turn, affects memory. Rose presents studies o f memory 
(including the experimentation by Ken Lukowiak in 1988 and by Mary Chen and Craig 
Bailey in 1990) that support work with neuron circuitry and distribution o f  memory 
across many neurons and cells as opposed to any single identifiable cell or neuron or 
synapse (1993, 226). Similarly, Kosko believes that "learning and memory lie in the 
great tangled webs o f synapses" (1993, 206) in our brains; and, as we learn, the 
synapses change, allowing us to store the patterns we distinguish with our brain's fuzzy 
sets in whole fields o f  neurons and synapses.
Also supporting the ideas o f  the brain and memory as being nonlinear sets or 
webs, o f neurons and synapses are chaos theory proponents Briggs and Peat. They
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support Ilya Prigogine's argument that the brain, as part o f  a nonlinear world, needs to 
be irregular in order to function properly (Briggs and Peat 1990, 166). Furthermore, the 
brain as irregular or nonlinear contains fluid patterns o f neurons within a network, and it 
is within these patterns o f the network that memory, such as for making a finger move, 
resides (1990, 171). This web o f memory, as opposed to any localization, explains how 
a hand can relearn to function even after severe damage to certain cells or neurons or 
even after the loss o f an appendage. They argue that "[a] memory, like a sensation, is 
not an isolated bit; it is a pattern o f  relationships" (1990, 173). In terms o f  studying 
autobiography, this theory can be applied to assert that our own life story or 
construction o f self is not a series o f  isolated incidents merely linked together, but is a 
general pattern that emerges over time within our individual fuzzy sets or webs, raising 
the question o f what is necessary to see the self-one book, one genre, one body of 
work?
The focus o f note here is that memory research currently follows the prevailing 
trends in culture, just as it has in the past. Theories that attempt to pinpoint specific 
cells or neurons responsible for specific memories have given way to new theories that 
support systems or webs o f neurons, across which memory is spread. This shift reflects 
the disillusionment or rejection o f postmodernism's fragmentation as the answer to how 
the world works. Instead, theories now promote interconnectedness o f our memory 
structure, and, in doing so, suggest some type o f  wholeness is attainable, even if  that 
wholeness is not definable or tangible. When Penrose discusses consciousness and 
individuality, he points out that because electrons are all exactly the same, regardless of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
193
whether that electron is in a brain or in a brick, "What distinguishes the person from his 
house is the pattern o f  how his constituents are arranged, not the individuality o f the 
constituents themselves" (1989, 25). Determining a pattern that identifies an individual 
is what has interested academics in various disciplines studying the self and has inspired 
a shift away from postmodernism. Likewise, the pattern that distinguishes an individual 
from his house also distinguishes him from other people, making autobiography and the 
assertion o f  the self as unique possible once again. As humans, Kosko argues, "our 
brains are full o f  fuzzy sets" (1993, 123) that we manipulate into loose groups where we 
can look for connections. These connections are the same as patterns, giving meaning 
and forging some type o f order out o f the noise o f  information that we encounter. 
Although we may all experience both unique as well as similar events in our lives, the 
way we can communicate how those experiences have helped forge an individual in an 
increasingly homogeneous society is by determining the pattern or shape o f  that 
person's system known as consciousness or self.
The network approach to memory, in addition to reflecting developments in 
other disciplines, has led to a new set o f  metaphors for explaining how memory may 
actually work. While these metaphors may not appear in the denoted autobiographies o f 
writers exploring their mental memory and writing processes as we saw in the past with 
Augustine, Rousseau, and Stein here, the metaphors do provide a new frame on which 
to view autobiography and the self as more diffuse and independently organizing than 
previously considered.
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As a reflection o f  the culture, current metaphors for explaining memory come 
out o f the technological fields o f computers and neural networks. The comparison that 
began in the 1940s with the advent o f computers and developed through various stages 
o f serial computing and then parallel computing is now evolving further with neural 
networks, even though it is now generally understood by scientists and technology 
experts that "the conscious mind cannot work like a computer, even though much o f 
what is actually involved in mental activity might do so" (Penrose 1989, 448). The 
metaphor during the 1970s and 1980s o f memory working like a parallel-distribution 
computer proved to be insufficient, because while parallel computers increased the 
speed or efficiency o f  processing in computers by distributing several bits o f 
information at once, this does not reflect the human brain (Penrose 1989, 398).
Although we may be bombarded by a variety o f  information simultaneously, we are still 
only capable o f processing and o f remembering one piece o f  that information at a time.
If  it is possible to process or learn more than one piece at a time, we have yet to teach 
ourselves how to do so. In Daniel Dennett's succinct comparison "conscious human 
minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented—inefficiently—on the 
parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us" (1991, 218). Proponents o f 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), who are very much in opposition to proponents o f neural 
networks, provide metaphors in line with Dennett's explanation o f how the mind works. 
AI developers see the mind as a type o f processor that works with symbols much in the 
same way that conventional computers operate with strings o f Os and 1 s—a very 
traditional linear movement o f  cause and effect throughout a system (Kosko 1993, 287).
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In the 1980s, the AI community believed that the human brain with its parallel hardware 
could, however, carry out numerous operations at the same time (Rose 1993, 83). The 
problem with this theory is that, ju s t as Dennett points out, we cannot carry out more 
than one conscious thought at any one time. Sure, we can perform numerous separate 
actions such as counting, walking, and snapping our fingers simultaneously, but these 
acts are not the same as trying to remember consciously more than one thing at a time. 
For the most part, in order for simultaneous actions to occur, these actions are learned 
and then become sub- or unconscious actions.
Despite our frenetic society, we are still limited, or perhaps preserved, by our 
ability to possess only one thought at any instant, even if  it is a very brief instant.
Despite the schizophrenic pace o f  postmodernism, the human consciousness, as part o f 
the cosmos, aspires to attain wholeness, and this is reinforced with metaphors o f  neural 
networks. As with all metaphors used to describe the brain and memory, neural 
networks must be seen as just that, a metaphor, not an actual accurate model o f the 
complex human being, whose intricate workings to some degree continue to escape the 
understanding o f  scientists. Even with their extraordinary capabilities to learn, neural 
nets are a very long way from being able, if  ever, to serve as a realistic model o f the 
human brain (Penrose 1989, 397-398).
When Rose conducted his experiments on chick brains in the late 1980s, he 
found that if  he trained the chicks, tracked the path o f learning, and then damaged that 
normal path, the chick's brain would redirect information to circumvent the damaged 
area and complete the flow o f  information (Rose 1993, 282). He and his colleagues
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determined that "the brain doesn't function as a set o f  simply connected little boxes but
as a richly interacting, functional system" (Rose 1993, 282). Rose asserts that brain
functioning includes nerve cell activity, which is electrical and which flows through the
brain "in patterns as simultaneously regular and varied as the waves o f  the sea" (Rose
1993, 131). While Rose's discovery does not acknowledge how brain functioning might
relate either to neural networks or to chaos theory, the similarity o f findings and shared
language cannot be disregarded. He may choose to avoid these metaphors in explaining
his findings, but others interested in understanding consciousness and the brain
(Penrose, Pribram, Skarda and Freeman, Briggs and Peat, and Kosko) embrace them.
Other than Rose's theory o f rerouting, another possible explanation for the
brain's capacity to recall information even after it has incurred damage has been
proposed by neurophysiologist Karl Pribram. Pribram, like many scientists, argues that
memory is "delocalized" across the entire brain (Briggs and Peat 1990, 170). However,
he also believes that memory is stored this way because it converts infomiation to
waveforms that he says:
create interference patterns which can be stored either at nerve cell synapses or 
in 'phase space' all over the brain...similar to the way information in a hologram 
is stored by the interference pattern formed when laser waves are brought 
together on the holographic plate. (Briggs and Peat 1990, 171)
To retrieve the image, the viewer shines a laser having the same wavelength either
through the plate for a clear replication or through part o f  the plate for a fuzzier version;
regardless o f  the method, the entire image is conjured. Pribram uses the hologram
metaphor to describe how the brain can also recall infomiation even after large sections
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o f the cortex (as with Rose's experiments) have been removed. The only requirement is 
that a waveform similar to the desired memory's waveform must pass through the brain. 
Although neuroscientists have not been able to confirm Pribram's theory, it nonetheless 
serves as an accessible metaphor for understanding the holistic nature o f the brain and 
has inspired further research in this area (Briggs and Peat 1990, 171).
Other scientists who also argue for some type o f holistic model o f memory are 
Walter Freeman and Christine Skarda. Their work with the olfactory bulb o f  rabbits 
revealed results similar to Pribram's claim, i.e., "the limit cycle 'memory' for a particular 
smell may be stored [holographically] in the whole bulb's low-level chaos or fractal 
pattern...because each local region o f  the bulb contains the whole limit cycle encoded in 
each o f the local region's oscillations" (Briggs and Peat 1990, 171). The patterns o f  
memory for the rabbit's olfactory bulb, as well as for all memory that Freeman and 
Skarda investigate, are self-organized within the brain and require the "prior existence 
o f  unpatterned energy distributions which appear to be noise, but which in reality are 
chaos" (ed. McGaugh et al. 1990, 377). According to Freeman and Skarda, the patterns 
that identify memories are continually feeding back into themselves, collapsing back 
into chaos, and then emerging as a new form o f  order each time (ed. McGaugh et al. 
1990, 377). Their explanation also complements the neural network model o f memory 
currently favored by scientists, in which "memories must arise as relationships within 
the whole neural network—a sort o f phase space o f  memories" (Briggs and Peat 1990, 
171).
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These metaphors for understanding memory lend themselves well to defining the 
self and interpreting autobiography. The self can be seen as possessing a base of 
unpattemed energy which continuously reorganizes, allowing for the individual to 
collide with many objects, thus changing shape—sometimes radically—but at the same 
time remaining stable in composition. The patterns that emerge as one interacts with 
the environment, not necessarily the underlying energies that are common to everyone, 
are what identifies the individual as unique. Likewise, autobiography can reflect this 
change in energy, with new orders o f  patterns emerging each time, but at the same time 
acknowledging that, while a particular autobiography may present a picture o f a 
particular order or pattern which contains what composes that individual, another order- 
-in the form o f another text or genre—is also a legitimate or "truthful" picture o f that 
individual. Like the hologram metaphor, any particular text or genre may be a fuzzy 
replication o f  that person, but it is, nonetheless, that person. Perhaps the only way to 
approach a clearer, continuous picture of that person is to consider that person's entire 
body o f  work—regardless o f when its discrete pieces are written, its genre, or its 
purpose.
By accounting for a writer's entire body o f  work, we obviously get a greater 
scope o f the writer's development and emerging order or sense through time, which is 
limited in a single text or view. However, even a complete body o f work does not 
translate into a complete reconstruction o f the self. A major source o f the problem with 
conventional ideas o f order when viewing autobiography is that many people, according 
to Foucault, confuse measurement and order (1970, 53). Foucault explains that
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measurement and order are the only two forms o f  comparison. Measurement 
presupposes that a whole at one time existed and has been broken into parts, which 
many people tend to want to collect together with the aim o f  reconstructing or totalling 
the whole once again. Order, however, does not depend on an external reference that is 
necessary to fulfill for successful completion. The difficulty arises when people 
mistake their inability to measure or total up a whole version o f the self for the inability 
to order the self. Measurement, tied to the Newtonian paradigm, focuses on individual 
particles or units with the assumption that if  these particles or units are tracked as they 
correspond to one another, a picture o f the whole system will emerge (Hayles 1990,
169-170). It is not difficult to see how this theor>' would be a convenient way to present 
an individual in an autobiography. However, as previously discussed, we now know 
that Newtonian paradigms do not accurately describe most o f  what occurs in our 
nonlinear world.
Developments in art
Recently I attended a Pop Art exhibit at the Contemporary Arts Center in New Orleans 
which, although small, was representative. The show, however, was highly criticized 
by a local art critic because of his bias toward more traditional/classical conceptions o f 
art. The writer, who seemingly had a strong background in studio painting, understood 
how to talk about painting—its composition, balance, and so forth. Oddly, though, for 
an art critic, he did not seem to command a knowledge o f art history, and, therefore, did 
not provide a clear interpretation to the newspaper's readership o f the period's intended 
mechanistic and technological purposes. The critic, while dismissing the works of
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Warhol, Lichtenstein, and Rosenquist (whose piece, among other things, incorporated 
the gallery's wall as the view from a painted car's window and was my personal favorite 
in this show), touted the sculptures o f currently producing artists because these works 
did more than elevate everyday objects to art status; they, like painting, again, had 
qualities o f balance, line, composition. In frustration, I crumpled up the review.
What the critic did bring to light, even if  only incidentally, is the shift in the last 
25 years away from the depersonalized works o f the 1960s and toward pieces that 
demonstrate the interconnectedness o f the individual and the world—be it family, 
community, politics, or environment. In the 1970s, the art world experienced a period 
o f increased funding for extending art beyond the boundaries of the museum and gallery 
walls out to public places (Sandler 1996, 186). The work that had previously been 
initiated by earthworks artists such as Robert Smithson and that aimed to contrast the 
linear order of geometry against the nonlinear order o f nature continued to bring art to 
people who may have otherwise never considered viewing art. Now, with cuts in 
government financial support for the arts, museums are making efforts to be more self- 
supporting by attracting more first-time visitors. This trend continued as many 
museums, including the recently unveiled Getty Museum in Los Angeles, made strides 
to attract new visitors by making the museum less formal and more interactive, with 
gardens, restaurants, gift shops, and hands-on learning centers. These spaces have 
altered the traditional museum atmosphere to attract people who might otherwise not 
visit, and, in doing so, have done much to change people's attitudes toward experiencing 
art. In the 1980s, however, the earthworks gave way to environmental works, such as
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Elyn Zimmerman's architectural sculptures that incorporated the natural environment
into the artwork itself, with the purpose, as Sandler points out, "to change people's
relationships to their immediate surroundings in order to foster their interest in larger
environmental issues (1996, 180). Works that emphasized the individual's
interconnectedness with and responsibility to the surrounding world were not limited to
outside environmental pieces; gallery installations and live performances also stressed
political and social interdependency. Reflecting trends in other disciplines, art
promoted ideas that showed us as part o f the cultural pattern and inherently cormected—
an abrupt tum from the shunning o f  history and continuity in early postmodern works.
As art moved beyond the depersonalized, mechanical work that reflected the
culture and technology o f the postmodern period, painting that was obviously painting—
i.e., meant to look like painting—once again gained credibility in the art community.
Painters who were leading the way now were using the canvas to show relationships o f
people across many generations and situations. Describing the 1970s paintings o f Philip
Guston, Sandler writes:
Many o f  his images appear to refer not only to his own life—his memories o f  his 
father's death or that o f his brother from gangrene after an automobile accident 
in which his leg was crushed—but to world events—the Holocaust. Piles of 
severed emaciated limbs, shoes, and decapitated heads are reminders both o f his 
brother's legs and o f  the remains o f Nazi death camps. (1996, 197)
Works such as Guston's, which he considers to be highly autobiographical, show the
connection between ourselves and our world while also expanding the definition of
what is considered to be the boundaries o f the autobiographical or self-referential.
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Other conventional art pieces (and by this I mean works intended for show in 
galleries and museums) during the 1980s and 1990s continued to  blur the line between 
the autobiographical and cultural. Jonathan Borofsky's extensive installations aim, as 
Guston's painting did, to cross the personal and the public. He considers each 
installation to be a complete work that can be broken into many pieces—each a work in 
itself—and then sold randomly or stored away (Sandler 1996, 211-212). Borofsky's 
emphasis on the art work as a complete whole that can be split into parts is not the 
interesting factor here. What is, instead, is that once this work is sold o ff in parts or its 
remaining pieces stowed away or exhibited elsewhere, the original whole is no longer 
the piece and may never return to its original shape again. So, while pieces o f the 
original installation may come together again at any given time, they are, indeed, the art 
work, and the place where the missing pieces originally existed holds the memory o f 
those missing pieces. However, the new art work, while appearing to be a different 
work, is actually only in a different phase o f  existence; its matter or spirit remains 
constant regardless o f which o f its pieces are together or absent at any given time. What 
Borofsky originally viewed in terms o f  measurement—or a divided whole—ultimately 
works more in terms o f order—or making some type o f sense without "adding up" to a 
previous established value or composition. This installation as a representation o f the 
personal or self undulates with the global or environment, changes shape and 
appearance, but remains constant in m atter and underlying energy, much like the way 
Antin describes the self and its boundaries.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
203
Whereas technology inspired mechanical reproduction during the early 
postmodern period, widespread use o f  computer and video technology shaped, and was 
used, in art during the 1980s and 1990s. Strengthening the comparison o f the brain and 
the computer, some artists used computers as a new way to show process and mental 
activity—much the same approach that Cézanne took to capture movement or process in 
his art. Sandler writes o f  Jenny Holzer's incorporation o f technology into art with her 
late 1980s installation o f LED signs in Times Square which flashed "truisms" she had 
collected from herself and the American unconscious (1996, 398). 1 do not believe that 
those two entities actually can be distinguished from one another. Her truisms, which 
included statements, such as, "Protect me from what I want " and "Money creates taste," 
flashed and paused rhythmically to reflect a voice, making the exhibit seem like "a big 
brain displaying insights" (Sandler 1996, 398). Not only was the definition and 
placement o f art being challenged, but so was the line between personal and cultural 
thought as well as human and machine. Was the point here just to demonstrate the 
advances in technology, or was it also to emphasize how removed the individual had 
become from her own sense o f personal thought? Had we all become computers 
spouting cultural clichés without thinking for ourselves? If so, what would now 
constitute autobiography? How do we see the individual in such a global-thinking 
society? Do we become completely insignificant?
As technology allowed for installations such as Holzer's to bring art directly to 
the general American public, it also opened new avenues for artistic expression.
Probably the one form o f art that is most accessible to popular culture and, therefore.
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characterized the 1980s and 1990s is video, specifically music video (ed. Gitlin 1986,
112). Music video is a commodity that combines the functions o f  being a creative work 
while also promoting itself and the music it represents for sale. As an art form, music 
videos are created for show on television, which is arguably the m ost accessible forum 
for gaining information or viewing art in American culture. Some music videos are 
legitimate artistic expressions in that they, like more conventional tactile forms 
discussed, reflect the current culture and the struggle o f the artist or individual to 
establish identity in that culture. Pat Aufderheide argues that in today's fast-paced and 
splintered society which is "dotted with shopping malls but with few community 
centers...music videos play to the adolescent's search for identity in an improvised 
community" (quoted in Gitlin 1986, 118). In a society that is not only secular but also 
global, that we have seen over the centuries move away from any semblance o f distinct 
center or focus for personal identity within that society, this art form reflects the 
individual's sense o f confusion and lack o f  coherency or even cohesion as the videos 
tend to present a montage o f information and images that are loosely (if at all) tied to 
the song's lyrics (ed. Gitlin 1986, 113).
As in other areas in culture, video pioneers are now also turning away from the 
decentered, seemingly random, barrage o f images and information o f  the postmodern 
and are searching for new forms o f order and coherency in their work to reflect their 
expression and culture. Just as we have heard the partial patterns o f  an underlying 
rhythmic energy emerge from the trademark noise and feedback loops o f the Jesus and 
Mary Chain on tracks appropriately named "Never Understand" and "The Living End"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
205
in the late 1980s, we have seen some artists visually pull together a  new type o f  order, 
as well. In his 1997 extended video format called Destination Anywhere, Jon Bon Jovi 
does more than make a 30-minute film with a soundtrack, does more than visually retell 
an album. Both the film and the music are integral to making sense o f  each other. The 
songs that overlay the action do not merely enhance or accompany the visual experience 
presented on the screen (and this video was made specifically for television). They 
provide the understanding, meaning, or sense for that part o f the film. What Bon Jovi 
has done in this video is erase the boundaries between genres o f film and music to 
create a space wherein a complete story o f a young couple's struggle to recover from the 
accidental death o f their daughter is revealed through music and dialogue, visual loops 
and flashbacks, moving video and still shots, and glimpses into the personal psyche and 
public perception o f  events. The combined media works better than a single form in its 
attempt to communicate a view o f  the se lf as affected by external and internal forces. 
Combining media, blurring genres as Bon Jovi does with the technology available to 
him, is possible because o f the work done by earlier performance artists such as Laurie 
Anderson and Patti Smith. Anderson and Smith challenged the boundaries assigned to 
their art forms by mixing autobiography and public issues in their performances which 
included poetry, music, and physical movement.
More closely identified with the literary world in the early 1970s—after he had 
written his first two autobiographies—David Antin moved into a new phase in which he 
is credited for creating the "talk poem" (ed. Hoover 1994, xxxvii). According to Paul 
Hoover, poet and editor o f Postmodern American Poetry: A Morton Anthology, Antin's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
206
performances "returned poetry to its communal roots [and]...implicitly challenged the 
preciousness o f  the page and the concept o f a poem as a closed system" (1994, xxxviii). 
By emphasizing that poetry—a highly autobiographical form—is an open system, Antin 
allows for the exploration o f  the self, its boundaries, and its definition to interact and 
change with the surrounding environment while it is being formed during performance 
and again later when it is translated and transformed on the page for publication. Antin 
and other performance artists show the self as having core ideas or truths that act on an 
audience but that are also modified by the audience, as he demonstrates in his 1976 text, 
talking at the boundaries: "i consider m yself a poet but im not reading poetry as you 
see i bring no books with me though ive written books i have a funny relationship to the 
idea o f reading if  you cant hear i would appreciate it if  youd come closer" (211). His 
interacting with his audience determines the length and content o f  his talks, as he 
measures events in terms o f  "energy" (1976, 191) and, therefore, shifts topics or closes 
performances according to energy surges, lapses, or exits. From reading the 
transcriptions o f  his performances, 1 suspect Antin's live explorations o f  the self, 
philosophy, politics, and culture are captivating. However, even working with only the 
texts o f these performances provides a sense—albeit limited—of the atmosphere created 
by Antin and his audience in this construction o f  a self. The melding o f  various art 
forms and literary genres in current culture furthers the argument for the existence of 
underlying connected structures o f patterned energy in nature and culture supported in 
the discussions o f chaos theory', quantum theory, and neural networks.
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The search for a new order in literary analysis
The early autobiographies o f David Antin are very much in the postmodern mode, 
which is to say they are, as previously discussed, collections o f seemingly unrelated 
fragments that can neither be attributed to any positively identifiable voice nor construct 
a definitive person or subject o f the texts. Antin's avant-garde texts o f  the late 1960s not 
only follow the cultural pattern o f the period as determined by an atmosphere o f politics 
in upheaval accompanied by an onslaught o f  information technology, but they also 
perpetuate that cultural pattem by presenting the shape or structure o f individuality or 
self possible in such a climate. As chapter three discusses, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
there was a cultural shift "toward local, fractured systems and modes o f analysis"
(Hayles 1990, 2).
In the midst o f postmodernism, literary theorists addressed the difficulty o f 
autobiography in the 1960s. Spengemann and Lundquist, like many theorists and 
philosophers, held the view that a writer must "identify the T which writes all his past 
experiences. I f  he does not, his life will seem to him fragmented and incoherent, and its 
story will appear to us pointless and confused" (1965, 515). This inability to identify a 
single "I" that directs all o f our past experiences is, o f course, the very point that avant- 
garde writers such as Antin make by presenting fragmented texts. The single view o f  
the self has long been discarded by cutting-edge writers, who have adopted numerous 
experimental writing styles with which to  try to locate and represent the self. However, 
as Spengemami and Lundquist ask, because any attempt to define the se lf is a 
convention that emerges from the culture, what does a writer do when "none o f  the
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conventions satisfies an autobiographer's need to order the details o f his life?" (1965,
515). What does the experimental autobiographer, like Antin, do when the fragmented 
nature o f postmodernism leaves him searching for a better way to understand his 
possible place in the world and to make sense o f how it fits in with history, therefore 
attaining a type o f  coherency? He searches for a new order, a new way o f 
understanding the events and pieces that in conventional perspective appear senseless or 
without order.
The understanding that current hierarchies and organizational structures did not 
adequately satisfy either cultural needs or physiological phenomena often became the 
focus o f academic debate. At this time, deconstruction theory emerged, questioning 
social and intellectual hierarchies, among other things. This seems logical, for the 
cultural climate at the time was one o f  international turmoil with actual and cold wars, 
as well as political movements o f minority groups (specifically African Americans and 
women), which produced a society constituted increasingly o f isolated pockets. These 
pockets o f society, particularly those involved in political movements in the United 
States, demanded rightfully that their position in the social and political hierarchy be 
questioned and that their own historical pattern be tracked. Because to live as a 
postmodernist is, as Hayles describes, "to live as schizophrenics are said to do, in a 
world o f disconnected moments that jostle one another but never form a continuous 
(much less logical) progression...to have no sense o f history" (1990, 282), some 
intellectuals sought out a theory that would provide an alternative to living without 
history, to living like a "schizophrenic." Deconstruction was intended to break the
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boundaries established by conventional structures and thinking; and, in doing this, in 
producing fragments, it opened systems that had been arbitrarily closed for centuries by 
the men with power (Hayles 1990, 176). This opening o f systems extends anywhere 
from gender roles to political ideology to literary genres. W hile deconstruction theorists 
questioned the prioritization o f  ideals based on traditional hierarchies and rejected the 
possibility o f  a conventionally cohesive whole being achieved, this measure seems very 
necessary; for as we know now, there is no one definitive view or story or history. 
Deconstruction theorists wanted to break from truths that were validated only by 
historical longevity; so, to initiate this break, they fragmented currently established 
structures. Likewise, proponents o f nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory also broke 
from the arbitrary boundaries o f classical systems. However, these fields, unlike 
deconstruction, emphasized continuity-i.e., history (Hayles 1990, 176). For those who 
found living within the constructs o f postmodernism and deconstruction unsuitable for 
their need to situate themselves in a cohesive historical continuum and, therefore, to 
establish some type o f  order, chaos theory provided just th a t-a  radical break from all 
conventional orders, yet an order nonetheless. Briggs and Peat argue that "[o]n a 
philosophical level, chaos theory may hold comfort for anyone who feels his or her 
place in the cosmos is inconsequential. Inconsequential things can have a huge effect in 
a nonlinear universe" (1990, 75). This attitude is different from that prevalent in 
postmodern thought where the individual really has no significance in an increasingly 
technological world—one in which machines can practically replace anyone, including 
the artist.
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Drawing upon the previous discussion o f  measurement and order, it is easier to 
see that the fragmentation associated with postmodern culture does not preclude order. 
Certainly the fact that these are fragments implies they are o f  something necessarily 
larger that no longer exists in that it can no longer be reassembled or returned to its 
original shape. However, just because the system's one-time shape carmot be reached 
again does not mean that the system also lacks order. An underlying pattem o f  what 
can be called energy or behavior or attraction continues to interact with external stimuli 
or information to generate new shapes o f  patterns, all o f which are composed o f  the 
system's same basic material. So, any particular text may present one or more 
perspectives o f the self at the time o f writing, but the view o f  the self in that text can 
never be complete; it may possess order, but it will not "add up" to a definitive, 
complete picture o f  the writer regardless o f how many perspectives are included. As 
Gddel's proof explains, the system can approach but never attain completion; there will 
always be some information in the structure's pattern that is different or missing at any 
given time. As Kosko points out, with systems such as the self, "the parts do not add up 
to the whole. That is nonlinearity...You can study arms and legs and other parts and 
still not know how a human behaves" (1993, 108). Likewise, you can see a piece o f 
someone in an autobiography and still not have a complete picture o f  who that person is. 
What you see is merely a dot in the larger pattem  o f that person's self, or the conflation 
o f time to one moment. You must see all o f that person's work throughout various 
periods o f  his life to see how, together, they present an overall shape—which is not to be 
confused with an overall complete or definitive view—of that person.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211
Following this theory, the more views o f a particular writer that we have over a 
greater period o f time, the more we can see the writer's patterns (o f tendencies, 
concerns, and so forth) change shape, providing more layers of the writer's structure, the 
self. Tracing those layers, we have a larger view o f the system which—while it can 
never be complete because of the nature o f measurement—more accurately presents a 
way o f  looking at that writer and determining how his or her shape (or self) changed 
with various experiences. A core pattern begins to emerge that we can only see from 
outside as observers over the course o f  time and an ever-expanding scope.
Because a writer's self changes shape and ultimately is defined through multiple 
texts and over time, many academics argue that no one text or genre can be considered 
the definitive autobiography o f a  writer. This seems logical in light o f relatively recent 
understanding of open systems. If the self is, indeed, an open system, then it makes 
sense that any attempt to represent the self must also be open. For example, we may not 
see in one text that a writer's b rief mention o f  attending a rally for communism may 
actually be a defining event for that person's life or place in history. However, this 
seemingly inconsequential incident may lead to a fuller understanding o f  that writer 
once other books are considered in which we can then see a relationship o f events, such 
as the connection between his family being uprooted from their Russian home and the 
resulting disruption o f order, i.e., of continuity or situation in history. In chaos theory, 
retrodiction verifies causalities even though prediction is impossible. Situating the self 
in one's historical pattem is easier to do externally, as opposed to internally, from within 
the self. This is why academics, as opposed to the autobiographer herself, are in the
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position to examine the developments o f a writer through her entire body o f  work and 
determine the relation o f pieces to one another in shaping the self. This is also why 
more academics (for example, Olney 1997) now believe that constructing the self 
requires looking at all works by an artist, regardless o f  labeled genre or point in time 
when written.
Examining David Antin's later autobiographical works as indicators of cultural 
shifts in order and coherency
Since the publication o f the officially titled autobiographies in the late 1960s, Antin has 
continued to produce highly autobiographical works, although they are not titled as 
such. These texts address his views on art, academia, culture, politics, coherency, and 
the self. As his work continues, it reveals cultural shifts in ideas o f order and coherency 
through immediately observable features, such as book titles and biographical sketches, 
as well as through more contextual aspects, such as narrative structure, writing style, 
and the discussion o f these very ideas-i.e., order, coherency, h istory-in  relation to the 
self. His work, if  anything, shows a constant concern with coherency and order and 
with defining one's self, which for Antin requires that it be situated historically.
Trying to find some way in which to begin writing about Antin's work, I jotted 
down a chronological list o f his titles. (I chose chronology because I am, for better or 
worse, compelled to follow my human instinct to see things develop in time.) The list 
o f his books as well as the essay that first introduced me to Antin's work, reads as 
follows: Autobiography (\967); Definitions (1967); Code o f  Flag Behavior, which 
includes "Autobiography 2" (1968); Meditations (1971); Talking (1972); After The
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JVar (A Long N ovel With Few Words) (1973); talking at the boundaries (1976); whos 
listening out there {\919)\ tuning (\9 iA )\ "Radical Coherency" (1987); Selected 
Poems: 1963-1973 (1991); what it means to be avant-garde (1993). The titles 
themselves indicate a concern with order, with organizing principles that track Antin’s 
search for a  way in which to define and situate himself, as represented through his 
autobiographical works. His initial autobiography, which, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, presents numerous unidentified voices and story pieces, is a quintessential 
postmodern text. What holds these seemingly random fragments together? According 
to Antin, these were images and bits o f information or conversations that he did not 
want to forget (1991, 15). The reader is at a loss to comprehend order or meaning in the 
text as she sees the random barrage o f information in postmodern society reflected on 
the pages in front o f  her.
As society and Antin found the lack o f order and conventional historical 
continuity prevalent in postmodern thought more than difficult to live with and maintain 
sanity, his work explored new types of order to replace those that had been proven 
inadequate. Talking implies just th a t-a  move away from preprinted text and toward 
spontaneous performance, although this text is a mixture o f  both art forms. In talking at 
the boundaries and tuning, Antin leaves behind the pre-scripted text to embrace 
performance, in which he interacts or collides with his audience as he attempts to find or 
fine-tune the boundaries that define the self. The 1987 essay, "Radical Coherency," 
presents a completely new way o f viewing one's idea o f order and personal narrative, 
which for Antin is that which traces the path o f  events or story inside o f one's mind and,
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therefore, imbues that story with sense and meaning. Breaking from conventional ideas 
o f order in search o f a new order corresponds with developments in other disciplines at 
the time, specifically chaos and quantum theory. Antin’s most recent books. Selected  
Poems: 1963-1973 and what it means to be avant-garde, imply that Antin has distanced 
him self from his past work so that he may situate him self historically by placing his 
selected poems in a specific time frame and by defining who he is at one point in tim e - 
which he says requires retrospection—once he is no longer a part o f the system that he 
calls the avant-garde (1993). One carmot write effectively about what it means to be 
anything—either an eight-year-old girl growing up in a small house with a big family or 
an avant-garde artist—until time and distance permit that person to have a less subjective 
and single perspective o f the situation.
Over the more than 25 years that Antin has been publishing, his work has 
increasingly challenged established categories o f art genres. As pointed out in the 
previous chapter, in what it means to be avant-garde, Antin refers to what he calls a 
problem because publishers want to categorize his work as poetry, but readers buy it, 
find no verse, and return it thinking they have not found poetry (1993, 125). Antin's 
poetry no more resembles traditional poetry than his autobiographies resemble 
conventional autobiographies. In much the same way that his poetry and 
autobiographies defy those very established literary genres, his entire body o f  work— 
writings and performances—blurs the traditional boundaries o f what is labeled 
performance, art, fiction, philosophy, and autobiography. In his appropriately titled 
book, talking at the boundaries (1976), Antin uses higher-level mathematics, physics.
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philosophy, and history to explore the definition or boundaries o f  the self. He writes 
that "as soon as you take a position very forcefully youre immediately at the boundary 
o f that position which lets you look directly over the boundary to the other side" (215). 
Pushing at the boundaries o f the self—how it is defined and where it is located (and, 
therefore, it certainly exists)—in his written accounts o f impromptu talk performances 
breaks from all ideas o f conventional genres. This blurring o f  categories reflects, and is 
possible because of, the culture in which technology has invaded every aspect o f  daily 
life, connecting and combining areas that were once distinct, such as the art work and 
the art viewer or the legal proceedings o f a court trial and the theatrical performance o f a 
television program. No longer is the individual shaped only by her interaction with the 
immediate environment but, thanks to satellites, televisions, and computers, also by her 
exposure to, perhaps even interaction with, global and universal phenomena.
In keeping with his continual challenge o f boundaries and genres, Antin also 
turns the biographical sketch inside out and back again. However, as Antin 
progressively explores new ideas o f coherency and order by disrupting and melding 
conventional art and literary genres, the biographical sketches that accompany his texts 
become increasingly traditional, perhaps as a sign that he has abandoned the attempt to 
convince publishers o f the futility o f such sketches and has allowed someone else to 
construct them. As discussed earlier, Antin's first autobiography includes the baffling 
biographical sketch at the end o f the book that leaves the reader as confused as the 
fragments that comprise the main text do. His comments, "Said 'suppositories' before 
he was two...Wrote his first poem at age 9...In after years had his apartment painted and
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is now considering moving" (1967, 14) show irreverence for these publishing 
requirements which are generic boilerplates and, therefore, meaningless because they 
present facts that could describe anyone.
He continues to demonstrate his disregard for the required sketch in his 1971 
text Meditations, in which he provides a photograph o f him self with his arms 
outstretched as if  to embrace the reader but w ith his head turned away in his usual 
fashion o f  contradiction. This time he includes more historical information such as 
when he was born, where he was living when the United States entered WWII, and the 
exact street location where he was standing the day the smog began in 1948. His 
sketch, while being very different from what one expects in a biographical information 
paragraph, is humorous, poignant, irreverent, but also historical in the sense that it does 
provide very specific details o f  Antin's developm ent-or at least placement—in a 
historical context. While this sketch is far from being traditional, it does possess more 
conventional traits than its predecessor in that it strives to give a glimpse o f the author 
in a historical context, thus helping to construct a view o f the self that has meaning for 
the reader.
Turning abruptly from the sardonic early sketches that Antin obviously penned 
himself, the biographical information sections o f  his recent books. Selected Poems 
(1991) and M'hat it means to be avant-garde (1993), are very conventional and most 
likely written by someone other than Antin. These sketches describe the different 
phases o f Antin's art, the areas in which he has worked professionally, his previous book 
title, and where he and his wife are currently residing and working. Interestingly, Antin
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is a professor o f  art, not English, at the University o f  California, San Diego (1991),
again reinforcing his breaking o f  boundaries, genres, categorization, and expectations.
Antin's expertise in multiple disciplines—art, poetry, linguistics, engineering—itself
reflects a shift in culture away from the single career for life toward various interests
and numerous career changes prevalent today. Furthermore, Antin's teaching position
in the art department o f a university reflects a shift after the postmodern period during
which influential artists and writers were thought always to work outside o f the
academy—0/7 the fringe. Now, it is commonplace, even expected, that an artist, but
especially a writer, train and work within the university system.
The concepts that Antin has investigated as a result o f  his multiple interests
permeate his works, particularly his later pieces that derive from his talks. The texts
reflect and perpetuate shifts in ideas o f coherency and order as reinforced by the
narrative structure and writing style. In his 1967 book, Definitions, he presents an
exhaustive list o f  fragments and extended passages defining particular concepts, in this
case, those o f  pain and loss. As with his first autobiography and second one which was
to follow the next year, the relationship between blocks o f  text is often a mystery to the
reader. However, something very interesting that Definitions provides, in addition to
many insightful and poignant glimpses into Antin's psyche, is a section that raises some
o f the same issues as chaos theory. Section four, "the roads," is a series o f stanzas that
attempts to look at a hypothetical situation involving a man travelling in straight lines:
he walks in a straight line in any direction 
he turns through any angle whatsoever and walks 
the same distance also in a straight line and keeps
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on repeating this process what is the likelihood that 
he will arrive at some point some distance from 
his starting point or
he rides in a  straight line any distance turns 
through any angle rides the same distance also in 
a straight line and repeats this process any number 
of times what are the odds that he will arrive at some 
place some distance from his starting point or 
[...]
suppose he encounters a wall (1967, 36-37).
Antin's reiteration o f  language and ideas in this piece at first seems reminiscent o f T.S. 
Eliot’s Four Quartets in which Eliot stops and starts over, saying, "That was a way o f 
putting it-n o t very satisfactory," ("East Coker," II, 18) referring to his discontent with 
the inability o f  language to convey intention. Even though "the roads" is a poem and, 
therefore, very concerned with precise language and meaning, the way in which the 
poem turns into itself structurally to mirror the content's concern with the man travelling 
and turning in angles is what lends it to study in terms o f  ideas in chaos. An ob ject- 
either a man or a poem or a mathematical equation—that continues to feed back into 
itself quickly changes form and does not arrive back at the point o f origin. When that 
object encounters something foreign to its system, such as an audience or a wall or a 
new point, the object must readjust in order to continue.
Much like Antin's fragmented texts that seem random and without order or 
structure but actually resemble the poetic form of the ghazal, this piece, in addition to 
presenting ideas that will surface in chaos theory, also possesses the feel o f another 
poetic form—the sestina. The sestina originated in the 16th century and is a highly 
structured form containing six end words that rotate positions, creating a scheme as
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follows: 123456, 615243, 364125, 532614, 451362,246531, 12/34/56. The last end 
word o f a stanza becomes the first end word o f  the next stanza, and the other end words 
are intricately woven back into the poem following the very rigid structure. This 
process of reiteration in the sestina is much like the concept o f  feedback loops or 
functional iteration in chaos theory, in which a plot o f a point on the x-y axis is 
reiterated by having the y variable become the x variable o f  the next point (Gleick 1987, 
61). A trace o f the original point always remains, although its presence becomes more 
residual as reiterations occur. Returning to the original point is not possible, but 
approaching that original point, like the man travelling in angles but always ending 
some distance from his starting point, is. In the last stanza o f a sestina, the end words 
return to their original order; however, the stanza has only three lines, each o f  which 
contains two o f the end words, preventing it from taking the shape o f  the first stanza.
This is the co-existence o f measurement and order that Foucault asserts that people 
often confuse. The reiteration over time will show itself as an order or pattern.
However, measurement will never reach absolute recurrence o f  the original whole; it 
will only approach the original point because measurement always allows for a smaller, 
more precise increment, which, in turn, precludes a return to completeness. The sestina, 
much like chaos, presents a rigid determined form that allows for freedom within the 
structure. Because o f its demands, the form almost forces the writer to produce a wild 
narrative within in the attempt to meet the constraints o f the end lines. W hat emerges, 
usually, is an uncontrolled wandering o f the writer's psychological connections to a very
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controlled, constrained order o f  specific words. Sestinas tend to be entertaining, taking 
the reader on a journey that often seems like the rantings o f a lunatic.
With all o f  his scripted tex ts-those that did not originate as live performances— 
Antin uses collage in varying degrees to structure his work. He does this to point out 
the lack o f cohesion in postmodern American culture (Antin 1991, 18). However, quite 
different from most postmodern writers, he has never denied that he structures his texts 
very meticulously to reinforce their purposes—whether it is to remember people and 
conversations (1991, 15) or to show  the arbitrary nature o f  American society (1991, 18). 
In Code o f  Flag Behavior, which is one o f his last solely written texts, he again presents 
a collage o f fragments, mainly found pieces from various sources. Even among the 
fragments o f his arbitrary culture, he searches for a structure, an order, a history, as he 
writes, "In this house nothing was ever thrown away. Theyd found a mass o f  doctors 
prescriptions pinned together in separate sheafs, some from twenty years before. The 
familys medical history could have been pieced together with the help o f  these scraps"
(1967, 29). Antin's interest in history, in coherency, is evident even in this early work. 
Much as he believes the family's medical history can be assembled with the help of 
random, seemingly unrelated scraps, the history o f his culture and the se lf can also be 
constructed with the help o f the seemingly unrelated fragments he has collected in his 
books. When he writes later in the same book, "There must be sense/ in this madness/ 
only/ he was not in a position/ to discover it," (1967, 65) he insinuates that eventually he 
will be in a position to see the sense. That is, as the principle o f  scale in chaos theory 
proposes, once enough time has passed, Antin will be able to have the perspective and
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retrospection necessary to situate and construct a self imbued with meaning. He will be 
in a position that allows him to step back, to see a larger scale or section o f  the system 
wherein a pattern emerges o f  which David Antin is a part.
In the 1970s, Antin continued his search for a coherency that represented the 
American mind, and in doing so, moved more and more toward live performance as 
opposed to reading a text written in isolation. In Talking (1972), he combines scripted 
and spontaneously added text. Physically on the page, the text combines regular, 
italicized, and bold print spaced irregularly to indicate changes in speakers as well as 
time elapsed between comments. Antin effectively creates a text that closely replicates 
the rhythm, duration, and energy o f  the actual radio performance. By beginning with a 
script that he and his wife Eleanor performed extemporaneously on the radio and 
incorporating the new material into the transcription for publication, Antin injects an 
element o f disorder into a pre-existing order. However, he does not create noise or 
chaos or disorder but, instead, a new  order or structure reflecting the relationship o f 
Eleanor, himself, the text, and the context o f  the radio station on that particular day.
The text that Antin and Eleanor develop addresses concerns ranging from the war in 
Vietnam to the discussion o f  artists who claim to have no interest in history or one's 
place in history. Antin reveals the contradiction o f attempting to live in the world while 
rejecting history when he discusses postmodern artists who claim that they are not 
interested in historical vaults known as museums. Antin believes these artists are not 
convincing anyone that they reject history or museums because they make oversized 
paintings that can only fit and be supported by walls in museums. Therefore, the artists'
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goal, stated or not, is to get into a museum, into the historical continuum (1972, 158- 
159).
While Talking illustrates, as well as print media can, the mental processes o f 
Antin and Eleanor interacting with each other and the text, Antin truly captures the 
sense o f  the present, o f  the processes o f the brain at work, in his oral, or talk, pieces. 
Once he abandons text for performance, a new coherency em erges-one that has 
meaning because it arises out o f  a very particular context and interaction with that 
environment. Because one o f the most difficult things to do is understand someone 
else's narrative (internalization o f a story or event), trying to duplicate the context and 
interaction o f the situation that produced the narrative is the closest we can get to 
translating that experience and, hopefully, conveying its significance. The human 
consciousness or narrative creates a radical coherency (Antin 1984, 197-198), and Antin 
tries to convey this coherency in his performances.
A marked departure from the fragmented early books, the talk pieces progress 
smoothly all the way through without interruption by formal punctuation. His structure 
mimics the movement o f the mind as it travels along, collides with factors (such as 
people moving in the audience), changes direction, and finally arrives at its end-w hich 
means all the energy is expended. An interest in the present, in process-w hich we have 
seen in previous chapters with Stein and with Antin's earlier work—is characteristic o f 
modem and postmodern writers. Antin's ability to capture the feeling o f the present 
unfolding as the reader scans the page is impeccable. He defends his preference for the 
immediacy o f performance over script when he (ironically) writes:
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talking for me is the closest i can come 
as a poet to thinking and i had wanted for a long 
time a kind o f poetry o f  thinking not a poetry o f thought 
but a poetry o f  thinking since getting so close to the 




interested in revision and polishing than in the difference 
between print and performance
now both are available and 
interesting for the representation o f  experience
performance is attractive for its immediacy and power 
print for its continuing availability which is a
convenience though sometimes delusory because it seems to
promise so much clarity and duration and i have an 
attraction to clarity though not so much to duration but 
i have a much greater attraction to performance to the 
moment (1993, "durations" 65).
Antin's interest in the present, as he intimates, is in understanding the narrative that
arises within a particular context. His decision to omit formal punctuation and to use,
instead, spacing as an indicator o f the performance's time, rhythm, and energy makes
the reader an active participant, not just an observer, on the ride through the experience
and ideas presented on the page where both the subject and reader arrive at a place, an
understanding, a narrative coherency together. Antin's teclmique and purpose are
different from that o f modern texts, such as James Joyce's Ulysses, in which the
spectacular concluding section tracks the mind o f  Molly Bloom in a style so fluid and
lucid that even without any punctuation it is arguably the easiest part o f  the book to
follow. Both Joyce's and Stein's texts aim to mimic the mind as it works in the moment.
Their writing, however, does not take the subject and the reader on a blind journey; the
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authors always remain in control, directing the text and leading the reader. Antin's 
texts are neither fictional nor meticulously scripted; they are extemporaneous 
explorations {very lightly edited for print (Antin 1993, 124)) o f self-definition, politics, 
family, philosophy, and science, among other things, that reinforce the current 
developments in neural networks, as well as in chaos and quantum theory.
Very different from his early fragmented texts, Antin's talk pieces possess a 
physical and contextual cohesion that is similar to current technological models in 
neural networks. Where his early texts reflected the emerging technology o f the day, 
conveying the feeling o f  someone clicking the remote control through numerous 
television channels ("channel surfing"), so, too, does his m ost recent work reflect 
contemporary technology—with key words such as "webs" and "nets." The concept o f 
our world becoming increasingly interconnected through the technology o f  the internet 
and world wide web, which individuals can access from their own homes, is certainly 
more than an intriguing convenience. However, the area o f computer technology that is 
o f interest here because o f  its tie to biology and mental processes is neural networks.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, neural networks are a system o f  layers composed o f 
neurons, units, cells, and nodes that communicate with each other across layers by way 
o f links called weights or synapses (Fausett 1994, 3). It is believed that the system's 
long-term memory resides in these weights or synapses, which change and adjust as the 
system gains experience. Therefore, the synapses connecting the system's layers o f 
neurons allow for meaning within and give the system cohesion.
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The role o f the scenarios that Antin includes in his later books resembles the 
synapses in neural networks because the scenarios function both to situate the piece that 
follows and to bridge all o f the talks so that the reader knows exactly who is speaking, 
when, where, and what it means. In providing the story o f what happened after one 
performance, consequently leading the reader into the next performance, Antin achieves 
a clarity and cohesion in his most recent work that his early texts eschew. He gives both 
story (the telling o f events) and narrative (the internal experience o f  those events), and 
the story helps the reader get to the narrative. This is not to say that neural networks are 
the model for Antin's writing. In actuality, they vary significantly in that, with the 
neural network, meaning is in the connection links between information. Conversely, 
Antin's texts provide the meaning in the talks and the information in the links that 
connect the transcriptions o f  experiences or narrative. Nonetheless, the basic concepts 
behind the technology indicate a cultural shift toward an interconnectedness that is 
evident in talking at the boundaries, tuning, "Radical Coherency," and what it means to 
be avant-garde.
Aside from the physical presentation and narrative structure, Antin's later works 
demonstrate an awareness o f cultural shifts with the topics o f talks often addressing 
ideas o f coherency and order, as well as o f locating the self, which will be explored later 
in this chapter. One o f the strongest illustrations o f Antin's (and contemporary 
society's) move toward a new type o f order is found in the essay "Radical Coherency" 
(1987). Although this piece is (as far as can be determined) an essay written for a 
magazine and not a transcription o f a performance, it still possesses the feel o f  process.
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if  not o f  the present. The reader still gets the impression that Antin is speaking into a 
tape recorder or writing as ideas enter, develop, and then exit his mind, giving way to 
yet some other topic, but that he has uncharacteristically started thinking through his 
original question before he turned on the recorder. The essay grows out o f magazine 
editor Don Wellman's question regarding Antin's move from collage to talk pieces, to 
which Antin sets up the rest o f the essay with:
but i wanted to think about what i was 
doing and what i used to do in the light o f the notion of 
coherency which i specifically wanted to think 
about the idea o f what we consider coherent why 
we consider it coherent and the different ways 
o f thinking things are coherent that are based on 
different organizing principles (1987, 183).
Different organizing principles, or ideas o f order and coherency, drive the different
stages o f Antin's work and correspond with changing cultural ideas o f order. That he
wants to view these organizing principles in the way that they connect his past and
current work further supports his move away from the random or arbitrary
fragmentation o f postmodern ideas and toward the interconnected nature o f chaos.
Antin began his work in the 1960s with collage in an attempt to make interesting
the "usually continuous things you would consider coherent" (1987, 183) by taking
pieces from these many different and varied continuous discourses and putting them
next to each other to see what new text emerged. He typically pulled from sources such
as aeronautics manuals, Jehovah's witness magazines, travel guides, and philosophical
reflections. While this proved to be entertaining for awhile, Antin says that eventually
when he heard the fragments coming in his readings he would recognize the original
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continuous discourses from which he had taken them. Because this was o f  no interest to 
him, he decided to move on from collage. An aspect o f  collage that he did like, 
however, was that he realized his audience was probably unfamiliar with some o f the 
sources he used in his work because he did use texts from such a wide range o f 
disciplines. For Antin, imagining what organizing principles his readers used to make 
sense o f the poems was fascinating, and he equates the way in which his audience 
probably views his collage with the way readers approach language poetry or the way 
his mother approaches going to a shopping center.
What ensues with this shift in Antin's narrative is an extensive retelling o f his 
journey with his 76-year-old mother tlirough Sears, which, like the entire shopping 
center, is organized around the system o f  collage. The juxtaposition of uru-elated 
sections in Sears is like the arbitrary collection o f shops in the mall, each of which is 
separated by boundaries, such as the terrazzo flooring, which are often unnoticeable or 
which quickly disintegrate into other sections. Each section has its own system o f 
organization; if  that familiar system o f order breaks d o w n -fb r example, when shoes are 
tangled together in piles instead o f  arranged on shelves—then it becomes difficult to 
make sense o f what is there. For Antin's mother, this means "she couldnt see any shoes" 
(1987, 187) even though there are probably hundreds in front o f  her. Because the pile in 
front o f  her does not possess an order with which she is familiar, she cannot 
comprehend or "see" it, much like linear or classical views o f order cannot see order in 
the barrage o f stimuli in postmodern society. Antin recognizes this as a problem not 
with the pace o f society but with society's view o f coherency, as he says, "i keep
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thinking/ shes going to figure this out" (1987, 191). Crossing the boundaries o f the 
store into a new section which has its own completely different idea o f order, however, 
is "a tough voyage" (1987, 192) for his mother who is afraid and who does not figure it 
out and who retreats into the safety o f familiarity with, "cant we ju st go home?" (1987, 
192) even if  it does mean that she will leave the store without getting what she needs. 
Her apprehension toward new systems o f  order in the Sears store certainly is not merely 
Antin's commentary on the disarray or daunting structure o f  a department store; he is 
commenting on the same apprehension that many scholars have toward approaching 
new ideas o f order that he terms radical coherency.
Before he moves into his explanation o f  radical coherency, he addresses a 
coherency he found interesting in the department store. He refers to a "fully articulated/ 
system o f hosiery" (1987, 193) that has been established but that "whatever the system 
contained at this/ particular moment all that is left o f the system/ is whats left on the 
shelves" (193-194). Antin's point is that there is a definite system of order in place, and 
at any given time different parts o f  the system are missing, which may seem like 
disorder, but the order is, in fact, there. The reader can see the hosiery system, which 
itself is incomplete, as part o f a larger incomplete system (Sears), which is also part o f  a 
still larger incomplete system (the shopping center). How disordered the system 
appears at any given tim e depends on the scale at which the system is being viewed: 
the smaller the increment of scale, the more difficult it is to see the recursive pattern and 
the more likely the system will seem random or unrelated. This, as Foucault has shown, 
is a problem with measurement and not with order—increase the measurement and the
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order will emerge. Antin's understanding o f an incomplete system nevertheless 
containing coherency echoes Godel's proof; likewise the levels o f  systems within the 
shopping center incites ideas o f  scale and fractals in chaos theory. While these areas o f 
study are currently topical, Antin is interested in ideas that account for more than either 
restoring the missing parts o f  a system or juxtaposing unrelated fragments (1987, 195), 
which he sees as "threatening to assemble itself into a fairly dull familiar thing" (1987,
195). For Antin, there are other types o f organization that he finds interesting— 
specifically the movement from and toward coherency (1987, 196).
Again, as it has always been with Antin, the fascination is with process (the 
movement) and not product (the arrival at order). He writes o f a professor who at one 
time is part o f  a conventional coherency but who begins to become less coherent to 
observers as he acquires bizarre articles o f clothing piece by piece (1987, 196).
However, as time passes and the professor acquires additional clothing, he again 
becomes more coherent to observers who make sense o f his new attire. He approaches a 
new type o f coherency; then he acquires a walking stick and disappears. The 
movement away from and toward different types o f coherency is like the reiteration o f 
an image in chaos theory; the professor once had a certain shape which fed back into 
itself, producing image after image that did not resemble the original form and was, 
therefore, incoherent. Eventually, and suddenly, a reiteration approaches something 
recognizable as the professor, yet not exactly what he was originally, and then 
disappears just as quickly.
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Making sense o f this professor's actions is difficult because trying, as Antin 
says, " to formulate a/ kind o f sense out o f someones most conventional/ narrative just 
to try to make sense o f it/ appears to produce a radical coherency that i had/ never 
anticipated" (1987, 197-198). He illustrates this with the story o f  his grandmother's 
death. During her final days, her words were incomprehensible ramblings to her family 
because they could not follow her narrative and, therefore, could not make sense o f 
what she was saying. Antin writes o f trying to reconstruct her narrative so that he could 
follow the order o f her thoughts, allowing him  to see the sense and coherency in her 
yells of, "give him some money," "put it in the can" and "theres not enough room / go 
away" (1987, 198). He thinks that the way the mind actually organizes things is far 
more interesting and radical than any mechanical attempt (such as cutting up text or 
making collage) to model the randomness in nature (1987, 197). Because he is 
fascinated with the way the human mind creates such intricate narratives, he is suiprised 
to learn how very little scientists actually know about the working mind (1987, 197). 
Because the human mind is so much more complex than any machine built to model it, 
any comparison is not only reductive but naive. The preference for the natural 
complexity o f the mind over any randomness constructed by a machine or technique is 
the reason Antin shifts his focus strictly to tracking the human narrative (1987).
Trying to understand someone's narrative is almost impossible if  you are unable 
to account for the introduction o f  elements that send the narrative spinning in an 
unexpected direction. In the way that chaos theory allows us to understand that a 
butterfly flapping its wings in Japan may ultimately be related to a rainstorm in South
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Carolina, it also allows us to see how "theres not enough room" is related to an orthodox 
Jew collecting money who will not get out o f  the bed and, subsequently, Antin's 
grandmother's death. There is a clarity in this seeming nonsense o f a narrative that 
presents a radical coherency and illustrates interconnectedness as a very complex web 
that is not linear but is definitely logical and, therefore, possesses order.
In his work that follows "Radical Coherency," Antin continues to explore the 
interconnectedness o f the narrative he identifies with the self. In Selected Poems and 
M’hat it means to be avant-garde, he looks back on his work, reflects, and situates it 
historically with the distance and perspective to see it on a different scale, one in which 
patterns emerge and which "will show somewhat more loosely and truly the body o f 
work that I did then and its clear connection to the apparently very different work I am 
doing now" (1993, 13). His most recent work considered along with his past work 
unveils a development o f Antin's understanding o f how and where the self can be 
constructed. Only in viewing all o f  his work can the reader see the connections that 
wind through Antin's texts, ultimately revealing a clearer, though still incomplete, view 
o f his narrative or self.
Constructing and locating the  self in a world of webs
In his most recent talk pieces, Antin may not use metaphors borrowed from current 
technology to explore his thinking or writing processes the way that Augustine, 
Rousseau, Stein, and even he to some degree in his early written texts do. However, he 
does use extended metaphors when discussing the construction and location o f the self. 
These metaphors reflect his experience in disciplines such as engineering and linguistics
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as evidenced by his knowledge o f advanced mathematics, literary theory, and sociology 
regarding language. In trying to define and address questions regarding the self, he 
situates h im self as a leader in the now current trend to look to other disciplines, 
specifically mathematics (which takes in chaos and quantum theory and nonlinear 
dynamics) for an understanding o f the self.
Although 26 years elapsed between Antin's first autobiography and what it 
means to be avant-garde, his ideas o f  the self in the eleven books written during those 
years do not change significantly. In all o f  his writings, he portrays the self in terms o f 
family, history, boundaries, and, most emphatically, narrative. As we have seen, the 
form he uses to present these concerns changes radically from the fragmented early texts 
to the fluid talk pieces. Nonetheless, his belief in the se lf remains constant despite 
criticism from deconstruction and structuralist academics. As chaos theory has entered 
academic dialogue, Antin's now 30-year-old ideas about the self reflect the current 
cultural shift in thinking toward our interconnectedness on not only a global, but a 
universal scale.
Talking his way out of explaining: Antin's move to performance as an 
alternative to trying and failing to represent the internal experience
"and like
spiders we poets are all beneficiaries and victims o f our 
language there are limits to what we can do with it as we 
move around in it" (Antin 1994, 164)
Like every autobiographer discussed in this study, Antin is consumed with the idea o f
translating the meaning o f  his internal experience to an external audience. In trying to
convey that experience, we have seen the writers try both to mimic and to explain the
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process o f thinking, the experience o f moving through the mind and acquiring meaning 
for the individual. Time and time again, writers have tried and have to some degree 
failed in frustration. As an alternative to representing the internal experience 
inadequately by attempting to re-create events and describe their effects on or 
significance to the writer, Antin chooses to make the event and the meaning the same by 
moving to talk pieces because he sees talking as the closest he can get to thinking and 
the process of thinking (1993, 123).
Antin's claim o f  talking as thinking makes the talk and, therefore, the thinking, 
the primary experience within a very particular context, i.e., the room where and 
audience to whom he is speaking. Because the event is the creation o f the meaning and 
is unfolding at the very moment that Antin verbalizes his thoughts, there is no need later 
to attempt to translate the internal experience o f that event; the meaning or experience 
is the event right there, almost verbatim in real time with spaces to indicate speech 
pauses, Antin successfully (and ironically) preserves his talks, which he says he never 
works on in advance (1993, 124), in print by tape recording them and then making a 
version in writing. The text is not exactly the same at the talk, as he explains:
o f  course it sometimes changes as it goes onto paper 
because whatever winds up on paper is never exactly like 
whats in the air although what i want to do is bring an 
image o f  talking out o f the air and onto the page to make 
the claim o f speech to make the claim o f thinking within 
the frame o f the book (1993,124).
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Antin's method for showing thinking in the text is not perfect; he is still the beneficiary
and victim o f  language, but he is, like all cutting-edge writers, trying to find a new way
to move within it and spin a new web.
His strong preference for performance over traditional writing, however,
coincides with his disillusionment with structuralists who he sees as externalists
interested more in story as a social production than in narrative. He believes that, in
trying to understand meaning, structuralists produce plots that fail, as he says:
because they begin from texts instead o f tellings and 
even if  they come out o f tellings they come out o f more or 
less ritualized occasions that tend to obliterate the 
narrative centers that arise from human social experience
but stories that arise from ordinary social occasions 
are always narrative because they arise out o f a 
circumstance in which you are talking and trying and 
failing to make some kind o f sense (1993, 110-111).
Antin recognizes that any medium for creating or translating meaning is doomed to
some degree o f failure. However, he does see that starting with the narrative, the talk,
he can create and capture the journey o f the mind, which is necessary for any amount of
knowing or understanding.
Tracking someone's narrative is the only way to come to some understanding of
a self. A complete understanding is never possible, both because all systems o f nature
are incomplete, and because the self is constantly changing shape. Although the self is
never fully recognizable as either the same or complete, a degree o f understanding at a
particular moment in a particular context can be attained by creating the narrative, the
meaning, showing the self at that point. Antin sees this approach in talk as the most
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effective way to use language to convey meaning and create a view o f  the self. In light 
o f  our limited scientific knowledge concerning how the mind works and our different 
physiochemical compositions, his talks, his presentations o f narrative, are the closest a 
reader can come to making the mental journey through its twists and jum ps with the 
autobiographer.
How is the self constructed and where is it located?
Antin's use o f the talk as a frame wherein he can create a shared meaning with the 
audience provides a narrative in progress, and for Antin, narrative, while it is not the 
same thing as the self, is at the core o f the selfs structure (1993, 92). That is, narrative 
defines the shape and composition of the self. This shape, as previously discussed, 
hovers and is constantly changing in response to external stimuli, such as the audience, 
which has the ability to change the direction o f  Antin's talk as he says, "what poem there 
is here will be built around whatever happens" (1976, 214). The audience certainly 
contributes to the shape o f the talk (the narrative), in the same way that all o f  our 
collisions with the environment affect who we are. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that for Antin, in order for a self to endure, it must survive these collisions and 
unions by rebounding and remaining distinct (1993, 98). The self has definite 
boundaries wherein lies its basic essence or composition: when foreign elements are 
introduced, the self either recognizes and assimilates that element as part o f its narrative 
or it does not (it collides and repels), allowing the self to remain distinct. W hether or 
not the self assimilates an experience into its narrative is determined retrospectively 
(1993, 107) when the autobiographer looks, or loops, back on his life to determine
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which elements contribute to the pattern he recognizes as the development o f his self.
In this sense, the self is clearly a construction that can only occur with retrospection 
(which is a feeding back into one's self), making history and memory absolutely 
necessary to the existence o f  any view o f  the self—an idea rejected in postmodern 
thought.
In talking at the boundaries, Antin uses extended mathematical metaphors to
write about the development o f  narrative in the construction o f the self. His metaphors
equate life events to numbers, which are all contained in boxes. Because numbers are
infinite, so, too, are the number o f  events in someone's life depending upon how  one
chooses to measure and look at an event. He can pull from the boxes any possible
order; the numbers do not have to be consecutive. So, although the events are
determined, the combinations and, therefore, forms that emerge are not. The appearance
or shape o f  the self can change, but the basic composition remains unique to that person,
distinct. What is in his boxes is his and no one else's. Furthermore, as he makes
different combinations, he still recognizes himself in those combinations because the
same experiences or prime numbers from formative years will continue to be a part of
higher numbers as he gains experience in life. As Antin explains:
a prime number is a number that is divisible only by 
itself and one thats an irreducible whole and you can 
imagine that beginning a life all events are prime because you 
have no past into which to reconstitute it that is it wouldnt be 
divisible into other recognizable integral factors...
... six? not prime you can remember 
three you have nostalgic memories o f  three and two (1976, 254).
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Using this metaphor, Antin shows how our past and remembering our past contribute to 
our development and how we construct the self. Whatever he associates with his 
number three or five will continue to be a part o f his later events because these numbers 
or experiences are at the core o f  what distinguishes him from someone else who has 
different associations for three and five.
While Antin may have extensive ideas regarding how a se lf is constructed and 
defined, he continues to have questions about where the self may be located or 
grounded. The autobiographers covered in this study have looked inward in the search 
for the locus o f  the self, only to find that it was not possible either to find one, linear, 
distinct self or to determine where the multiple selves could be centered. In response to 
this tendency to continue looking inward, as people commonly say, "Look inside o f 
yourself," Antin asks what does that mean? Are we really looking inside? For him, 
again, talking is the best way to arrive at some notion o f  narrative, meaning, and self.
He writes:
its a funny idea i 
mean the idea that the self is inside is itself a funny notion
whats inside? and inside o f what? i mean im not even inside 
o f myself...
... what do i see as my self? the part 
that comes out? see i cant get out o f saying out (1976, 241).
His mocking o f  his own inability to avoid referring to the self in terms o f  "in" and "out"
of the body does actually make the point that, until there is narrative, an understanding
o f meaning, the self cannot be recognized. Also, a shift away from centuries o f looking
inward to try (and fail) to locate the self is now being pursued in quantum physics and
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chaos theory. So, even though Antin and many theorists are now trying to locate the 
self and consciousness somewhere outside o f the body, this is still an area in need o f 
tremendous study—meaning a very dark place in desperate need o f light.
Is a cohesive, continuous self possible?
When I first began working on this manuscript years ago, a colleague asked me if  I 
believed in the idea o f a continuous selfhood. At the time, I was heavily entrenched in 
postmodem reading and thought that a belief in continuous selfhood certainly was 
outdated in light o f  the fragmented nature o f  our society and the perception o f multiple 
selves that it produced. However, the more I was exposed to ideas and chaos and 
quantum theory and the more I read Antin's work, I began to see that a  cohesive, 
continuous self was, indeed, possible—i.e., as long as cohesion and continuous were not 
necessarily synonymous with linearity.
Antin's talk pieces are fluid narrative that are also filled with pauses as he 
grapples for his thought and with interruptions from the audience. These gaps and 
interruptions, however, are not seen as breaks in the narrative. As pointed out earlier, 
Antin acknowledges the other stimuli in the room and their ability to change the 
direction or shape o f  what is taking place because everything in the room, not just 
Antin, is part o f what will make the poem being created at that moment in that context. 
The gaps and interruptions are not seen as breaks in selfhood but as contributing 
influences to its shape, direction, and development. Even though what we might 
recognize as the se lf does not exist in those gaps or interruptions because they lie 
somewhere outside o f  our familiar conception o f linear development and do not contain
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
239
a part o f  what we view as ours, they still relate to and in some way affect the overall 
development and shape o f the self.
To illustrate how many very different selves can actually possess cohesion and 
be continuous—although not linear—Antin again uses a mathematical metaphor, this 
time comparing the ratio o f  prime numbers to that o f  our various selves. The language 
o f his metaphor bears similarity to ideas that develop more fully in chaos theory 
regarding fractal dimensions as a way to determine the level o f  irregularity o f something 
that does not fit into our straight-forward dimensions o f  zero (a point or set o f points), 
one (a line or curve or edge), two (a wall, tabletop, or piece o f  paper), and three (space) 
(Briggs and Peat 1990, 94). In talking at the boundaries, Antin addresses his 
"confidence in the coherency" (1976, 252) o f  his life, which he sees as connected to a 
past and unfolding in time. A t this point, however, he introduces the idea of different 
kinds o f temporal consistency, which is where he argues that perhaps the self does not 
necessarily unroll like a rug, i.e., linearly, but instead like a sequence o f numbers pulled 
from boxes o f rational, irrational, imaginary, and (on occasion) transcendental numbers. 
This is the point at which he presents his ideas on how the self may be constructed, 
which is discussed in the previous section here. As he moves on to illustrate how the 
self may, in fact, possess a coherency without being linear, he compares prime numbers 
to life experiences, assigning each number to an experience. He uses this comparison as 
a spring board to the more complex concept o f  ratio as a way to understand how two 
very distinct views o f his self can actually be viewed as continuous. He explains that, 
when someone compares two events (prime numbers) in his life, he expresses this
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comparison as a ratio, and with ratios, one number is divided into the other. In other 
words, the memory o f one experience is compared with the other experience, which is 
why the memory o f formative experiences or prime numbers influence later 
experiences; they are factors o f  those larger, later numbers.
Antin informs the audience that after the first two prime numbers—one and two— 
the ratios o f  successive experiences will bounce around but never be as small as one or 
as high as two, and he says, "whatever kind o f oscillation theres going to be in this life 
o f successive primes is going to bounce between two and one and never reach either 
again" (1976, 256). The experiences can approach the original state o f  wholeness or 
irreducibility but never reach it, much like the numerous references in this chapter to 
systems and the se lf approaching, but never reaching, completeness or wholeness. 
Furthermore, he uses the ratio metaphor to show how he could hold in his mind and 
compare two very different versions o f his self—one when he ran a scientific publishing 
company and another when he was adventurous and collecting unemployment 
insurance. He can hold the two in his mind, compare them, and see their relation to 
each other in terms o f how the ratio oscillates between one and two.
This irregular, though not discontinuous, development o f the self as described by 
Antin resembles Briggs and Peats' explanation o f fractal dimensions in chaos theory 
(1990, 95). Fractal dimensions, which always fall between 1 and 2, are used to 
determine the degree or irregularity for things, such as a coastline or a ball o f string, that 
do not fit into our definitions o f  conventional (0, 1 , 2 , 3 )  dimensions. The closer a 
fractal dimension is to one, the smoother its surface is because it is closer to a line; the
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closer it is to two, the more irregular or chaotic it is because tracing its points requires
more twists that produces what looks more like a plane than a line. Briggs and Peat
provide an example involving rice grains to illustrate this concept:
Imagine scattering grains o f rice uniformly across a map. There may be, say,
10,000 grains and this collection could be said to characterize the two 
dimensionality o f  the map. A straight line drawn across the page passes through 
only 200 grains, so only 2 percent o f the grains lie on the line. The vast majority 
lie in other regions o f  the plane. But suppose now the line twists and curves so 
that it passes through more and more grains o f rice, reaching not only the grains 
o f rice but even the individual points in the plane. As more and more o f  these 
points are crossed it becomes clear that the dimension o f the line lies closer to 
that o f a plane (two) than a line (one). In fact, twisting fractal lines have 
dimensions that are fractional, such as 1.2618, 1.1291, 1.3652, and so on. The 
coastline o f Britain has a fractional dimension o f 1.26 (1990, 95).
Like determining the fractal dimension o f rice grains or a coastline or a ball o f  string,
trying to see cohesion in a linearly disjointed self could be said to produce a fractal
dimension closer to two than to one because the self is irregular and chaotic in smaller
scales or increments o f its existence. It is impossible to capture any significant portion
o f a dynamic self-w hich cannot be described in terms o f conventional dim ensions-on a
straight line with the intention o f  determining the cause and effect o f linear,
chronologically arranged events.
Antin's ideas of the self as reflective of cultural shifts in autobiography
Antin's ideas regarding the construction and cohesion o f the self indicate that a fast- 
paced, seemingly disjointed society may actually possess a cohesion and order. In light 
o f developments in technology and science that indicate the mutual influence o f 
apparently remote and disconnected elements, events, cultures, and ideas, the fragments 
o f postmodern culture are now being viewed as interrelated. Antin's use of
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mathematical metaphors to explain the construction o f the self reflects his experience in 
engineering and indicates a general shift in current studies to explore the self and 
consciousness using math and physics. Likewise, his comparison o f prime numbers or 
experiences as a ratio further puts the discussion o f the se lf in the mathematical realm.
In terms o f  autobiography studies, although it intimates that two versions o f the 
self or two autobiographies that may appear very different can, and should, be 
compared. For example, when Antin's first autobiography is compared with his more 
recent books, the books appear to have been written by two different people. However, 
there is a relation between these works, a connection between his early texts and where 
he is now. Antin asserts that "no art that elapses in time can be looked at all at once 
unless it is terribly short" (1976, 187). Likewise, no life or self, which develops in time, 
can be looked at all at once in one book from one perspective o f  writing. His proposal 
that views o f  the se lf be compared and an entire body o f work be evaluated in order to 
see as much o f  that changing, incomplete system known as the self as possible is the 
current trend in academia, which is calling for life studies instead o f autobiography. To 
see how each work fits into the pattern and affects the shape o f the self calls for the 
work to be seen as interconnected (not necessarily a serial cause/effect relationship) and 
contributing to the shape o f the autobiographer.
With a move toward viewing all o f a writer's work in order to grasp some notion 
o f  the self, the question is how to pull all o f those different perspectives together and 
find a locus that can be called the self. This question remains unanswered, but studies 
now are looking toward math and physics to determine where the self and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243
consciousness lie, with the logic that since we are part o f  nature we, too, must be part o f 
a collective, cosmic world. How scholars will continue to investigate this very plausible 
theory is yet to be seen. However, Antin certainly provides support for looking outward 
to determine the ground o f  the self, as he illustrates with a story about a  woman with 
multiple personalities, each o f which is able to form a coherency in relation to its 
memory o f  the psychiatrist treating her (1976, 230). What is interesting here is that 
coherency can only be maintained in relation to something external; the self is not 
centered in any one o f  the woman's personalities but instead hovers somewhere outside 
o f her. Likewise, the various works that cover an autobiographer's life present 
numerous shapes o f  the self as determined by a particular set o f circumstances.
Hovering somewhere outside o f  these works is what is recognizable as the self that 
gives cohesion to and shows a relation between these otherwise discontinuous 
perspectives o f  what is considered the autobiographer's self.
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since the invention o f  autobiography as a literary genre 1600 years ago, writers 
have searched for ways to define the self using memory to represent the internal 
experiences that give meaning to that self. As culture has evolved, so, too, has the role 
o f the individual in society changed. This study has shown that shifts in culture and the 
self both are mutually reflective and are influenced by developments in science and 
technology, art, and literary theory. The self, which as we have seen indicates culture, 
has undergone numerous constructions, ranging from its synonymous identification 
with the Church during antiquity to its current multifacetedness in a secular society.
Beginning with St. Augustine's The Confessions (401), generally recognized as 
the first autobiography, we saw the self as a microcosm o f society, which during 
antiquity in Europe was aligned solely with the Church. The purpose o f  life was to 
proceed along the providential or "correct" path, which began at birth and continued 
straight forward to death, where one would be reunited with God. Because completion 
o f the Christian life included a return to God, memory was vital to fulfilling the purpose 
o f life, for that was how someone recognized God after death. The science o f the time 
was the philosophy that nature, providence, and memory all progressed linearly. As a 
result o f the single purpose and identity in life, the individual in autobiography was 
strictly limited to showing oneself as an example for the rest o f  the Christian 
community. By incorporating the popular form o f the rhetorical argument, which 
unfolds in strict serial fashion and which defers to a higher authority (in this case the
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ultimate authority—God) for validation, Augustine's text reinforces the linear order o f 
providence accepted as the only correct order in his society.
As secularism began to take hold and the Church lost its position as the sole 
institution o f power in society, the individual began to be held accountable primarily to 
society and secondly—if at all—to God. The Confessions o f Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
completed in 1770, show a man distressed over his inability to represent accurately to 
his audience the good man he really is inside. He worries continually that people will 
read his words and misjudge him as a rogue. Attempting to influence his 
readers/judges, he creates a textual audience that sits in Judgement o f him; he reasons 
that if the audience o f the text can see his true nature as good then his actual readers and 
neighbors may be swayed to do the same. Underlying his concern for being 
misinterpreted, however, is his struggle and failure to come to terms with and unite the 
numerous sides o f Jean-Jacques. To his credit, his recognition o f the difficulty in 
reckoning with the multiple views o f the self situates his text as a precursor o f 
modernism, which, among other things, is grounded in this very idea.
As society looked outside o f the Church for answers to life's mysteries, 
developments in science and technology-specifically the introduction o f  invasive 
experimental methodology regarding the study o f the brain and the invention o f the 
telegraph as a communication tool—influenced how one looked at memory and the 
evolution o f the self. Rousseau's society saw memory as necessary in tracking the 
development o f the self. However, the linear movement o f memory and growth o f the 
self that was linked to the belief in providence during antiquity was now attributed to
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the belief that, because we live in time, which is linear, we also develop 
chronologically. Circumscribing one's development, then, in what was considered the 
natural and correct order and presenting it in such a fashion so as to show one's 
achievements and to make one's individual mark in society was the purpose o f 
autobiography. Memory, therefore, was a necessary tool for reconstructing one's life 
from beginning to end on the page and for arriving at a complete, definitive view o f  the 
writer. What Rousseau's text so clearly shows is that these goals are unattainable, not 
through any fault o f  Rousseau, but because they are born out o f  the desire for linear 
order and not out o f the reality that the world is actually highly nonlinear. His text reads 
like a picaresque novel, with adventure after adventure presented chronologically, not 
necessarily focusing on how specific events may have developed or defined the self.
What Rousseau introduced regarding the self in autobiography, Gertrude Stein 
explored in great detail in The Autobiography o f  Alice B. Toklas (1933) and Everybody's 
Autobiography (1937). Taking Rousseau's approach even further, Stein not only delved 
into how the self is constructed through memory, but how one actually remembers the 
self while she is writing. Her writing style in the autobiographies (what literary critics 
have come to call stream-of-consciousness) captures movement—that o f  the mind, the 
self, and society. Moving in jum ps, tangents, and loops as opposed to strict linear 
chronology, her writing attempts to mimic the actual movement o f the mind and 
development o f the self. Her style reflects both work in contemporary science, which 
was performing invasive experiments with electrodes on the brain and which had 
recently derived equations to represent the nonlinear systems in nature, as well as
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advances in technology, which included high-speed transportation and electrical 
communication.
As the speed at which society functioned increased, the self was perceived as 
more multidimensional and decentered than ever, as subsequently represented by the 
work o f  Cubist artists. Stein and other modem  writers aimed to show the mutual 
influence o f changes in cultural truths that challenged traditional hierarchies and views 
o f  the se lf by presenting the numerous perspectives o f the self in a single autobiography 
which—all o f  the pieces together—would construct an amalgamation o f the person. 
Furthermore, the self was defined in relation to a larger portion o f society due to the 
access to the world that technological advances created. Now, the self was not only 
constructed in terms o f  the Church and the immediate community, but with an extended 
community and readership that was reachable by way o f automobile, airplane, or 
telephone. No longer was autobiography intended either to be an example o f  how to 
live correctly or to justify one's actions, but to show oneself in relation to the many 
groups with which one identifies, in the attempt to unite these various sides o f  the self. 
The modernists, as Stein's texts reinforce, were knowingly caught in the middle ground 
between understanding that the world actually possessed a nonlinear order and the 
desire, nonetheless, to represent the self as a once whole entity that was now in pieces 
but which was capable o f being reconstructed following linear, Newtonian principles 
into its original form.
After the modernists were dissatisfied w ith their attempts to recreate the self as a 
whole again in text, the postmodernists embraced the idea that humans are too divided
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by culture ever to become cohesive wholes again. Like previous autobiographies,
David Antin's Autobiography (1967) and "Autobiography 2" (1968) show a collision 
between the internal understanding and external perception o f the self. His work, 
however, is not an expansion o f traditional autobiography; it is a break from 
conventional ideas o f  the genre and o f order in reaction to a completely new culture 
after the modern period. The second half o f the twentieth century ushered in 
technological advances and scientific developments that further changed the speed at 
which society functioned. To meet the needs o f a faster-moving society, information 
was also transmitted faster, producing a barrage o f stimuli that the individual needed to 
process and that postmodern artists and writers represented as fragmentation and collage 
in their work.
Reflecting the increasing complexity and interconnectedness o f  society, Antin's 
early work brings together numerous aspects—such as unidentified voices, clips from 
advertisements, and news items—that had never before been considered appropriate for 
autobiography. As communication technology, such as televisions, satellites, and 
computers, allowed for even greater access to remote parts o f the world, many 
combinations o f influences with which one could identify were possible, making it more 
difficult for individuals to identify and communicate similar experiences with each 
other. Responding to the ironic breakdown in the ability to translate experience while 
communication technology improved, the art community abandoned expressionism and 
adopted mechanical reproductions and geometric forms that emphasized the stark 
contrast in conventional ideas o f order and reality.
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With conventional ideas o f  order, center, and hierarchies dismantled, the notion 
o f an individual possessing the ability or authority to create a view o f the se lf at all was 
questioned by postmodernists. Antin responded to the paradox o f  postmodern 
autobiography by creating a text in which the self hovers outside of the text and is 
hinted at in terms o f how it is defined by surrounding objects—which initially may seem 
similar to what Stein achieves in her autobiographies. However, Antin goes beyond 
Stein to relinquish his control as orchestrator o f the text. His autobiographies shift 
person and voice to reveal shards o f  other people's stories. His emphasis on 
fragmentation and his lack o f an obvious center to his text reflect his postmodern 
culture. His texts emphasize the postmodern constructs o f process over product, the 
absorption o f the individual into society, and the acceptance o f entropy over linear 
conventional order in nature. We see many parts, pieces, fragments, yet they do not add 
up to the whole.
As this study has demonstrated, human nature desires order and is willing to 
consider new ideas o f order when conventional ones no longer work or exist. Karl 
Lashley's 1950s theory o f  memory (Rose 1993) proclaiming that we simultaneously 
process information everywhere and nowhere in the brain is similar to the postmodern 
notion o f a fragmented self which is not centered but is dispersed throughout society. If  
the self can only be defined or constructed through memory, then it seems plausible that 
if  memory is dispersed and not centralized, so, too, is the self. In embracing the idea 
that there was no unified, continuous self, postmodern writers were still searching for an 
understanding o f the self, a way to put one's life in order. This attempt to order one's
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life has corresponded with developments in culture and technology as the various 
periods have shown. Now that technology has allowed us to explore areas in greater 
depth (specifically the advances computers have brought to the fields o f  physics and 
mathematics) researchers interested in memory and the se lf are looking outside o f  the 
human body for answers regarding the self and its location in nature, which is now 
generally accepted as chaotic and nonlinear. M athematician Roger Penrose (1989) 
believes that the answer to understanding the self lies in quantum theory and in locating 
the individual in terms o f  the cosmos. Likewise, the currently popular fields o f  chaos 
theory and neural networks require one to consider the relationship o f individual 
elements to an entire system as the system changes shape, allowing new orders to 
emerge in an overall pattern that may at times appear to be in disorder. While this 
sounds like a return to the past ideas o f Heraclitus, scientists believe that with available 
technology and new understanding o f nature, some principles o f the ancient 
philosophers may once again become viable theory in our culture.
David Antin's later works indicate a cultural shift towards the emergence o f 
chaos theory, a new order or type o f coherency, which is not linear but is, instead, based 
on recursions and fractal geometry in which patterns develop across multiple layers and 
scales o f systems that approach different degrees o f completeness (or what we recognize 
as the system in order) and disorderly order. For patterns to emerge, then, consideration 
o f one's place in history (debunked by postmodernism) is necessary; otherwise, the 
isolated fragments o f  the patterns remain incoherent in relation to each other and the 
system wherein they fall. In order to see how the various perspectives that constitute
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
251
the self fit together and affect the overall shape of the self, memory, history, and 
retrospection are all necessary in order to get a sense o f that self or system changing 
throughout time. Is this self continuous then? Yes. Is it stable or unchanging and, 
therefore, always immediately recognizable? No. As chaos theory and nonlinear 
dynamics support, the self is reflective o f n a tu re -o f which humans are a part; it 
continuously approaches new orders and then quickly turns back into itself and moves 
toward a different version o f order.
Because this understanding o f  the se lf is one that proposes that the self does not 
evolve linearly or ever completely (and, therefore, never definitively), the study o f 
autobiography, to be more accurate, must cease perpetuating the delusion that one te x t-  
regardless o f how many perspectives are included-w ritten at one point in time can 
possibly be considered definitive. The self by nature as an incomplete system defies 
absolute definition. At this point, the best we can hope for is to consider the entire body 
o f work across the life span o f an autobiographer. Across these layers or scales o f the 
writer's life, we can see various stages o f development and versions o f the self 
"hovering" and how these stages and versions relate to one another to change the overall 
shape o f the self, not necessarily the linear concept o f cause and effect, or how one 
station in life led to the next. This shift away from the idea that one complete, definitive 
version o f the self is possible reflects cultural changes supported by developments in 
science and the arts that now allow society to see the world as highly interrelated and 
interdependent both with other societies and the environment.
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With nonlinear systems, such as the self, the parts do not add up to the whole.
As Bart Kosko points out, "You can study arms and legs and other parts and still not 
know how a human behaves" (1993, 108). Likewise, you can see a piece o f someone in 
an autobiography and still not have a complete picture o f who that person is. What you 
see is merely a dot in the larger pattern o f that person's self, and you must see all o f that 
person's work throughout various periods o f  his or her life in order to see how they 
together present an overall shape—which is not to be confused with an overall complete 
or definitive view—o f that person. So, ultimately, perhaps the writing o f an 
autobiography while one is still living and developing perpetuates the misguided notion 
that the true version o f  the self is attainable. Perhaps it is necessary for us to change our 
expectations o f what autobiography can and should aspire to achieve. Instead, the study 
o f  the self may actually be the task o f the outsider who can view the subject as a 
dynamic being possessing unique patterns that emerge and which we can attribute to 
that person only after examining her or his entire life and shape o f  self.
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